"The Battle For Japan, 1944, 1945"

 

From everything that I read about the Japanese Soldier in WWII was that they were fanatical, dedicated, would sacrifice everything for the goals set by their commanders, they were imbued by a form of "bushido" or Martial spirit or the samurai spirit. Please realize that my descriptions are very simple, I could go on for pages if I wanted to do a deep dive.  I respected the Japanese Soldier of WWII for what he could do, I did not admire them  They were often cruel to the people they captured, but that was to me part of the draconian disciplinary system of the Japanese Army, where the lower enlisted were beaten by their NCO's for the smallest infractions, and they were frequently treated with disdain by their officers.  They viewed the west as "weak" especially the United States, the Pacific War was brutal compared to the European war, it matched the savagery of the Eastern front, and in some cases exceeded it because there was no quarters given by either side.  The Americans learned to be very wary of accepting "surrendering" japanese soldiers because it was frequently a ruse to kill more Americans, and if there were any wounded Americans, captured, they were almost always bayoneted by the Japanese. Like I said, very savage. compared to the War in the European Theater.  The Americans had no compunctions of using flame throwers and other weapons on japanese positions during the island hopping campaigns.  It was a very different war.

    I got this off "Quora"

n "Nemesis" The Battle for Japan 1944–45’ by Max Hastings, a British army officer is quoted as making the observation that the Japanese were first class soldiers fighting in a third-rate army.

The soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army were brave, well trained and highly disciplined. They would rather die than surrender and, consequently, fought to the death to avoid the dishonour of being captured. However, technologically the IJA was backward compared to the other key armies of WWII. It lacked a decent tank nor a doctrine of how to use the ones they did have. In open ground warfare where there was space to maneuver the IJA was hopelessly outclassed, as Slim in Burma and the Red Army in Manchuria before and at the end of the war, proved. Moreover, senior IJA leadership were often appallingly incompetent in sending their forces into battle in adverse circumstances and this manifested especially in the manner in which logistical challenges were fatally underestimated, as noted in the question. This stemmed principally from a shocking underestimation of their enemies. It was frequently assumed that the lightly burdened, fast moving Japanese soldiers would overcome their enemies quickly - as they had done in Malaya and early on in Burma- and capture all the supplies they required from their defeated enemies. But by 1943, the offensive weaknesses of the IJA had been more fully recognized, its initial victories notwithstanding. It became clear that whilst the Japanese soldier was a formidable and ferocious enemy when defending in place behind fixed defensive positions, he was much less so out in the open when attacking.

Unfortunately for the Japanese army, in all three battles mentioned (and others besides) its enemies failed to cooperate by collapsing, forcing the Japanese soldiers to retreat with little food and in difficult conditions. The wounded who could not keep up were either killed or left to kill themselves with grenades, hopefully taking a pursuing Allied soldier with them. In Guadalcanal, on the Kokoda Trail and at Imphal/Kohima, the disastrous result of their offensive failures resulted in mass starvation amongst retreating Japanese soldiers as well as death from disease. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers in the Pacific were bypassed and left to rot on scores of islands and atolls as the United States Navy juggernaut continued its inexorable and innovative island-hopping advance towards Japan’s home islands.

A stark example of the hopelessly unrealistic ambitions of senior Japanese commanders, and their inability to comprehend logistical challenges, was the idiotic plan to disrupt British plans to retake Burma by attacking Imphal and Kohima in northeastern India. The brainchild of General Renya Mutaguchi commanding 15th Army, it would compel Japanese forces to traverse some of the wettest and most rugged country in Asia where annual rainfall sometimes reached 800 inches, with only a tenuous logistical lifeline, mounted against an enemy with overall numerical superiority and command of the air. It also came at a time when Japanese fortunes elsewhere had taken a decided turn for the worst. Mutaguchi proved a complete incompetent but his plan was approved in Tokyo after the most cursory examination of its feasibility by higher command, possibly because Burma was considered very much a sideshow.

The result was a battle in which the Japanese soldiers fought for many weeks with their usual ferocity but with decreasing prospects of success. Worst of all the 15th Army’s already weak logistical lifeline was disrupted by Allied air attacks, and they began to starve. After Mutaguchi refused pleas from subordinates to retreat, one divisional commander took it upon himself to order his division to do so. The incompetent army commander finally had no option but to order a general retreat. But by this time the monsoon had set in, tracks and trails had become all but impossible to navigate and thousands of Japanese soldiers died of starvation, disease and/or their wounds. The despised Mutaguchi was eventually fired.

One key consequence of this calamity was that the Japanese forces available to contest Field Marshal Bill Slim’s masterful campaign to retake Burma were greatly weakened , and even their fighting spirit in the later stages of the campaign was significantly diminished.

Logistics undoubtedly proved an Achilles heel for the IJA throughout the war.