"The Battle For Japan, 1944, 1945"

 

From everything that I read about the Japanese Soldier in WWII was that they were fanatical, dedicated, would sacrifice everything for the goals set by their commanders, they were imbued by a form of "bushido" or Martial spirit or the samurai spirit. Please realize that my descriptions are very simple, I could go on for pages if I wanted to do a deep dive.  I respected the Japanese Soldier of WWII for what he could do, I did not admire them  They were often cruel to the people they captured, but that was to me part of the draconian disciplinary system of the Japanese Army, where the lower enlisted were beaten by their NCO's for the smallest infractions, and they were frequently treated with disdain by their officers.  They viewed the west as "weak" especially the United States, the Pacific War was brutal compared to the European war, it matched the savagery of the Eastern front, and in some cases exceeded it because there was no quarters given by either side.  The Americans learned to be very wary of accepting "surrendering" japanese soldiers because it was frequently a ruse to kill more Americans, and if there were any wounded Americans, captured, they were almost always bayoneted by the Japanese. Like I said, very savage. compared to the War in the European Theater.  The Americans had no compunctions of using flame throwers and other weapons on japanese positions during the island hopping campaigns.  It was a very different war.

    I got this off "Quora"

n "Nemesis" The Battle for Japan 1944–45’ by Max Hastings, a British army officer is quoted as making the observation that the Japanese were first class soldiers fighting in a third-rate army.

The soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army were brave, well trained and highly disciplined. They would rather die than surrender and, consequently, fought to the death to avoid the dishonour of being captured. However, technologically the IJA was backward compared to the other key armies of WWII. It lacked a decent tank nor a doctrine of how to use the ones they did have. In open ground warfare where there was space to maneuver the IJA was hopelessly outclassed, as Slim in Burma and the Red Army in Manchuria before and at the end of the war, proved. Moreover, senior IJA leadership were often appallingly incompetent in sending their forces into battle in adverse circumstances and this manifested especially in the manner in which logistical challenges were fatally underestimated, as noted in the question. This stemmed principally from a shocking underestimation of their enemies. It was frequently assumed that the lightly burdened, fast moving Japanese soldiers would overcome their enemies quickly - as they had done in Malaya and early on in Burma- and capture all the supplies they required from their defeated enemies. But by 1943, the offensive weaknesses of the IJA had been more fully recognized, its initial victories notwithstanding. It became clear that whilst the Japanese soldier was a formidable and ferocious enemy when defending in place behind fixed defensive positions, he was much less so out in the open when attacking.

Unfortunately for the Japanese army, in all three battles mentioned (and others besides) its enemies failed to cooperate by collapsing, forcing the Japanese soldiers to retreat with little food and in difficult conditions. The wounded who could not keep up were either killed or left to kill themselves with grenades, hopefully taking a pursuing Allied soldier with them. In Guadalcanal, on the Kokoda Trail and at Imphal/Kohima, the disastrous result of their offensive failures resulted in mass starvation amongst retreating Japanese soldiers as well as death from disease. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers in the Pacific were bypassed and left to rot on scores of islands and atolls as the United States Navy juggernaut continued its inexorable and innovative island-hopping advance towards Japan’s home islands.

A stark example of the hopelessly unrealistic ambitions of senior Japanese commanders, and their inability to comprehend logistical challenges, was the idiotic plan to disrupt British plans to retake Burma by attacking Imphal and Kohima in northeastern India. The brainchild of General Renya Mutaguchi commanding 15th Army, it would compel Japanese forces to traverse some of the wettest and most rugged country in Asia where annual rainfall sometimes reached 800 inches, with only a tenuous logistical lifeline, mounted against an enemy with overall numerical superiority and command of the air. It also came at a time when Japanese fortunes elsewhere had taken a decided turn for the worst. Mutaguchi proved a complete incompetent but his plan was approved in Tokyo after the most cursory examination of its feasibility by higher command, possibly because Burma was considered very much a sideshow.

The result was a battle in which the Japanese soldiers fought for many weeks with their usual ferocity but with decreasing prospects of success. Worst of all the 15th Army’s already weak logistical lifeline was disrupted by Allied air attacks, and they began to starve. After Mutaguchi refused pleas from subordinates to retreat, one divisional commander took it upon himself to order his division to do so. The incompetent army commander finally had no option but to order a general retreat. But by this time the monsoon had set in, tracks and trails had become all but impossible to navigate and thousands of Japanese soldiers died of starvation, disease and/or their wounds. The despised Mutaguchi was eventually fired.

One key consequence of this calamity was that the Japanese forces available to contest Field Marshal Bill Slim’s masterful campaign to retake Burma were greatly weakened , and even their fighting spirit in the later stages of the campaign was significantly diminished.

Logistics undoubtedly proved an Achilles heel for the IJA throughout the war.

"Japanese Last Ditch Small Arms of WWII"

 Everyone knew about the German "Volksturm" with this picture being Iconic for the group.

   Well the Japanese had the same kinda thing, and most people didn't know about it.  I remember seeing pictures in my WWII books of Japanese soldiers teaching Japanese civilians how to use bamboo spears to attack the American soldiers after they set foot on the homeland.  I also know after a few incidents of this plus of the bloodbath of Okinawa, we would have had to eradicate the Japanese as a people and a culture to beat them. and anything less than an unconditional surrender would mean fighting the japanese in 20 years after they rearmed and got smarter and we had demobilized as we tend to do after a major conflict.  Hitler Germany taught that little lesson.  So when I hear about the revisionist talk about that we should have not used the A-bomb on the Japanese I know that they don't really know history and that they are apologist for the Soviet Union Er the Marxist movement.

   I shamelessly clipped this from "American Rifleman"

Japanese women were expected to be combatants in the Volunteer Fighting Corps. These ladies train with a Nambu Type 11 light machine gun (6.5x50 mm Arisaka). It is highly unlikely that even an old Type 11 LMG would have been available to the Japanese militia.

Photo courtesy of author’s collection.

“The bulwark of this Volkssturm in Japan proper is the Second National Army, which in peacetime consists of a large group of untrained males of military age. With the small amount of training now being given this group and with the formal registering on its rolls of all 17- and-18-year-olds since November 1944, the use of civilians in the defense of the Japanese homeland begins to assume increasing military importance.”

—Secret U.S. Military Intelligence document from the Pacific Theater of Operations, March 1945

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While the Allied concept of “unconditional surrender” of Axis forces in Europe was sound, the prospects of a national Japanese surrender seemed unlikely. Before anyone knew anything about the war-ending potential of the atomic bomb, American military planners had to prepare to overcome a fanatical defense of the Japanese home islands—a battle during which the Japanese military appeared ready to sacrifice their entire population to protect their homeland.

As firearms became more and more scarce, the Japanese turned to the most basic weapons: spears were constructed using standard rifle bayonets or simply a sharpened metal rod. American troops first encountered these on Saipan and sometimes referred to them as “Banzai Sticks.” Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

But while the Japanese spirit was willing, their physical resources were growing weak. The emperor’s forces struggled to provide enough firearms and ammunition to their combat troops. To train and supply a large civilian militia with effective modern small arms would require extreme ingenuity to match the traditional Japanese willingness to sacrifice. Consequently, the Japanese would develop some of the crudest firearms of World War II.

Setting The Stage For Operation Downfall
Allied leaders concluded that they could not wait for a blockade and intensive bombings to bring about a Japanese surrender—a massive invasion of the home islands was necessary. Meanwhile, a timeline was set for the defeat of Japan within one year of the surrender of Germany. The larger plan, dubbed “Operation Downfall,” was divided into two parts: Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet.

Olympic was to be the invasion of Kyūshū, scheduled for Nov. 1, 1945. Coronet was the second phase, with a massive force planned to invade Honshu in March 1946. All the main preparations were made without any knowledge of atomic bombs, and until the successful A-bomb test (July 16, 1945), it would have been folly to plan for the intervention of any secret weapon. A massive amount of brute force was the Allied recipe for success.

Marines pose with Japanese Type 22 Murata rifles (11 mm) captured on Okinawa. These obsolete rifles were issued to the Japanese Volunteer Fighting Corps. The Type 22 entered service in 1889 and was the first Japanese military rifle to use smokeless powder. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

As American forces progressed in the island-hopping campaign, reaching islands closer to Japan proper, they encountered more Japanese civilians in the combat zone. These encounters provided a clearer picture of what Allied forces could expect when they invaded the Japanese home islands. American intelligence began to understand the scope of the Japanese militia, and the militarists plans for "The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million."

The Japanese Type 2 submachine gun (8x22 mm Nambu) is blowback-operated and fires from an open bolt. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

In a March 28, 1945, Military Research bulletin, American intel resources reported on the “employment of Japanese civilians in local defense:”

“It has long been the policy of the Japanese Army, even in peacetime, to keep close check upon all Japanese males of military age, not only as to whereabouts and amount of military training received but also as to education and occupational skills. This policy has been facilitated by assigning every fit male to a reserve component of the Army at the time of his conscription examination. In peacetime, those picked for conscript training, released after two years of active service, became members of the First Reserve. Those picked for a short term of replacement training formed the Conscript Reserve.

Both trained groups automatically entered the First National Army on reaching the age of 37. All other males 17-40 (now 17-44) who were not declared "unfit" became members of the Second National Army, a large body of untrained militia subject to call in emergency.

Japan has declared her intention to employ this reservoir of civilian manpower in local defense of the homeland and overseas areas, While It is true that Japanese civilians have not been used too effectively in the areas already attacked (see Bulletin 10), the following factors indicate that the employment of this Japanese "people’s army" will become more important as the war nears Japan Proper:

1. 1. Greater numbers of Japanese nationals will be encountered
   2. The Army has had greater experience in handling civilians
   3. The individual's determination to fight will increase as the threat to the homeland becomes more imminent

The available numbers, the past employment, and preparations made by the Japanese for the use of these civilian fighters, and the general methods of employment are discussed below.

It must be remembered that the Japanese Army will also continue to use natives as far as possible for military labor and as auxiliary forces, but this study is concerned only with the less variable use of Japanese nationals residing in operational areas.”

A Japanese (Navy) Type 97 aircraft machine gun adapted for ground use. This gun was a licensed copy of the British Vickers Type E machine gun and was chambered in .303 British. Note the extremely crude front sight, tripod and wire spade grips. The cyclic rate was up to 900 rounds per minute. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

The report concluded that 17,450,000 men aged 15-59 were available as militia troops in the Japanese home islands.

“The proportion of the above numbers actually available as effective fighting men will be limited by several factors, including local administrative problems and the ability of the Japanese to arm and equip the personnel present in areas under attack.”

The Japanese Type 100/44 submachine gun (8x22 mm Nambu). Japan showed little interest in submachine guns during the 1930s, and few of the original Type 100 were available in the early war years.

Relaxed Japanese Manufacturing Standards
U.S. troops in the field captured various new and modified Japanese wfirearms. Of particular interest were the modifications to the Japanese Model 99 (1939) Pattern 7.7 mm Rifle. These were detailed in an Ordnance intelligence report, produced in late 1944:

“A Japanese 7.7mm rifle of the Model 99 (1939) pattern, recovered in the Ormoc area, is of extreme interest as it Indicates a possible relaxation in the standard of manufacture. The points of variance between this and other rifles of the same model previously recovered are as follows: 

1. 1. The wire monopod has been omitted.
   2. The anti-aircraft lead arms on the back sight have been removed.  Also, instead of the sight being machined in one piece, the sight base is now welded to the mount. 
   3. The bolt knob is smaller and cylindrical in shape, instead of the usual oval ball. 
   4. The safety knob is no longer knurled on its rear face, but is left square, just as it was when it was cut off the lathe.
   5. The wooden stock is much inferior in quality to that usually fitted. 

According to a recently captured document, Japanese ordnance chiefs have expressed grave concern at the lack of essential ordnance supplies. With a view to remedying this condition, it was decided that the manufacture of certain items was to cease, while others were to be modified so that an intensified effort could be made to speed up production.” 

The Type 100/44 represented a simpler, easier to build variant of Japan’s primary homegrown submachine gun. Weight was 9 lbs., 11 ozs. (loaded). Ammunition feed was via a 30-round box magazine, with an 800-round-per-minute cyclic rate. About 9,000 of the Type 100/44 SMGs were made. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

The Type 99 7.7 mm Substitute Rifle
In 1943, the Japanese decided to simplify the standard Type 99 rifle and make a “substitute standard” small arm. These modifications included eliminating the sling, cleaning bar and bolt cover, while substituting inferior steel for parts like the bolt and barrel. The simplification eliminated the chromium plate in the barrel, used an inferior grade of wood for the stock, and revised the sight to a range of only 300 meters. This was called a Substitute Type 99 Rifle.

 

The Japanese Type 99 rifle (7.7x58 mm Arisaka). In the late-war period, Type 99 rifles were often found with particularly crude, short-cut finishing. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Japanese rifle collectors have uncovered a tremendous amount of information about the nuances of late-war Japanese arms production. Type 99 rifle collectors have described wide variations in the “Substitute Rifle,” including no serial or series number, unnumbered parts, mismatched parts, front sights missing guards, rear sights missing wings, alternate shapes to the bolt handle and varying types of butt plates.

The Type 2 submachine gun weighed about 9¾ lbs., loaded, and used 30- or (rarely) 50-round magazines. The cyclic rate was 600 rounds per minute. Fewer than 200 are thought to have been made. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

During April 1945, Japan made a significant change in its civil defense forces, designating them as civilian militia, and by June, conscription laws had been enacted even while the militia was renamed the Volunteer Fighting Corps (Kokumin Giyū Sentōtai). By the end of June, more than 25 million Japanese men were deemed “combat capable” by their hopeful government, but very few of them could be equipped with firearms of any kind. The Volunteer Fighting Corps did not see action during the war, but an early precursor, the local home guard on Okinawa, was equipped with obsolete rifles, most notably the Type 22 Murata rifles (11 mm). In the home islands, all that was available in the short term were spears, swords, axes, clubs and crossbows. Hand grenades were the most plentiful of modern weapons.

The Japanese "Simple Rifle:" Crude Weapons For The Massed Militia
Preparing for the invasion they knew would come, the Japanese embarked on a quick program of simple weapons development to equip their mostly untrained militia. The resulting firearms are some of the rarest guns of the entire war. The following descriptions (and photos) come from a series of U.S. Ordnance Technical Intelligence reports compiled during the first few months of 1946.

Simple 7.7 mm & 8 mm Rifles
A very simple rifle that would fire the standard 7.7 mm ammunition was attempted. The length of the barrel was 50 cm, and it was so simple in construction that it, as well as the other parts, could be made on an ordinary lathe. It was a bolt-action, single-shot piece that was intended to equip front-line defense troops in an invasion. However, as the ammunition proved too powerful, it was decided to make the rifle shorter and to use standard 8 mm 14th Year Type pistol ammunition, which proved much more satisfactory.

The original Japanese Simple Rifle: chambered for use with standard 7.7 mm rifle ammunition, the cartridge proved far too powerful for the weapon. The barrel was about 50 cm long. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

The second generation of Japanese Simple Rifles were even more crude—however, as they were chambered for the standard 8 mm pistol ammunition, these single-shot firearms were acceptable for use with the civilian militia. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

National Rifle & Pistol For Civilian Defense
This rifle was developed for the purpose of equipping volunteer defense troops and was a type that could be made by any small factory or smithy shop. The construction was simple as an ordinary piece of pipe (13 mm diameter) formed the barrel. It was loaded with 3 to 5 grams of blackpowder, and the projectile was made from ordinary bar stock cut in sections about 15 mm in length. It was fired by the hammer striking a primer-igniter cap that was placed over a small flash hole on top of the barrel. A pistol version of this firearm was also produced.

The Japanese National Rifle for Civilian Defense—a simple blackpowder weapon with a smoothbore barrel made from pipe. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

The Japanese National Pistol for Civilian Defense—a crude blackpowder weapon that fired a 13 mm ball. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Type 5 Semi-Automatic Rifle (Garand copy)
The need for a semi-automatic rifle for the Japanese army was recognized in 1922, but the development of such a firearm was not begun until 1931 when several models were made; all proved unsatisfactory. This study lasted until 1937, at which time research was temporarily discontinued.

In March 1941, the inquiry was again started because of the progress on semi-automatic rifles in foreign countries. At this time, the 1st Section and the Kokura Army Arsenal designed several types of recoil and gas-operated rifles. The results of tests showed that none of the models were entirely satisfactory in operation, and because of the unforeseen difficulty in manufacturing such a rifle, research was again stopped.

About March 1944, there was a strong demand to develop a semi-automatic rifle, especially from the paratroop command. At that time, the Navy introduced a semi-automatic rifle copied from the U.S. M1 (Garand) Rifle that used the standard Japanese 7.7 mm ammunition. In April 1945, models were finished and tested. Although the test results were not entirely satisfactory due to breakage of parts, loading and feeding difficulties, they were considered good enough to adopt the gun. The rifle was standardized as the Type 5.

The Type 5 semi-automatic rifle. Weight was a little over 9 lbs., and length was 42.2".

The Type 5 (sometimes called the Type 4) semi-automatic rifle (7.7x58 mm Arisaka). It is estimated that about 125 of these “Japanese Garands” were completed at the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal in late 1944/early 1945. Few surviving examples exist today. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

World War II finally ended after the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9). While the casualties from the two nuclear blasts were horrific, they pale in comparison to projected number of deaths if dozens of Allied infantry divisions assaulted Japan and Japanese militarist plans to sacrifice the entirety of their population to stop them came to fruition. Armed with bamboo spears and an odd assortment of crude firearms, the Japanese Volunteer Fighting Corps would have inflicted their share of casualties on the invaders, but the utter and tragic destruction of Japan and its people would certainly have followed.

WWII and the Japanese Kamakaze movement

 

The nation of Japan was helpless before the invading force. They were outnumbered, and the enemy was about to land on the shores of the Imperial Home Islands. There was nothing left but to fight to the death against the savage invaders. But then, suddenly and without warning, a great wind came and destroyed the enemy fleet. The enemy, Mongols under Kublai Khan, had been destroyed by a sudden typhoon, a “Divine Wind” or “Kamikaze,” as it came to be known in Japanese history. In the year 1281, Japan had been saved by this help from above.

Nearly 700 years later, in 1944, the same situation faced Japan. It was not Mongols this time, but an enormous military force led by the United States that was threatening to invade Japan. The Western Allies had begun their inexorable advance against Japan three years earlier at New Guinea and Guadalcanal, and they were now more than halfway across the vast Pacific, aiming directly for Japan itself. In desperation, some Japanese leaders looked to another “Divine Wind” again to save them. This time, the Kamikaze would not be a typhoon, but swarms of suicide planes that were to be unleashed at the advancing allies.

A kamikaze pilot salutes as he receives his orders for a “divine wind” mission. It is estimated that over 

1,200 pilots (out of 2,314) lost their lives on such missions.

The concept of individual suicide was accepted within Japanese society, particularly among those descended from the warrior, or Samurai, class. Suicide was generally accepted as the way to atone for failure, and ritual suicide, also known as seppuku and harakiri, was common among the military of Japan. It would appear repeatedly during the Pacific war, beginning at Guadalcanal and lasting to, and even after, Japan’s surrender.

But mass suicide was something else. Throughout the war, individual Japanese, particularly pilots whose planes were too badly damaged to return to base and being culturally unable to accept a surrender to the enemy, would fly their damaged aircraft into some enemy target, be it a ship or a ground target. These men were presumed to have been granted a direct passage to an honored place in heaven for their actions.

 

Suicide as a doctrinal military tactic, however, did not enter Japanese military policy until October 1944. By then, the Americans were invading the Philippines and the Palau Islands, threatening to cut off Japanese lines of supply from the Far East. Without those supplies, Japan could not sustain its war effort much longer. All attempts to stop the American advance had so far failed, and, as in 1281, Japan was growing increasingly desperate. Once again, the accepted solution was the Kamikaze.

The origins of the modern Kamikaze are traced to Luzon, in the Philippines, in October 1944. The Americans were about to invade those islands, and the Japanese were preparing to meet that invasion. Captain Rikihei Inoguchi of the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Forces was at Clark Field discussing attack plans against the approaching American invasion force. As a senior staff officer of the 1st Air Fleet, he had been assigned the job of organizing the air defenses of the Philippines.

While speaking with Commander Asaichi Tamai, commanding the 201st Air Group, he was joined suddenly by Vice Adm. Takijiro Ohnishi, the recently appointed commander of Japanese Naval Air Forces in the Philippines. Joined by some squadron leaders, the group sat down to listen to Admiral Ohnishi’s instructions.

Admiral Ohnishi was himself a pilot and a long-time advocate of naval aviation in Japan. He had helped plan the Pearl Harbor attack and had been a protégé of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. As a staff officer, Ohnishi had long been involved in discussions in Tokyo over the use of suicide operations, arguing against them. But the continued defeats in the Pacific and the loss of vital resource territory seemed to have changed his opinion by the time he was appointed to command the 1st Air Fleet in the Philippines.

Admiral Ohnishi began by stating the obvious: Japan’s situation was critical. He then explained that the Imperial Japanese Navy was about to launch an all-out attack on the American fleet off Leyte. But the Japanese fleet had no air cover of its own; the 1st Air Fleet on Luzon would have to provide that air cover. He had orders to protect the fleet for at least one week, keeping the American aircraft carriers from launching strikes that would cripple or destroy the oncoming Japanese fleet.

The problem was that the 1st Air Fleet had only 30 serviceable aircraft on Luzon. How could such a small force hold back the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of American planes coming to Leyte Gulf?

Admiral Ohnishi presented his solution. He told the assembled pilots and staff officers, “In my opinion, there is only one way of assuring that our meager strength will be effective to a maximum degree. That is to organize suicide attack units composed of Zero fighters armed with 250-kilogram bombs, with each plane to crash-dive into an enemy carrier…What do you think?”

Despite a broken elevator and wings riddled with bullet holes, a Mitsubishi A6M “Zeke” Kamikaze plane makes its death plunge toward the carrier USS Essex off Okinawa, May 14, 1945. Japan’s efforts to cripple the American invasion of Okinawa brought about the mass employment of suicide missions.

Silence initially replied to the admiral’s proposal. Captain Inoguchi remembered, “No one spoke for a time, but Admiral Ohnishi’s words struck a spark in each of us. Indeed, ‘body-crashing’ (taiatari) tactics had already been used by Navy pilots in air-to-air combat against big enemy bombers, and there were many fliers in the combat air units who had urged that the same tactics be employed against enemy carriers.”

The group then discussed whether a fighter plane armed with a 250-kilogram bomb would be enough to disable or even sink an American aircraft carrier. They acknowledged that accuracy would be greater with a pilot guiding the weapon, including his own plane, to the target. Commander Tamai, the senior flying officer present, agreed that the plane and bomb together would be enough to at least disable any American aircraft carrier it hit.

Commander Tamai then held a meeting with his pilots, and came back to say, “The 201st Air Group will carry out his proposal. May I ask that you leave to us the organization of our crash-dive unit?” The Japanese Kamikaze program of 1944 had begun.

Commander Tamai assembled his enlisted pilots and explained the new proposal to them. Every one of the 23 pilots joyfully agreed to participate in the Kamikaze program. Returning to his staff, Commander Tanai and Captain Inoguchi discussed how best to organize the unit. They wanted an officer, preferably a graduate of the Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima, to lead the first attack.

After some discussion, Lieutenant Yukio Seki was selected as the attack leader. When approached by Inoguchi and Tamai, Lieutenant Seki responded, “You absolutely must let me do it.”

Discussions followed regarding the force’s organization. A name was suggested, and soon the new unit was called Shimpu, another Japanese word for Kamikaze. Admiral Ohnishi approved the plans, organization, and men for the new unit.

On the morning of October 20, 1944, the Shimpu attack group ate breakfast and then assembled for their final instructions. Admiral Ohnishi gave them a speech encouraging them to succeed, and the 24 pilots were prepared to go. But that was easier said than done.

Admiral Takijiro Ohnishi (right), commander of the Kamikaze Special Attack Force, dispenses ceremonial cups of sake to suicide pilots about to take off.

The initial missions had to be aborted: mechanical failure grounded aircraft, enemy combat air patrols kept the Japanese grounded, and bad weather prevented takeoff. It wasn’t until the morning of October 25 that Lieutenant Seki and his group finally launched their mission.

The Shimpu encountered a support carrier group known to the Americans as “Taffy 3.” These Americans had already been attacked by Imperial Japanese Navy surface forces days earlier in Leyte Gulf. Now, one of the Shimpu group dove out of the sky at the escort aircraft carrier USS Kitkun Bay (CVE-71).

Sailor Ron Vaughn, an 18-year-old lookout on Kitkun Bay, spotted the plane as it climbed, rolled, and plunged down on his ship, aiming for its flight deck. The ship’s antiaircraft guns opened fire and damaged the plane as it dove. One round crumpled the tail section, causing it to veer off course. But the plane hit the water close aboard, damaging the ship and causing scores of casualties.

Another Shimpu pilot dove on the USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68) and hit the deck of the carrier; two others were driven off by the antiaircraft fire.

American fighter pilots immediately raced to the scene to defend their home carriers. Despite their efforts, three more Shimpu planes attacked the escort carrier USS St. Lo (CVE-63) from above; the first Japanese plane was shot down by fire from the St. Lo.

The second suffered the same fate, but this aircraft drew the American’s attention away from the third aircraft, which was following the ship and simply pulled up, nosed over, and crashed into the vessel. Witnesses remembered that the plane sliced through the flight deck, igniting fuel and ammunition in the hanger area below that deck. One sailor insisted that he saw a bomb drop from the aircraft an instant before the plane crashed into the ship.

The impact doomed the St. Lo. Explosions rocked the ship from bow to stern. Damage-control sailors raced around to save their ship, but it was no use. Thirty minutes after she was hit, the St. Lo sank. With her went 140 American sailors. She was the first “official” kill of the Kamikaze attack force.

                                                                                               

Admiral Ohnishi committed    suicide after Japan’s surrender.

Meanwhile, the Kalinin Bay was hit again and severely damaged; the USS White Plains (CVE-66) and USS Kitkun Bay were both narrowly missed. Although all these three ships were damaged, casualties remained few.

Ashore, the Japanese awaited the results of the first Kamikaze attack. Commander Tadashi Nakajima was at his base on Cebu Island when three Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter planes landed there. Out of the first to land came Chief Warrant Officer Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, who ran up to Commander Nakajima and made his report: Of the five Kamikazes and four escorts, he reported, Lieutenant Seki had hit a carrier, and a second Kamikaze hit the same ship, which soon sank. The third Kamikaze struck another carrier, setting it afire. The fourth plane crashed into a light cruiser which “sank instantly.” The fifth Kamikaze disappeared. Three of the four escorts managed to return to Cebu.

The report was a fiction. In fact, only the USS St. Lo was sunk, with the Kitkun Bay and White Plains damaged. No light cruiser was struck on October 25. This report, inaccurate as it was, was forwarded to Tokyo, which accepted it at face value and broadcast it to the Japanese nation as a great victory by the newly established Kamikaze Corps.

Believing a great success had been achieved from a small group of aircraft, the Kamikaze program continued on October 26. For the expenditure of five Kamikazes and two escorts, the light carrier USS Suwannee (CVE-27) was slightly damaged. Earlier, the USS Santee (CVE-29) had been damaged by a Kamikaze that approached so swiftly that no guns had been able to fire before it slammed into the ship.

By now, the standard operating procedure for the launching of Kamikazes had been established. First, they would await a report from a search plane that would locate, identify, and report on an American carrier group. Often, these reports were inaccurate, and a mission would have to be aborted when no ships were found by the Kamikaze pilots. Each Kamikaze flight had at least two escorting fighters to assist them in getting past the American combat air patrols that protected the American carrier battle groups.

Weather was, of course, always a factor. How many Kamikazes were assigned to any one mission depended upon the conditions reported by the scouts. Approaching their targets, the Kamikazes would increase their speed to make their approaches while the escorting fighters protected them from the combat air patrol. The signal, “All Planes Attack!” was given by the flight leader’s raised arm, and each pilot picked his own target, then plunged down toward it.

The deeds of the “Kamikaze Special Attack Corps,” one of the names for the new Kamikaze force, had by now reached Tokyo. Emperor Hirohito had responded to this new tactic with a message to his naval aviators through Admiral Ohnishi. The message read, “Was it necessary to go to this extreme? They certainly did a magnificent job.”

Crewmen aboard the carrier USS Belleau Wood off the Philippines pour water on aircraft and burning flight deck after a Kamikaze strike, October 30, 1944. The carrier USS Franklin, also hit by a suicide plane, burns in the distance.

Captain Inoguchi, who was with Admiral Ohnishi in Manila, felt that the first sentence of the Emperor’s words were something of a criticism of Ohnishi’s new project, and Ohnishi appeared quite upset upon reading this message. But he remained determined to gain the Emperor’s favor by increasing his success.

Kamikaze strikes continued against American ships throughout the Philippine Campaign, including the invasion of Luzon and the clearing of the southern Philippines.

Meanwhile, the idea spread throughout the Imperial Japanese Navy and was taken up by the Imperial Japanese Army, as well. One of the chief reasons for this was the lack of skilled pilots. At the outbreak of the war, Japanese pilots had been the best of the best. But over the three years that the war had thus far progressed, attrition had whittled down those expert pilots to a precious few, many of whom where now busy training their replacements.

But the training of new pilots took time and fuel, neither of which the Japanese had in abundance. A Kamikaze pilot, though, did not need the in-depth training that a pre-war fighter pilot needed. He only needed to be able to take off, fly a distance, and crash into an enemy ship. Even formation flying was optional, although helpful.

As one historian has written, “Loss of aircraft and veteran pilots and shortages of fuel led to a reliance on suicidal Kamikaze units by 1944, made up of largely green, ill-trained aviators and a mélange of planes.”

The Kamikaze idea had by now spread far and wide among the Japanese military. Soon Kamikaze Corps were being established in Japan itself. Those forward bases under attack by the advancing Americans were often provided with some “Special Attack Units.” Soon this title was expanded to other suicidal methods of defeating the enemy.

One such method was known as the “Kaiten”—a manned suicide torpedo that was intended to sneak into American-held harbors and sink enemy ships at anchor. Then came the “Ohka” (Cherry Blossom)—a human-piloted bomb released from a carrying aircraft over the target and flown into that target by the pilot.

The first major warship sunk by the Kamikazes was the carrier USS St. Lo, which was hit off Samar in Leyte Gulf, October 25, 1944. One hundred forty Americans died.

There were also suicide explosive speedboats (“Shin’yo” or Sea Quake)—small plywood craft filled with explosives and driven by a crew of one or two into enemy ships as they approached the shore of a Japanese base. Hundreds of these were later captured unused in the Philippines and Okinawa.

At the war’s end, near Okinawa, even the Imperial Japanese Navy’s super-battleship, the IJN Yamato, was turned into a form of Kamikaze. (See WWII Quarterly, Spring 2020.) But none of these other efforts achieved either the fame or the success of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s “Kamikaze Special Attack Corps.”

Some ships just seemed to draw the attention of the Kamikazes. One such ship was the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia. Perhaps because her appearance different from that of American ships, she was hit repeatedly, although her near-identical sister ship, HMAS Shropshire, who often sailed alongside her, was never hit. Some called her “the Kamikaze Magnet.”

HMAS Australia had been in the war since the early days of 1939 and had earned herself an enviable battle record. But she just couldn’t seem to shake the Kamikazes. She was first targeted in Leyte Gulf on October 21, 1944, leading some Australians to claim that she was the first victim of the Kamikazes, and not the USS St. Lo.

That day, the attacking aircraft was seen to be hit by antiaircraft fire and almost crashed into the water. But the plane recovered, and despite further heavy antiaircraft fire, punched into the port side of the heavy cruiser. This sounds more like a “body-crashing” (Taiatari) tactic than a Kamikaze attack, but the strike cost the ship her captain, Captain Emile F. V. Dechaineux, along with five officers and 23 enlisted sailors. Scores of others were wounded.

The ship returned to the war after repairs in November, well after the Kamikaze had begun in earnest. In early January 1945, the HMAS Australia was attacked no less than five times by Kamikazes. On January 5, she was struck by a Zero, which hit her amidships; 25 men on the gun crews died and another 30 were wounded. Damage was slight, and she remained on station with a gunfire support group off Leyte.

The next day she was hit again, at the middle smokestack on the starboard side, killing 14 and wounding 26. Damage was minimal, and she remained on station. January 7 was a quiet day, but January 8 was not.

A solemn Kamikaze pilot has his hachimaki headband, symbolizing manly courage, attached by a smiling comrade. Ancient Samuri warriors wore a folded white cloth when going into battle to keep their long hair and sweat out of their eyes.

A Japanese bomber came in, chased by four fighters of the combat air patrol. The enemy went down barely 20 meters off the HMAS Australia’s port side. It skidded into the cruiser’s hull, but caused no damage or casualties. Less than 20 minutes later, another Japanese bomber appeared and repeated the same events. But this time, the bomb that the plane was carrying went off and ripped a large hole in the cruiser’s port side, flooding two compartments. Once again, there were no casualties. Asked if he wanted to withdraw for repairs, Captain J.M. Armstrong refused and remained on station.

By January 9, the Sixth U S. Army was wading ashore on the main Philippine Island of Luzon, and HMAS Australia was offshore in support. Eight Kamikazes came in searching for the invasion fleet, and two headed for the Australia. One of these hit the USS Mississippi (BB-41) and the other hit the Australia at her foremast, crushing her forward smokestack and rendering the forward fire room inoperable. With a hole in her side, her forward fire room out of action, and her speed reduced, the Australia had had enough. This time she accepted the offer to retire for repairs, once again with no additional casualties.

Kamikazes appeared in almost every battle after Leyte. But by far their most successful and deadly campaign came against the American invasion of Okinawa. Here, Marines and the soldiers of the Tenth U. S. Army faced a determined defense, one of whose primary objectives was to draw the American fleet into a position that would make it vulnerable for attacks from nearby Japan.

One of the negative by-products of rushing pilots through an abbreviated training program to qualify them as Kamikazes was that they had poor ship identification skills. This error was felt most by the “small boys”—the auxiliary ships that often accompanied the major fleet units to supply, fuel, and otherwise provide succor to them when needed.

These included some described by their titles, including LCS(L)3, or Landing Craft Support (Large) Mark 3. Developed from the original Landing Craft Infantry, or LCI, some had been modified with rockets, machine guns, 20mm and 40mm guns, and other assorted armament which, to the untrained Japanese pilot desperately trying to find a target while avoiding the combat air patrol and antiaircraft fire, were often mistaken for combat vessels such as destroyers and even cruisers. As a result, these flat-bottomed, diesel-powered, 160-foot-long ships often became the targets these Japanese pilots were seeking.

The U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Raymond Spruance, was the largest in the world (535 warships), but its position at Okinawa was exposed. It was committed to the island for all manner of support and supply duties, which made its ships stationary targets for the Japanese, who no longer had to guess where the American fleet could be found.

To protect the fleet, the Americans had established a series of “radar picket” posts around the island to give early warning of the Japanese approach. Instead, these soon presented to the Japanese aviators’ lonely targets, ripe for attack. The radar-picket destroyers and destroyer escorts were supported by various “little boys,” which were known at these posts as “pall bearers,” since they spent so much time picking up survivors out of the water, making them an inviting target for the Japanese.

Marines examine a captured Yokosuka MXY-7 Ohka rocket-propelled suicide flying bomb found at the Yontan airfield.

The Japanese reaction began slowly. On March 20, 1945, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters came up with a major offensive involving Kamikaze pilots called Ten-Goō(“Heavenly Operation”). Tasked with leading this operation was Vice Adm. Matome Ugaki, commander of the IJN Fifth Air Fleet.

After gathering every flyable plane he could find, no matter its obsolescence or original purpose, Ugaki assembled 3,000 of them at bases across Kyushu. The plan, dubbed Operation Kikusui, was simple: guided by the few experienced pilots Japan had left, the suicide pilots would be sent out in waves to find the American ships and destroy them. The veteran pilots would then return to their bases to pick up another group and repeat the process.

On April 6, 1945, the Japanese struck in force with Kikusui No. 1 against the U.S. Navy’s Task Force 58 and the British Royal Navy’s Task Force 57, the latter operating between Formosa and Okinawa. Some 700 planes—half of them suicide planes—took off and went hunting for the Allied fleets.

The first to be attacked at Okinawa were the destroyers USS Bush (DD-529) at picket station number 1, the Colhoun (DD-801) at picket station number 2, and the Cassin Young (DD-793) at picket station number 3. Although the three destroyers put up a deadly screen of antiaircraft fire, enough enemy planes got through to sink both the Bush and Colhoun; the Cassin Young barely escaped the same fate—for now.

Elsewhere, the destroyers USS Howorth (DD-592) and Hyman (DD-732) were severely damaged, while the destroyers USS Leutze (DD-481) and Morris (DD-417) were knocked out of the war. Destroyer USS Mullany (DD-528) was so badly damaged that she had to be scrapped. Destroyer USS Newcomb (DD-586) was also sent home for good, as was the USS Rodman (DD-456).

The list of sunken ships included LST-447 and support ships Logan Victory and Hobbs Victory. The minesweeper USS Defense (AM-317) went down as well. The USS Haynsworth (DD-700) was damaged, as was the USS Feiberling (DE-640). And this was only one day’s success for the Kamikazes.

The suicide pilots also tried attacking two American carriers, the Bennington (CV-20) and Belleau Wood (CV-24), but both ships escaped with minimal damage.

Both sides suffered badly during Kikusui No. 1. The Japanese had hit 17 American ships, sunk or knocked 11 out of the war, and killed over 360 sailors. The Japanese, in turn, had lost over 350 planes and pilots—planes and pilots that could not be replaced.

The Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia, showing damage incurred on October 21, 1944, was struck so many times by suicide pilots that she earned the nickname “the Kamikaze magnet.” She was never sunk, however.

The next day the massive battleship IJN Yamato steamed toward Okinawa and her doom at the hands of the American pilots from Task Force 58.

The loss of Yamato did not stop the Japanese from continuing their suicide attacks on the Allied fleets. After suspending operations for a few days due to bad weather, on April 11, Kikusui No. 2 was launched—a two-day assault by 185 suicide planes accompanied by 150 escorts. The carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) was the first to feel the enemy’s sting, which knocked it out of action for two days while repairs were made. The carrier Essex (CV-9), too, was hit but not sunk.

On April 12, another dozen ships were hit, with the destroyer USS Mannert L. Abele (DD-733) and LCS(L)-33 going down. On that same day, the Cassin Young was in the middle of the fight for her life, as she was targeted during a heavy Kamikaze raid. Her gunners shot down five aircraft, but a sixth crashed into her foremast, exploding in midair only 50 feet above the ship.

Surprisingly, only one man was killed, but 58 were wounded, many seriously. Although badly damaged, Cassin Young made it to Keramo Retto under her own power and would return to Okinawa in May after repairs. She would be attacked again in July, suffering major damage and loss of life, but she refused to be sunk. (The ship is today on display at the Charleston Navy Yard in Boston, Massachusetts.)

Each day, one or more ships were being hit and disabled, if not sunk. The radar picket posts were the most vulnerable, set far from other support and usually exposed to the incoming enemy air raids before anyone else. The raids went on daily throughout April, May, and June, and ship after ship was lost to the incessant aerial attacks.

CinCPac Admiral Chester W. Nimitz grew increasingly concerned and pushed Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, commanding the Tenth U. S. Army, to move quickly to clear Okinawa of enemy resistance so that he could withdraw his ships from Japanese target practice. But the Japanese ashore were as determined as those in the air, and the battle continued well into June.

One the worst attacks by the Kamikazes was that suffered by the USS Laffey (DD-724), stationed at radar picket post number 1 on April 16. The first USS Laffey had been sunk during the naval battles for Guadalcanal. The current USS Laffey, laid down in 1942, had already established herself as a worthy successor to her namesake and had participated in the naval support during the landings in Normandy. On April 16, 1945, she would prove her worth once again.

Soon after dawn, 50 enemy planes were closing in on the fleet, and Laffey’s radar picked up four enemy planes approaching her. Three were shot down by Laffey’s antiaircraft fire, and the fourth was shot down by the guns on board Lieutenant Howell Chickering’s nearby LCS(L)-51. Carrier-borne Corsairs were slicing through the enemy formation, downing as many planes as they could.

The destroyer USS Hazelwood smoulders after being hit by a Kamikaze attacker off Okinawa, April 29, 1945. Ten officers and 67 men were killed, including the commanding officer; 36 were missing, presumed dead.

A fifth plane attacked Laffey, only to be shot down as well. Then a sixth streaked in, strafing the ship as it approached. Several casualties resulted from the strafing before this plane crashed into the ship at the after funnel, jamming the fire-control radar.

A seventh aircraft smashed into the forward gun mount and then ricocheted off the ship, leaving no serious damage. An eighth plane was shot down as it attacked. But a ninth Zero used that attack to approach undetected and crashed into the starboard 20mm battery, damaging nearby 40mm batteries, starting a gasoline fire, and setting off the ammunition.

Almost immediately, a tenth plane hit the ship’s fantail, knocked out the aft 5-inch gun, and damaged three 20mm antiaircraft guns there. Plane number 11 dropped its bomb first near the depth-charge rails before crashing into the aft 5-inch gun mount, already damaged by a previous plane.

Plane number 12 dropped its bomb close aboard, jamming the rudder to a hard-left position. The Laffey now had no operable guns in the rear of the ship. The captain, Lt. Cmdr. Frederick J. Becton, now had a ship on fire and with no guns protecting her stern. The Japanese quickly took advantage of this weakness, and two more planes came in from astern, crashing again into the 5-inch mount number 53 and killing several of the crew who were fighting fires there.

Plane number 15 was shot out of the sky as it approached from the port quarter. A pursuing combat air patrol Corsair was so close on his heels that he hit the ship’s mast and ditched nearby. But this attack knocked out the ship’s radar.

Plane number 16 was next in line and was shot down over the ship by the combat air patrol, but not before its bomb shredded the ship’s bow with shrapnel, knocking out power to 5-inch mount 52, which continued to operate manually.

Plane number 17 was shot down, and plane number 18 was disintegrated by a shell from mount 52. Plane number 19 was also shot down, by mount number 51. A twentieth plane came in through the smoke off the Laffey and dropped its bomb on mount number 53 before breaking off the ship’s yardarm. It was then splashed by the combat air patrol.

A suicide pilot homes in on the carrier USS Enterprise during the battle for Okinawa, May 14, 1945. The pilot destroyed Big E’s forward elevator, killed 14, injured 32.

Plane number 21 also dropped its bomb, knocking out two 20mm antiaircraft mounts before being shot down by the combat air patrol. A final attacker was also taken out by the combat air patrol.

The USS Laffey was miraculously still afloat but in serious trouble. It was down at the stern, the rudder was jammed, and most of its guns were disabled. Fortunately, the hull and engines had not been damaged. She had been hit by six Kamikazes, damaged by two other near misses, struck by three bombs, and had other close calls. She lost 31 killed and 72 wounded, but the fires were soon under control and the flooding stopped. She was towed to a repair base off Okinawa and, after service during the Korean War, would eventually end up as a memorial at Patriot’s Point, Charleston, South Carolina. Both LCS(L)s supporting her also survived, although with significant casualties.

But, like a swarm of angry wasps, the Kamikazes kept coming. As the battle progressed, their attacks and numbers began to thin out. Since Okinawa was lost and the next invasion would no doubt be at Japan itself, the Japanese decided to hoard their remaining Kamikaze planes and pilots for the final battle.

One of the greatest tragedies to befall the American fleet was that of the carrier USS Bunker Hill (CV-17), the flagship of Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher’s Task Force 58. On May 11, the carrier was on station 76 miles east of Okinawa when a Japanese “Zeke” fighter suddenly appeared out of the cloud cover.

Having just been refueled with nearly two million gallons of high-octane aviation fuel, the Bunker Hill was a floating Molotov cocktail waiting for a spark. The Zeke crashed into the flight deck, which was brimming with 30 planes waiting to take off; in the hangar deck below were 48 more that had been fueled and armed.

The shattered 3.5” gun mount aboard the USS Laffey. The ship was attacked by 22 Japanese planes on April 16, 1945, and struck by four bombs and five suicide planes. Thirty-one sailors were killed, 72 wounded.

While the planes on deck exploded and burned, another Kamikaze dashed in and slammed into the ship’s control center, known as “the island.” Crewmen sprang into action in a valiant, but ultimately futile, effort to contain the blaze. Other ships pulled alongside to aid in the effort but they, too, stood no chance against the roaring inferno.

In the end, 346 officers and men out of the ship’s complement of 3,000 lost their lives, 43 were missing, and another 264 were injured. The charred wreck of the carrier managed to return for repairs to Bremerton, Washington, via Pearl Harbor, but it would never fight again.

At the end of the war, the Japanese themselves compiled a recapitulation of the record of the “Kamikaze Special Attack Corps.” They recorded that, of the 2,314 planes dispatched (including escorts), 1,086 returned. For the 1,228 planes “expended,” they claimed 81 ships sunk and 195 damaged, for a total of 276 ships.

Postwar records indicate that the correct figures are 34 ships sunk, including three light carriers and 13 destroyers. Of the 195 ships the Japanese claimed as damaged, they had actually damaged 288 ships, including 16 fleet aircraft carriers, three light carriers, and 17 escort carriers. It should be noted that several ships, like the HMAS Australia and USS Laffey, were hit repeatedly but not sunk. So, the Japanese claim of a total of 276 enemy ships sunk or damaged by Kamikazes is understated. In fact, they hit 322 allied ships, sinking 34. It was not the “Divine Wind” of 1281, but it was a respectable effort, nevertheless.

But, despite all her efforts to halt the American invasion of Okinawa, Japan had shot her bolt. Once Okinawa fell, she had very little chance of preventing a full-scale invasion of the Home Islands.

As the intelligence officer of the Fifth Fleet put it, “The Japanese are defeated, but we have not yet won the victory.”  The Kamakaze and the resistance on Iwo Jima and Okinawa with the suicides of the civilians jumping to their death sealed the fate of the Japanese, and the casualties that the Americans suffered prompted President Truman to use the Atomic Bombs to force a surrender.

Went to go see "Midway"

I and my son went to watch the movie "Midway".

Overall I was impressed, I know a lot about the battle, I have blogged about "Midway" a lot in the past.  The Movie did touch on how out classed the TBD "Devastator" was against the Japanese and how bad the torpedo's we had.  It wasn't just the Aerial Torpedo's that were bad, the Submarine Torpedo's sucked just as bad.  It was a group of Submariners taking one of their torpedo's and hoisting it on a crane and dropping the torpedo straight down on the warhead contact .After the non explosion of the torpedo, it finally proved to the ordinance dept that the torpedo's were faulty.   The Movie also touched on the conflict that the Japanese General Staff had, you had the Army that was worried about Russia and China and the Navy was concerned about the United States. 
     The General Staff was locked until the Doolittle raid shook up the Japanese Psyche. 

Here is a technical analysis of the Movie.  Sure it had technical inaccuracies but it was accurate in a lot of things and it is worth seeing with a bag of popcorn and watch the movie.  I will be adding the blue-ray version to my collection.

Short Post...well kinda...short anyway...

I will be doing a short post...

  I had ordered my gun socks from Amazon, got them for $7.00 apiece.. and got them in the mail last night..

 I was happy since I would not have to deal with "Sportsman guide" and break my self imposed ban.  Like I said, I and many other gun owners remembered how we were treated after Sandy Hook by them.  I understand that it was all business and I get that...but I also remembered a quote from the book "The GodFather" by Mario Puzo  "Sure you can say that it is all business and nothing is personal, but when it comes to business it is all personal."  When you have a business relationship with someone or a company, there is an equal exchange for goods and service, you develop a business relationship and there is a certain loyalty that goes into the business relationship and the loyalty is a 2 way street. 
     Well anyway my O3, My Mosin and 2 of my .22LR rifles are now happy.  They are all gunsocked, LOL.
     I was loaned a book by a friend of mine from work, it talks about the battle of Midway from the Japanese perspective....and it is a different point of view..

I knew from past books and other articles that I have read, the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy really didn't get along....we talk about the Army/Navy rivalry  that the United States had...we still have it to a certain extent.  I remember reading in a book called "Prodigal Soldiers"

"Documenting the transformation of the U.S. military from Vietnam to the Gulf War, a history of a generation of officers examines changing ideas about war, ending the draft, reducing racial tensions, and integrating women into the ranks."

       Yep that book, I remembered buying a copy of the book in the late 90's and I was mesmerized because I lived through the story from my time in the service to going to the Gulf War.  I remember seeing how my Dad was treated after Vietnam and how the Military was portrayed as the "Bad guys" in all the movies and TV shows to the debacle of "Desert One".  The soldiers were afraid to wear their uniforms off post because how they would be treated.  To the time in the early 1980's when President Reagan showed unabashed pride in being an American and it filtered down.  From our first forays in Grenada in 1983, I remembered the commercials changing from "The Army wants to join you" to "Be all you can be" and the difference several years made as the United States Military transformed itself from the nightmare that Vietnam created to the force that crushed Saddam Hussain.
     But I digressed...I remembered reading about the group called "The Iron Majors" whose sole function was to make sure that their own service got all it could, even at the expense of the other service and the country..Well Japan had it far worse than we ever could.  In the book I read that the Japanese Military was focused on 2 foes, the Japanese Army focused on Russia and the Japanese Navy focused on the United States and the 2 worked at cross purpose to each other.  The Japanese Army was hungry for war, they have been fighting in China since 1937 but the Navy was far less interested in getting into a fight.  Their squabbles went all the way up to the imperial staff that advised the emperor Hirohito.  
     The book also explained that the attack in Pearl Harbor was an attack to keep the United Stated from interfering with the seizures of the Dutch East Indies and all their rich resources.  I already knew that from my other reads but it was interesting reading it from their perspective.  The book explained the Japanese philosophy of attack and defense and it is a very good read.  I am half way through the book and hope to have it done in a day or so...depending on what else is going on.