I fly a lot, it is a perk of the job, but I have noticed the sheer amount of luggage people bring on the plane, backpack with 2 rollerbags, and one person will literally fill up an entire overhead bin by themselves, and to hell with anybody else on that row. Gate agents will literally offer to check a bag for free and people will refuse and drag their living room down the aisle. Courtesy is no longer a thing it seems. I did see videos of the Sukhoi accident and it did show some of the passengers blocking access rows getting their carryon bags despite the flight attendents telling them to hurry and get out. The standard is 90 seconds to get off the plane, this was set from the Manchester accident where a lot of the passengers were not killed by fire but by fumes from the combustibles inside the plane.
The aviation industry has a carry-on bag problem.
Airline policies and passengers’ desire to avoid a few extra minutes of wait time upon arrival lead to more carry-on space demand than supply on most flights. And in the rare instances when things go wrong, the temptation to stop and grab a bag before proceeding to the nearest available emergency exit proves too tantalizing for many to avoid.
That leads to longer evacuation times. And—egregious bag fees and related money-first policies notwithstanding—that’s the problem.
Smart phones and social media have amplified the issue, but it’s not new. The NTSB’s 2016 probe of an American Airlines engine failure prompted the board to recommend the FAA quantify the risk and take action.
The FAA’s action came via a recently issued safety alert for operators (SAFO). It urges airlines to review their outreach—from cabin crew briefings to gate signage—and fill any gaps. “Consider communication methods to highlight consequences of non-compliance with crewmember commands regarding retrieval of personal items during an evacuation,” the SAFO recommends.
As for the analysis that led to the SAFO? Turns out the risk of grabbing a bag in the midst of an emergency evacuation—which shouldn’t need much evidence to quantify—is more dangerous than many might expect.
An FAA-sponsored University of Greenwich study examined the issue as part of the agency’s response to the NTSB’s recommendations. In the study, completed in 2024 and published with little fanfare, researchers built a model to simulate evacuations. They selected a 180-seat narrowbody with a full cabin staffed with two pilots and three cabin crew.
The model followed FAA regulatory standards that call for evacuations within 90 sec. with half of the available exits unavailable. It added a real-world wrinkle, making only the front pair of Type C exits and left pair of Type III exits available—and none in the rear. This matches two famous fatal disasters involving post-crash fires: the 1985 "British Airtours B737"at Manchester, England, and the "2019 Sukhoi Superjet 100 Accident" accident at Sheremetyevo.
Four scenarios were developed using variables to reflect real-world evacuation and luggage-retrieval observations. In the base case, no passengers retrieved luggage. The three other cases saw 25%, 50%, and 75% of passengers, respectively, attempt to grab belongings. Each scenario was run 1,000 times.
The big-picture takeaways? Even in the base case of everyone leaving belongings behind, the average total evacuation time (TET)—121 sec.—exceeded the regulatory requirement of 90 sec. The results showed an average of 38 passengers still onboard at that critical 90-sec. mark when everyone is supposed to be gone (fodder for a separate risk evaluation, perhaps).
In the worst-case scenario, TETs averaged 199 sec., and an average of 63 virtual passengers were still onboard after 90 sec.
Within each luggage-retrieving scenario, the random distribution of retrievers in the cabin had a measurable effect on outcomes. The exit configuration selected meant that passengers in the rear of the cabin—designated as Zone 5—were most at risk in any scenario.
“[In] the event of a serious post-crash cabin fire, increasing the number of luggage retrievers will increase average dwell times, which, in turn, is likely to decrease the survivability of passengers, particularly in Zone 05, by increasing their exposure to hazardous fire products,” the study said. “Furthermore, the increased exposure to toxic fire products, heat, and the obscuration effects of smoke will adversely impact the ability of exposed passengers to evacuate, further increasing their dwell time in Zone 05 and, hence, their exposure to severe fire hazards. This downward spiral is likely to result in a significant increase in the expected number of fatalities.”
The authors caution that the study has many limitations, such as including certain assumptions in scenarios out of necessity. More work is needed—such as examining other exit availability scenarios—to draw any firm conclusions, they add.
Still, the results are eye-opening. And should prompt industry action.
