Was the Bismarck a failure? or was the decisions of the Captain a failure.

 

Why did Germany’s epic battleship Bismarck fail so quickly? Was it inevitable that such a creation would be an immediate lightning rod for all of the Allied forces?

Despite being the largest battleship that the Germans had ever built, the Bismarck’s failure was expected by many. The ship itself was built to manifest German greatness in the eyes of the Führer and to act as a motivational tool for the German public.

The British Royal Navy boasted the world’s greatest navy entering World War 2 and despite losing over 50,000 sailors to the Germans, had a considerable upper hand on the German navy throughout World War II. Bismarck was an attempt by Germany to try and match the greatness of the Royal Navy.

If we analyze the situation that Bismarck faced, we might find some internal reasons regarding the Germans that led to the failure of the famous battleship. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss some of the mistakes that the Germans made which ultimately sealed the fate of Bismarck.

A significant factor of the failure was that the Germans made crucial mistakes when designing the battleship.

Because the German battleship designers lacked experience, they followed outdated design philosophies that were used in battleships during World War I.

Consequently, the design of Bismarck had inferior defensive capabilities. For example, its main belt armor was thin and installed vertically, decreasing its horizontal defensive ability. Similarly, the Bismarck’s upper and main armored decks were not strong enough, as evidenced by the lack of protection on its turrets.

Moreover, likely due to the anachronistic designs, its defenses against air combatants was subpar, leaving it open to Allied air strikes. Therefore, even with an advanced manufacturing process, the Germans were not able to produce a battleship that was powerful enough because of their outdated design.

On the other hand, the Royal Navy had only built 2 battleships, HMS Rodney and HMS Nelson, and no battlecruisers between 1918 – 1939, thus their fleet was almost all WW1 vintage.

The HMS Rodney was built in 1927, while only the HMS Prince of Wales was in any sense modern. However, the Prince of Wales was still so fresh that in fact she still had dockyard workers on board. The Royal Navy hardly possessed an elite and modern battlecruiser unit.

In addition to the outdated design of Bismarck, the Germans had not realized that battleships were no longer the preeminent weapon.

The importance of the air force increased exponentially during World War II. On May 22nd 1941, the Royal Air Force spotted that German battleships had left the harbor.

Multiple days later on May 26th, more aircraft had found and tracked the Bismarck, something that traditional vessels would not be able to do.

During the final battle, the aircraft dealt the nail in the coffin for the mighty German vessel. The skies were now where wars were won due to wartime innovation, and the British had caught on to this trend, manufacturing two aircraft carriers to assist in the war effort and ultimately proving that they were superior to traditional approaches.

As a result, aircraft carriers would become the overlord of the sea.

Another serious mistake was that the German military did not emphasize the importance of information security. Prior to the sinking of Bismarck, during the Rhine Exercise, the British military had already deciphered Germany’s military codes and destroyed several German replenishment oilers. This had ruined Germans’ Rhine Exercise.

Then, on May 25th 1941, after Bismarck was damaged and on its way back to the harbor, a German admiral on the ship, Johann Günther Lütjens, sent a telegram out from the ship to the military command. Even though Johann Günther Lütjens’ tactics were successful and created opportunities for Bismarck to retreat, his decision of sending this telegram was the most serious mistake he had ever made. It was so deadly that it finally led to Bismarck’s sinking and his own death.

When the admiral sent out the telegram, he was too confident that Bismarck had already escaped from the Royal Navy.

However, the Royal Navy captured this and successfully captured Bismarck’s location. Had the admiral never sent this, the British military would have resorted to searching blindly on the sea by navy and air force for the Bismarck. Then, Bismarck may have been able to have retreated safely.

But, was retreating really an option? We must also remember that Lütjens was under orders to attack British shipping, so he wouldn’t have wanted to retreat. His signal gave his general location, but it was patrolling aircraft that located Bismarck.

Had Bismarck retreated, HMS Hood, the largest battlecruiser in the British Navy, would have been spared being sunk by the Bismarck on May 24, 1941. Hood was sunk in a matter of minutes, losing all but 3 of its 1,418 crewmembers. The legendary battle between Hood & Bismarck was chronicled in Theodore Taylor’s book, H.M.S. Hood Vs Bismark: The Battleship Battle.

One more important mistake that the Germans made was regarding Bismarck’s fuel. At that time, Bismarck was designed with a maximum speed faster than most of the British ships. In addition, Bismarck’s fuel capacity was designed for an eight-day sailing while maintaining its maximum speed. Therefore, even if Bismarck had lost the battle, it would still have had the ability to retreat safely.

Bismarck under construction by Blohm & Voss in Hamburg, 1938

Lütjens’ signal was instrumental in helping the Royal Navy locate Bismarck, and the damage received from the Prince of Wales was significant, but it was the airstrike that damaged the screws and the rudders that was the decisively fatal blow in the end. Once Ark Royal’s aircraft (open cockpit biplanes) had hit, Bismarck needed repairs, and there was only one dock she could go to in France. The Royal Navy then had a good idea of her course and intercepted her as a result.

Moreover, after deciding to retreat, Bismarck had been sailing with high speed for three days. As a result, when it was found by the Royal Navy, there was not much left in its fuel stores. So that maintaining high-speed sailing was not possible even if the crew had been able to repair the broken rudder.

The significant factor wasn’t Bismarck’s fuel state, but the ship’s inability to maneuver, which doomed her. Ark Royal’s airstrike damaged the rudders and in the sea state it proved too difficult to steer by engines.

This left her vulnerable to Rodney and King George V and their attendant cruisers and destroyers. At the end, Rodney closed to 3000 yards (point blank range for 16 inch guns) to finish off Bismarck. ‘After the sinking, Admiral John Tovey said, “The Bismarck had put up a most gallant fight against impossible odds worthy of the old days of the Imperial German Navy, and she went down with her colours flying.”‘ (wiki) Bismarck’s great threat to the British nation was her great power.

Had she escaped into the North Atlantic she and her consort, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, would have been free to savage the vital convoy routes between North America and the UK.

HMS Rodney firing on Bismarck, which can be seen burning in the distance

In fact after close observation by the explorer Robert Ballard when he found Bismarck at the bottom of the sea in 1989 it was discovered that despite being bombarded at close range Bismarck was mostly intact. “A detailed underwater survey of the wreck in 2002 showed that the sustained close-range shelling was largely ineffective in the effort to sink the ship, the many torpedoes launched at Bismarck were also almost completely ineffective, and the massive plating of the armour deck was also found to be virtually intact.” (Wiki)

Both ships were vastly faster and vastly better armed than convoy escorts, which would have fought gallantly and died futilely defending their convoys. The scattering merchant ships themselves would have been easy prey to the battleship and her heavy cruiser attendant. U-boat henchmen lurking nearby would have completed the destruction – PQ17 is evidence enough of that.

HMS Dorsetshire picking up survivors

Small wonder then that the Royal Navy mobilized every available capital ship north of Gibraltar to deal with the menace. In addition continued to devote disproportionate levels of effort to counter Bismarck’s sister, Tirpitz until she too sunk. The British Admiralty has known since the days of Pepys that command of the sea is what kept Britain safe from invasion and was the anvil of victory over oppression in the 18th, 19th and 20th Centuries.

Kaisers Commerce Raider

 I haven't done an article about WWI in a bit so I found this one and dusted it off and posted it.

Commerce raiding has been employed for many centuries by various nations in the hope of denying the enemy vital supplies.
  During World War one and two the German U boats became arguably the most famous commerce raiders of all time, their tenacity and vigor twice nearly led to the capitulation of Great Britain and consequently they became the most noted and studied part of modern naval warfare. During World War one the U boat was in its infancy, its tactics not yet fully refined or realized and Germany, not occupying France meant that only a handful of vessels had the ability to attack British and French shipping far beyond the waters of Europe and North Atlantic.

World war two would bring the most well-known episodes of commerce raiding, such vessels and men like the Admiral Graf Spee, The U boat aces Otto Kretschmar, Gunther Prien and many others would go down in history as some of the most successful commerce raiders of their respective war.

History always notes the famous battles and ships, Battles such as Jutland and ships such as the Emden and Dresden, but arguably the most successful surface commerce raider of world war one must be the rather unremarkable SMS Wolf.

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  SMS Wolf picture from the Australian War Memorial

She wasn’t a Battleship, cruiser or submarine but a rather bland, boring looking freighter that was launched in 1913 at Flensburg as the Wachtfels for the DDG Hansa line.
  She was taken over by the Kaiserliche marine and re named SMS Wolf being commissioned on the 16^th may 1916.

The Wolf was quite unremarkable and limited in her features and capabilities but that didn’t stop the Kaiserliche Marine putting her to good use, in fact these attributes were to be her best attributes.
   The Wolf was a modest ship at 135 meters long 17 meters wide and displacing 11,200tons, she was powered by 3 coal burning boilers generating steam for the single VTE engine turning a single 4 blade screw, her top speed was around 11 knots.
  The wolf could bunker 8,000 tons of coal and at a steady 8 knots she used roughly 35 tons of coal per day giving her a huge range of 32,000 nautical miles. 

Between 1914 and 1916 the Wolf was heavily modified and posses a formidable armament, eight 5.9inch guns and three 2 inch guns made up her main battery, she was also fitted with four 20 inch torpedo tubes and carried 465 mines in her hold.

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  Wolf Laying Mines picture from Australian war memorial

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  Wolf loading mines in Kiel Picture from Australian War memorial

   The armament was more than enough to take on the allied merchant ships, but wolf had no armour herself thus her orders were not to engage allied warships.
   Also fitted was a single Friedrichshafen FF.33 Sea plane for scouting, this was dubbed the little wolf by the crew.  
      The wolf could also change her appearance, she had masts the retracted or erected as well as a fake funnel to disguise who she really was.

On November 30^th 1916 in total secrecy the SMS Wolf slipped her moorings in Keil and headed out to sea with Kapitan zur See Karl August Nerger in command and a crew of 348 men on board.
  She quietly transited the Norwegian coast disguised as a British Freighter and slipped past the Royal Navy blockade rounded Scotland and slipped quietly into the North Atlantic turning south.

After a few weeks at sea the crew crossed the equator and performed a crossing the line ceremony paying tribute to King Neptune it was a time of relaxation and enjoyment for the crew but soon the mission would start.

Rounding the cape of good hope she laid some mines close to the port of Cape town, this would cause the loss and damage of some ships notably, the Spanish ship Carlos de Einzaguirre struck one of her mines and sank in four minuets with the loss of 134 people this included 12 women and 5 children.

she proceeded on into the Indian ocean laying mines in Colombo Ceylon (modern day Sri Lanka), Mumbai India, and Singapore again she got success in each location.
   To avoid capture she never stayed in one place for too long and never put into port, after the mine laying she headed towards the Pacific Ocean and laid more mines off ports in Southern Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia.

While laying mines she also engaged other merchant vessels capturing cargos and prisoners and even taking over the freighter Turritella sending her out as a second raiding vessel, she was later captured but Wolf wouldn’t have it all easy.
  On September 26^th 1917 she sighted the 6,560 ton Japanese Freighter Hitachi Maru she fired a single shot asking the vessel to come about, the Wolf was met by return gun fire from the Japanese ship and a total of 14 rounds were fired at the Hitachi Maru killing 16 and wounding another 6 before the captain surrendered his ship.
   Later Captain Tomonaga of the Hitachi Maru so ashamed that his ship had been captured committed suicide by jumping over the side.

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  Hitachi Maru after capture picture from Australian war memorial

Once she had expended all her mines the Wolf set course for home, however she had little coal reserves to make the long journey, one of her last captures the Spanish ship Igotz Mendi, she was carrying 5,000tons of coal destined for the Royal Navy.
  At least 1,000tons of coal was transferred to the Wolf while under way and both ships headed for the Cocos Islands where the Ingotz Mendi was painted grey, and a prize crew took her over and sailed with the wolf towards Germany.

The long voyage home saw the ships return through the Atlantic, around Iceland and down the Norwegian coast, again avoiding the British Blockade.
  While transiting Danish waters the Ingotz Mendi ran aground in thick fog, a Danish gunboat arrived and removed the crew and prisoners but the ship remained hard aground.

      The Wolf continued on entering her home port of Keil carrying her captured cargos and 467 prisoners’ of war on February 24^th 1918 after travelling over 100,000km on a voyage lasting 451 days (15 months) at which time she never put into a port or made a single radio transmission, it became the longest deployment of the war.
The wolf had captured and sunk 14 ships totaling over 38,000tons, she is also credited with a further 13 ships hitting her mines totaling nearly 76,000tons.

The Wolf would only make one other foray before wars end this time in the Baltic, at wars end she was ceded to France as reparations and became Antinous she was scrapped in 1931.

Herr Captain Karl August Nerger

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Her Captain Karl August Nerger for his exploits would be awarded the Prussian Pour la Merit and the Bavarian Military order of Max Joseph he would survive the war only to be beaten to death on August 15^th 1945 in the now soviet controlled former concentration camp at Sachsenhausen.

Another Notable Crewmember Theodore Plievier

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Theodor Plievier took part in the Wilhelmshaven mutiny of 1918 and after leaving the navy went on to write several books.
   In 1933 under the new National Socialist government came to power his books were banned and burnt, he fled to France and later Sweden before settling in the Soviet Union where, during world war two he interviewed captured German prisoners.
  After the war he moved to Switzerland and died on March 12^th 1955.

                                                  The Journey of SMS "Wolf"

Postwar Aircraft Carrier Fires

Still recovering from Christmas.  My son got some parts to mod his truck and I will post those in a day or 2 also.  I have every intent of avoiding any retail establishment on this day.

I have heard of the Oriskany and of course of the Forrestal Fire.  I have a book in my library that talked about the Forrestal fire and it is a very good book.  It did explain a few things I didn't know.

I had picked up in some bargain bin a long time ago and it was very well done and researched.  I had learned a lot about it.   I heard something about a fire on the U.S.S Enterprise(CVN-65)  Fires on a ship is a very big deal, that is usually what sinks them.  The Lessons of the Forrestal are still taught at Naval shipboard schools.

Aircraft carriers may “rule the seas,” but even they do not have immunity from disasters at sea. To quote the 1973 U.S. Navy training film Trial By Fire: A Carrier Fights for Life, “Yet for all this vast strength, as real as it is apparent, a carrier at sea is extremely vulnerable since her striking arm requires the use of exotic fuels and powerful weapons. She is forced to carry with her the potential for her own destruction. It’s all around her, on and below decks, waiting—waiting for a miscue, a careless error, or a tragic accident.”
Since the members of a ship’s crew are human like anyone else, when thousands of souls embark on a carrier they have no choice but to put their lives in their shipmates’ hands. They have to trust the rules and procedures designed to best mitigate the hazards of such a dangerous environment.
There is no telling how many times sailors on board an aircraft carrier have flirted with disaster, and simply been lucky. During the 1960’s, as the Vietnam War brought American sailors into major combat conditions for the first time since the Korean War, three aircraft carriers were not so lucky.

Oriskany (foreground) and her sister Bonhomme Richard conducting operations in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1970

Oriskany was no stranger to fire during combat operations. During the Korean War, a “hung” bomb on a F4U Corsair fighter broke loose and exploded as the aircraft landed, killing 2 and injuring 14 sailors. But that paled in comparison to the conflagration that struck the ship 13 years later.
Oriskany had been at Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin since early July 1966, conducting airstrikes against North Vietnam. On October 27, a three-foot-long magnesium parachute flare somehow ignited while a sailor was handling it in the ship’s hangar bay. The sailor reportedly panicked and threw the flare, burning at 5,400º F, back into the “flare locker,” a space which held at least 700 more flares. Those also ignited, resulting in an explosion that blasted open the locker’s steel bulkheads.

Oriskany on fire

The explosion itself, the chemical fire, and the suffocating smoke from the burning magnesium—which cannot be put out with water, rendering the hangar bay sprinkler system useless—caused 38 sailors to be injured, 3 aircraft destroyed, and 3 aircraft damaged.

 Trial by Fire "A carrier fights for survival.

Worse, 43 sailors died, mostly pilots who had been sleeping in nearby staterooms when the explosion occurred, and succumbed while trapped by the intense heat and smoke.
Oriskany was forced to depart to San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard to repair the extensive damage. She would return to the combat zone in July 1967.

An F-8 Crusader intercepts a Tu-95 “Bear-D”. Oriskany, from which the F-8 launched, can be seen in the background.

 Oriskany arrived back at Yankee Station in time to be witness to, and aid in, a shipboard disaster that far eclipsed her own. The Forrestal fire marks the second worst loss of life on a Navy ship after World War II.
Forrestal had arrived in theater just six days previously and was beginning her fifth day of airstrikes against North Vietnam. Many factors united to create the deadly conditions that led to tragedy.
For instance, some ordnance handlers followed loose procedures that violated Navy safety regulations. Some equipment had material deficiencies. Also, due to a shortage of Mk-83 bombs, the Navy supplied Forrestal with badly deteriorated AN-M65 1,000-lb bombs left over from the Korean War.

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CV-59) underway at sea in 1987. Various aircraft of Carrier Air Wing 6 (CVW-6) are visible on deck

A major factor was that, aside from the sailors who had been specially trained as firefighters, most of the crew and especially the air wing were generally ignorant of proper shipboard firefighting and damage control procedures.
World War II had proven the value of training all sailors to fight fires, but the practice had lapsed over the years. On top of that, damage control equipment had not been sufficiently updated over time to keep pace with changing combat conditions.

A port bow view of the aircraft carrier USS FORRESTAL (CV 59) passing through a rainbow while underway in the North Atlantic Ocean during Exercise TEAM WORK’88.

That fateful day, 27 aircraft were staged on Forrestal‘s flight deck, fully fueled and bristling with various bombs, missiles, rockets, and 20 mm ammunition. Everyone was busily preparing for an 11:00 AM launch. But at 10:51, a power surge in an F-4 Phantom triggered the inadvertent firing of one of the Phantom’s Zuni rockets.
The flash from the rocket was recorded by the ship’s Pilot Landing Aid Television (PLAT) camera. The Zuni crossed the flight deck and struck an A-4 Skyhawk 100 feet away, rupturing its 400-gallon fuel tank and igniting the spilling fuel.

An A-4 Skyhawk burns shortly after its fuel tank was struck by a Zuni missile.

In the blink of an eye, flames engulfed several aircraft. Future Senator John McCain, back then a Naval aviator, managed to escape from his own A-4 as Chief Aviation Boatswain’s Mate Gerald Farrier began fighting the fire with a Purple-K canister, trying to help other pilots who were trapped in the flames. McCain got away in the nick of time, as the AN-M65 bombs too quickly yielded their devastating payload.
Words fail to succinctly describe the horror of the catastrophic chain reaction of explosions. The first bomb “cooked off” a mere 90 seconds after the fire began. At least 8 explosions wiped out two firefighting teams and tore gaping holes in the flight deck, and the fire raged out of control. Burning jet fuel poured into the holes and down the sides of the ship, expanding the fire to multiple decks below.

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CVA-59) underway off the Philippines on 12 August 1967. This photo was taken approximately three weeks after fires and explosions damaged the ship off Vietnam on 29 July 1967.

When the explosions subsided, Forrestal‘s sailors heroically set out to save their ship, and finally extinguished the last of the flames at 4 AM the next day. Unfortunately, their lack of training in some cases caused more trouble. Foam hose teams spread protective foam only to see water hose teams wash it away. Water hose teams also caused additional damage by unnecessarily flooding spaces untouched by the fire.
In the end, the casualties were 134 killed, 161 injured, 20 aircraft destroyed, and $72 million in damage to the ship. Forrestal was effectively knocked out of the Vietnam War, and would take 2 years to repair.
USS Forrestal (CV-59) underway on trials, 29 September 1955, just prior to commissioning The video recording of the inferno from Forrestal‘s PLAT camera was incorporated into the previously mentioned Trial By Fire film. For years afterward, countless sailors watched it as part of training classes. The Navy named its new firefighting school in Norfolk in honor of Chief Farrier, immortalized as “the Chief with the Purple-K” in the film.
The Navy made many changes to its policies and damage control equipment as a direct result of the fire. Most notably, firefighting and damage control training became mandatory for crew-members on every Navy ship.

An aerial starboard beam view of the aircraft carrier USS FORRESTAL (CV-59) underway.

 A Zuni rocket was once again the catalyst the third time disaster struck an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War. This time, it was Enterprise that relived an experience similar to Forrestal‘s: 8 major explosions and a raging fire. Enterprise, however, saw some significant differences.
Unlike Oriskany or Forrestal, Enterprise was not in a combat situation. She was near Hawaii, in the middle of what probably many sailors would agree was the second worst time to have a disastrous fire onboard—an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI).

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) underway returning to the United States from Western Pacific cruise that included the evacuation of Saigon

16 armed aircraft were scheduled to launch at 8:30 AM. Around 8:15, according to the Navy JAG investigation afterward, “an MD-3A jet aircraft starter unit was positioned on the starboard side of an F-4J…such that its exhaust outlet was in line with and within twenty-four inches of a loaded LAU-10 ZUNI rocket launcher mounted on the starboard wing of the aircraft.”
Although several people, including one of the ORI inspectors, observed the exhaust from the improperly parked “huffer” heating the rockets, no one took definite action. An overheated rocket exploded, beginning the exact same chain reaction that had occurred on Forrestal: punctured fuel tanks spilled fuel that ignited, which in turn detonated ordnance.

Sailors aboard Enterprise battle a huge ordnance fire triggered by a Zuni rocket. 14 January 1969

As with Forrestal, holes blown in the flight deck allowed burning fuel to enter the interior of the ship. But thanks to Forrestal, nearly all of Enterprise‘s ship’s company and the majority of its embarked air wing had been trained in firefighting, which proved invaluable.
Another major difference in Enterprise‘s case is that the modern bombs involved did not detonate immediately, buying time for sailors to jettison other ordnance near the fire. The Captain turned the ship so that the wind blew the flames clear of undamaged aircraft, which also helped prevent the fire from spreading across the flight deck. By 11:38, all fires were extinguished.
Sailors from the destroyer Rogers use their on board hoses to assist with the firefighting efforts aboard Enterprise Enterprise‘s casualties were 27 dead and 371 injured. Damage to the ship was estimated to be over $10 million. In addition, 15 aircraft were destroyed and 17 damaged, costing another estimated $44 million.
The investigative report concluded that “sound damage control organization, training and execution minimized casualties and prevented the initial fire from spreading beyond the Fly Three area of the flight deck to any significant degree.” The report also indicated, however, that flight deck personnel were still largely deficient in knowledge of weapons specifics, such as their cook-off times.

View of Enterprise’s stern during the fire, January 1969

Mishaps, some fatal, inevitably still occur on carriers. USS Nimitz (CVN 68) in 1981 experienced a similar fuel and ordnance fire as the carriers of the 60’s, although on a smaller scale. But overall, the “lessons learned” in the 60’s resulted in improved policies, procedures, and equipment that have been largely effective at preventing a repeat. Forrestal particularly was a milestone in the Navy’s change of approach toward firefighting.

The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11 transits into San Diego prior to mooring at Naval Air Station North Island

However, the “entirely preventable” 2008 fire aboard USS George Washington (CVN 73) was a grim reminder that even the most ironclad regulations and procedures can sometimes be no match for fatigue, laziness, ignorance, or haste, not to mention freak accidents.
George Washington‘s fire, which originated below decks and fortunately did not involve weapons, resulted in $70 million in damages and 37 sailors injured, but no fatalities. In wartime, as other carriers can attest, adding weapons and aviation fuel to any of those human factors can make the outcome far more deadly.

Dueling and Stephen Decater

I ran across this article and it was a fascinating read, the pics are compliments of "google".  The Impressment of Americans into the British Navy especially during the Napoleonic wars was extensive.  Some of the Seamen that were impressed were British deserters, but a lot of them were American citizens.  The British Navy had a history of draconian discipline where flogging was commonplace

.and press gangs would roam British harbor cities and literally "press" or kidnap men for service on Royal Navy ships.  If you haven't seen the movie "Damm the Defiant" it is a good movie made in 1962 and for a hollywood production was pretty accurate.

To die for personal honor is a long-vanished custom of the pre-industrial age. But 200 years ago it still held great meaning for men, particularly in politics and the military. Many men of that period would eagerly face death to defend their honor. Commodore Stephen Decatur was such a man. A veteran of the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812, he was a naval officer whose fame as comparable to that of later American heroes such as pilot Charles Lindbergh and astronaut Neil Armstrong.

Tall and handsome, the Philadelphia native had first gained fame in the nascent U.S. Navy by leading the small volunteer force that boarded and burned the captured frigate Philadelphia in Tripoli harbor in 1804. From that day his fame grew, matched only by his unquenchable thirst for glory. In March 1820 Decatur died at the hands of a fellow naval officer in a duel in which he participated to preserve his honor. The duel that felled Decatur might have been a conspiracy to commit murder by those who helped arrange it.

The origins of that day go back to June 1807, during the calm between the first Barbary Wars and the War of 1812. When a squadron of Royal Navy warships rode at anchor just off Norfolk Navy Yard in Virginia, several men deserted and made their way into the city. Some of them took the opportunity to enlist in the U.S. Navy. This led directly to the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair.

The frigate USS Chesapeake was being prepared for an extended cruise to the Mediterranean under Commodore James Barron, a veteran of the Barbary Wars. The tall, aristocratic Virginian had served with his father as a midshipman during the American Revolution. Although he joined the Navy in 1797, most of his time at sea had been in merchant ships. The U.S. Navy had commissioned the 38-gun Chesapeake at the Gosport Navy Yard in 1800. She was one of the original six frigates that Congress authorized via the Naval Act of 1794.

As preparations for the cruise moved forward, Barron was informed by U.S. Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith that a number of men suspected of being deserters from Royal Navy warships had signed on to the crew of the Chesapeake. Smith asked Barron to find them and determine their status. Barron spoke with three of these men. He then informed Smith in writing that he was satisfied that, even though they were deserters, they also were American citizens. This ended the matter as far as the Barron was concerned; however, the British had other ideas.

Lieutenant Stephen Decatur

Before leaving port, the Chesapeake was in disarray. The crew had piled lumber, crates, and provisions on the upper deck and many guns were not mounted. The disarray on the decks seemed not to bother Barron. On the morning of June 21, 1807, the frigate set sail for the Mediterranean. She cleared Hampton Roads and sailed past a British squadron stationed off Lynnhaven Bay. This was during the Napoleonic Wars, and the British squadron was blockading two French ships in the Chesapeake Bay.

The Royal Navy squadron included the 74-gun Triumph and the 50-gun Leopard. They raised anchor and headed out to sea. The Americans took note but read nothing into it until they were well out to sea. At 3:27 pm the Leopard came to within 60 yards of the Chesapeake and called via speaking trumpet that she had a message for Barron. The commodore agreed to let a boat come over and ordered the Chesapeake hove to. Even in peacetime, a prudent commander would call his crew to action when being approached by a warship of another nation. Barron felt this was unnecessary and waited to greet the British representative. The Royal Navy lieutenant handed Barron a letter from the admiral in command of the British squadron at the North American Station. The admiral demanded the return of every Royal Navy deserter onboard Chesapeake. Barron fumed at this insolence and flatly refused. Again setting sail, Barron saw the Leopard approaching his vessel. Another hailing call was made, but before Barron could reply the larger ship fired a shot across his bow. This was clearly a provocation. Barron was in a tight fix. He had not alerted the crew nor made any moves toward getting his guns ready for action.

Suddenly, the Leopard unleashed a massive broadside into the smaller American ship, sending splinters and hot iron tearing across the decks. The Chesapeake’s unprepared crew suffered a large number of casualties. Pandemonium ensued as the Americans scrambled to load and fire their guns. The materials stacked around the upper deck hampered their ability to operate quickly and efficiently. “For God’s sake, to fire one gun for the honor of the flag I must strike!” roared Barron, who had been wounded in the leg.

One officer managed to get a coal from the galley stove and used it to fire a single gun. Barron had no choice but to surrender. With dozens of men bleeding and dying on the decks he watched impotently as two boats loaded with officers and armed men boarded his ship. They found their four deserters and removed them from the ship. Then, the Leopard sailed off. Afterward the battered Chesapeake, with dead and dying men strewn across its bloody decks, limped back to Norfolk.

The first U.S. Navy officer to board the crippled frigate the following day was Decatur, the commandant of the Norfolk Navy Yard. He was horrified by the destruction and chaos, as well as downright angry. But unlike the rest of the nation, which was incensed with the unwarranted attack by the British, Decatur reserved his rancor for one man: James Barron. Decatur believed that Barron had surrendered to the British without a fight. In his mind, the act was simply unforgivable.

Decatur was appointed to the four-man court-martial board convened after a board of inquiry decided Barron should be held accountable for the disaster. Barron faced death if convicted. Decatur did not want to serve on the court-martial board because he believed he could not be objective.

Decatur had known Barron since 1798 when as a young midshipman on the frigate USS United States during the so-called Quasi-War with France, he had served under Third Lieutenant Barron. Decatur, who was 10 years younger than Barron, initially had great respect and admiration for Barron.

Over time Decatur’s opinion of Barron underwent a radical change. “He is an excellent seaman, but he is no soldier,” Decatur said. Barron simply did not measure up to Decatur’s high standards of courage and leadership.

If Barron, who would have to face the court-martial board, hoped for any leniency from his old protegé, he would be sorely disappointed. Decatur glared at his old mentor with uncompromising hostility. 

James Barron was court-martialed for surrendering the USS Chesapeake to the British warship HMS Leopard in 1807. Decatur, who served on the court-martial board, glared at his former mentor with hostility during the proceedings.

On June 22, 1807, the board found Barron guilty on all charges. Yet because of his long service and exemplary past conduct, he was suspended from the U.S. Navy for a period of five years without pay. Navy rules stated that after five years, effective January 1813, he would be permitted to reapply for his commission.

By that time, the United States was at war with Great Britain. The War of 1812 offered U.S. Navy officers many opportunities for distinction. Like many others, Decatur hungered for fame and glory, which he achieved quickly in one of the first naval victories of the war. On October 25, 1812, he crippled and captured the British frigate HMS Macedonian in an engagement in the Atlantic Ocean 500 miles south of the Azores. 

Barron returned to the United States in December 1818. During the war, while his fellow officers were actively fighting the Royal Navy, Barron was conspicuously absent. He remained in Denmark where he occasionally commanded British-registered merchant ships. It was also alleged that he had made disparaging remarks about the U.S. Navy to a British officer in Brazil. Many officers in the U.S. Navy considered this tantamount to treason.

Although Barron submitted an inquiry about his commission to the Secretary of the Navy in 1813, he did not reapply for it at that time. When he did try to regain his commission in 1818, he found no support for it. Many of the officers in the service opposed it. The most vocal of these was Decatur.

Barron was at first confused, hurt, and insulted. He was incensed when he learned that Decatur had said he could “insult Barron with impunity.” In the vernacular of the day, the expression meant that Barron lacked honor and was too cowardly to take insult. For Barron, who had been enduring scorn ever since his court-martial, Decatur’s dig was unbearable. 

He began by writing peevish letters to Decatur outlining his grievances. Never a combative man, as the affair with the Leopard indicated, he only seemed to want Decatur to acknowledge the insult and apologize. But these were things that the proud Decatur would not do. This continued until early the fall of 1819 when Barron’s letter writing stopped.

At that point, Decatur considered the matter done. Then, another letter arrived just before the end of the year. Barron’s earlier correspondence had been mostly self-serving and querulous. But the new letter was more challenging, almost as if someone else had written it. What had precipitated the sudden change?

Americans had learned that year that Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry had died on August 23 of yellow fever while on duty in South America. Although seemingly unconnected with the Barron-Decatur dispute, it may well have been the catalyst that led directly to the duel.

Captain Jesse Elliott, who was well known in the U.S. Navy for his confrontational behavior, had been second in command under Commodore Perry during the battle for Lake Erie in September 1813. Perry, himself a firebrand like his close friend Decatur, was angered at Elliott’s failure to carry out Perry’s orders to attack the British ships. He pressed charges of insubordination and cowardice against Elliott, but the demands of the war compelled the U.S. Navy to defer the matter until later.

Perry kept detailed records of the incident and never stopped his campaign to see Elliott court-martialed. The matter had not been resolved when Perry was sent to Venezuela on a diplomatic mission. Perry had handed his documents over to Decatur for safekeeping in case of his death.

Elliott approached Barron in late 1819 and offered his help. He had been a midshipman aboard USS Chesapeake in 1807 and had spoken in Barron’s defense at the court-martial. His involvement in the dispute coincided with Perry’s death. He knew that Perry had given his papers to Decatur. Perry was no longer a threat; Decatur was now the enemy. A man of much stronger will and determination than the complaining Barron, Elliott was almost certainly influencing him in the spring of 1820.

Although exasperated, Decatur told Barron that he accepted his challenge. As time passed, though, Decatur was unable to find a suitable officer to serve as his second. Commodores John Rodgers and David Porter, both of whom served on the Navy Board with Decatur, refused on the grounds that the duel was pointless.

From left: Commodore James Barron, Commodore William Bainbridge, and Captain Jesse Elliott.

Decatur was walking home from the Navy Department one day in March 1820 when a carriage stopped in front of him. Commodore William Bainbridge emerged from the carriage with a broad smile. Reaching for Decatur’s hand to give it a warm shake, he said, “Decatur, I’ve been a fool! I hope you will forgive me.”

This was totally unexpected and with good reason. In the early months of 1815, U.S. President James Madison had sent two strong squadrons of warships to the Mediterranean Sea to force the Barbary States into favorable treaty terms. Overall command was given to Commodore William Bainbridge, a hero of the War of 1812 and the captain of the Philadelphia when she was captured by the Tripolitans.

Bainbridge had every reason to want success and revenge. His subordinate, in command of the first squadron, was Decatur, who was to leave for the Mediterranean Sea a month earlier than Bainbridge. Eager and audacious as ever, Decatur confronted, blockaded, and threatened the four Barbary States and in less than two weeks had achieved every goal of the mission.

When Bainbridge arrived with his ships, he found that Decatur had done the job for him. A proud man, Bainbridge was suddenly irrelevant. He never forgave Decatur for stealing his glory. Decatur was not cruel or mean; he simply never gave a thought to Bainbridge’s feelings. Decatur had made a bitter enemy. When Bainbridge encountered Decatur in the halls of the Navy Department over the course of the next five years, he never uttered a single word to him.

Although he was confused by Bainbridge’s behavior, Decatur invited him to his home. At some point during their conversation, the subject of Decatur’s duel with Barron arose. Bainbridge offered to act as Decatur’s second. Decatur, who was relieved by the offer, gladly accepted it. Bainbridge set off to handle the duties of the second. He subsequently contacted Elliott and Barron to arrange the time, place, and other details.

For anyone other than Decatur, the sudden arrival and friendliness of someone who had spent five years in bitter hostility would seem highly suspicious. But Decatur, who was an honorable man, tended to attribute these qualities to others. He was too relieved to have a suitable second to question Bainbridge’s odd turnabout. But it is very likely Bainbridge had already been in contact with Elliott.

The seconds established the details of the duel. They selected a sloping field in Bladensburg, Maryland, that had long served as a dueling ground. Since dueling was technically illegal, it was better not to conduct it in the nation’s capital.

The duelists, who would use flintlock pistols, were told to arrive at 9 am on March 22, 1820. Some of the specifics established for the duel were unusual. Instead of having each man walk 10 to 12 paces, as was ordinarily done, and then turn, aim, and fire, Decatur and Barron would stand facing one another at eight paces with aimed pistols. Firing at each other from eight paces was almost sure to produce serious, and perhaps even fatal, wounds. This was likely to be the outcome even with the smoothbore pistols of the day.

Barron, who was over 50 and nearsighted, had asked for this concession to assure that he had an equal chance against the younger and steadier Decatur. Bainbridge was to count “one, two, three.” The duelists were to fire after one and before three.

The duelists, both of whom wore civilian clothes, arrived on time at the Bladensburg field. Each had come with his second, but Decatur also had the support of Commodores Rodgers and Porter. Barron appeared nervous and even reluctant, but Elliott was at his side, offering support and encouragement.

The two men faced each another. Decatur had told Rodgers he had no wish to kill Barron. At Bainbridge’s order to present, each man cocked and raised his pistol and took aim at his opponent’s hip. “I hope that when we meet in another world we will be better friends than we have in this,” Barron said.

“I have never been your enemy, sir,” replied Decatur.

Bainbridge began counting. Both guns discharged. Each barrel emitted a spurt of yellow flame followed by a cloud of white smoke. Barron grunted and slid to the ground; Decatur swayed on his feet. The color drained from his face as a bright red stain spread over his groin. “Oh, Lord,” Decatur mumbled. “I am a dead man.” He too fell to the ground.

Elliott ran for the carriage. He had almost reached it when Porter caught up to him and shouted at him to stop. “How do things fare?” asked Elliott.

Infuriated by Elliott’s flight, Porter said, “Go back and do your duty for your wounded friend!” Elliott never returned.

Meanwhile, Decatur was carried to his carriage. As he was laid inside, Baron said, “God bless you, Decatur.”

“Farewell, Barron,” Decatur replied in a weak voice.

Decatur died in his home later that day. His death plunged the nation into mourning.

Was it a legitimate duel or a conspiracy to kill Decatur? One point stands out. When Barron and Decatur had their verbal exchange just before firing, it was a clear sign that each had forgiven the other. That was the moment that either second should have spoken up and called a halt, since the duel was no longer necessary. But neither man did so. They failed to protect the men they had sworn to represent. The only plausible reason is that each had a motive for wanting Decatur dead.

Bainbridge wanted revenge, while Elliott sought to remove the final threat to his naval career embodied in the documents that Decatur had in his possession. Despite his unerring skill in naval combat and shrewd dealings with the Navy, Decatur was surprisingly obtuse in not realizing that the two seconds were his enemies.

As for Bainbridge, he had a strong desire to be remembered in a favorable light. He kept extensive letters and papers. Yet on his deathbed, he ordered his daughter to burn all his personal correspondence. This makes absolutely no sense; that is, unless those documents contained correspondence with Elliott and Barron detailing how they plotted to force Decatur into a duel.

Although these theories are now impossible to prove, the circumstantial evidence is compelling. All three officers had long and distinguished careers in the U.S. Navy. Decatur is revered to this day, while Barron is forever tainted as the man who killed a beloved naval hero. He might just have been a pawn in an even greater infamy.

 U.S.S Chesapeake and H.M.S Leopard

USS Texas in trouble..

I ran across this article while surfing around.  I really hope they can pull it together and save the ship.  There ain't any WWI Dreadnough around anymore.  Most of the American ones were either used as target ships for "Operation Crossroads" because it was quicker to blow them up rather than scrap or put the ships in a museum and others were scrapped.  We were drawing down after WWII and quickly demobilizing back to a peacetime military and we had a bunch of "Modern" ships from WWII so the older ships were expended.  USS Texas was spared such a fate as was the USS Olympia which was Admiral Dewey's flagship at the battle of Manila( where Old NFO manned the tiller and stood resolutely by, but that is another story) and IJN Mikasa the only pre-Dreadnough battleship left in the world.  The USS Texas is tangible link to our past and it showed when men of Iron sailed on ships of steel.  Tradition is important to anybody with a martial interest, it gives the Soldiers and Sailors today a link to the past and it reaffirms their belief in themselves and their country.  I keep thinking if I ever scored the lottery, I would blow a huge chunk of my fortune to save those ships.

 

Battleship Texas BB35 is a New York-class battleship that has the distinction of having served in both World War I and World War II. The 104-year-old ship is facing possibly its toughest battle as it fights a two front war against time and budgetary constraints.

The aging battleship is currently closed to the public as it undergoes repairs. Corrosion has caused leaks in the hull of the last remaining WWI dreadnought. Officials have stated that they are pumping 300,000 gallons of water out of the hull every day.

A heavy German coast artillery shell falls between Texas (in the background) and Arkansas while the two battleships were engaging Battery Hamburg during the battle of Cherbourg, France, 25 June 1944

The state of Texas had been paying for maintenance on the ship but it has announced that it will no longer do so after paying $35 million to have the ship floated to a shipyard to undergo the repairs.
This means that the ship will have to support itself based on admission fees. That would require 300,000 people to pay to visit it each year in order to fund its own maintenance costs. Currently, the ship is berthed by the San Jacinto Battle Monument in La Porte, Texas. That site does not get enough visitors to keep the ship afloat.

The tale of American exploits during WWI and WWII will not be complete without mention of Texas BB 35

Galveston has emerged as a front runner to provide a home for the Texas. They have two locations that could take the battleship, though both have problems which need to be addressed before the ship could dock there. These findings are from a citizen-led committee’s report which provides recommendations on where the ship could be berthed.
Seawolf Park on Pelican Island and Pier 21 located on Galveston’s harbor are the two locations identified in the report.

A veteran of two world wars

Bruce Bramlett, executive director of the Battleship Texas Foundation, says that the ship needs to find a spot with higher visitation which would rule Seawolf Park out in his mind. “That would be a worse location that what we’re in,” he said.
Seawolf Park currently sees 80,000 visitors per year according to park managers for the Galveston. This is not nearly enough to support the Texas. But Galveston Island Convention & Visitors Bureau Chief Tourism Officer, Michael Woody, believes that the number would rise with the Texas berthed there.

Having the historic ship located in Seawolf Park, which already hosts the USS Cavalla and the USS Stewart, would provide opportunities for education programs, school trips, corporate events and even increase leisure traffic at the park.
Pier 21 has the benefit of being near downtown and cruise ship traffic. This would provide the necessary numbers to support the ship. But having the battleship docked there would exacerbate parking and crowding issues already being experienced at the pier.
Also, the berth at Pier 21 is 510 feet long but the Texas is 560 feet long. With budgetary constraints, the city may simply not be able to afford the work required to bring the Texas to that site.
The city officials have stated that they will require more information before deciding if they want to make a bid for hosting the Texas.
Representative Mayes Middleton is on the committee researching locations in Galveston says that the bottom line is whether Galveston has the number of visitors required to support the Texas. He says that since the ship needs 300,000 visitors each year and Galveston sees over 7 million tourists every year, the numbers aren’t a problem.
The committee is expecting to release the full report along with its recommendations this month.
Meanwhile, the Battleship Texas Foundation, which is responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the Texas, is pushing for the ship to be placed in a dry berth. The constant contact with salt water has weakened the hull of the ship and caused many leaks.
Work on building the Texas began in 1910.  After serving in both world wars, the Texas was placed under the care of the Battleship Texas Commission in 1947. The Texas became one of the first museum ships in the US. In 1983, leadership of the Texas was transferred to the Texas Park and Wildlife department. At that time, a survey showed that the watertight seal. The ship was closed to the public for nearly two years while repairs were made.
In 2010, a new leak led to the ship sinking 2-3 feet. In 2012, 30 new leaks were discovered. The ship was once again repaired and reopened to the public.
The Battle Ship Commission would like to see the ship placed in a dry berth, out of the water. Then they could stop spending money on repairs. But getting the Texas out of the water will cost $40 million. The foundation is willing to raise part of the money but seeking assurance from the government that they will provide the rest.

The Fastest class of ship by class in WWII

I shamelessly clipped this from "The Navy General Board".  Only ship they really missed was the Submarine, and I will do some research on that one.   Yep found it, There were 2 of them actually, one was Japanese, the Type I-201 and the German XVII.  The Japanese sub started construction but was never completed.  It was projected to be phenomenally fast, but the class was never commissioned, whereas the German submarine was commissioned and entered service, but there were only 3 of them that were commissioned and one became HMS Meteorite.  the others were scuttled after the war by their crews.

Submarines

 The Type XVII U-boats were small coastal submarines that used a high-test peroxide propulsion system, which offered a combination of air-independent propulsion and high submerged speeds.

In the early 1930s Hellmuth Walter had designed a small, high-speed submarine with a streamlined form propelled by high-test peroxide (HTP) and in 1939 he was awarded a contract to build an experimental vessel, the 80 ton V-80, which achieved an underwater speed of 28.1 knots (52.0 km/h; 32.3 mph) during trials in 1940. In November 1940 Admirals Erich Raeder and Werner Fuchs (head of the Kriegsmarine's Construction Office) witnessed a demonstration of the V-80; Raeder was impressed, but Fuchs was slow to approve further tests.
Following the success of the V-80's trials, Walter contacted Karl Dönitz in January 1942, who enthusiastically embraced the idea and requested that these submarines be developed as quickly as possible. An initial order was placed in summer 1942 for four Type XVIIA development submarines.



Do you have the need for speed? The warships in this article certainly do! We have previously done articles about the largest cruisers and the biggest battleships. For this article we are breaking the fastest warships of World War 2 based on class. We will examine the fastest destroyer, cruiser, battleship, and aircraft carrier used during the Second World War. Some ships are relatively well known, but a few of our winners are largely unknown warships to the public at large. However, they all have one thing in common and that is that they are all exceedingly fast.

Fastest Destroyer – Le Fatasque Class

The fastest destroyers of World War II actually entered service during the mid 1930s. These destroyers were the Le Fantasque class of France. The Le Fantasque class were designed to operate with France’s high speed battleship and cruiser forces. To perform in this role, the Le Fantasque class needed to equip powerful engines in a large hull for the nessacary speed and seaworthiness.
Six ships of this class were built, consisting of the ships Le Fantasque, Le Malin, Le Terrible, L’Indomptable, L’Audacieux, and Le Triopmhant. Though the ships were large, exceeding 430′ (132m) in length, they carried a correspondingly large powerplant. The destroyers could produce up to 81,000shp, enough to propel the ships to speeds of 45 knots. This not only made them the fastest destroyers of World War II, but the fastest destroyers of all time!
At the start of World War II, the six ships of the Le Fantasque class were all assigned to France’s powerful Force De Raid squadron. Following the German conquest of France, the sisters then joined the Vichy French fleet. Two of the ships, L’Indomptable and L’Audacieux, were lost. (L’Indomptable at Toulon in Nov 1942 and L’Audacieux at Bizerte in May 1943). The surviving four ships joined the Allies and were sent to the United States for refit. Under the Allies, the Le Fantasque class were reclassified as cruisers. They were also equipped with so much new weaponry and equipment that their famous speed was dropped to 37 knots. This made them slower than other destroyers (Tashkent, Shimakaze), however none of those ships could approach their original speed. The remaining ships surviving World War II and survived into the late 1950s, early 1960s.

Fastest Cruiser – Capitani Romani Class

The Le Fantasque class destroyers were amazingly fast ships and for that reason, they worried France’s rivals. Italy’s solution? To develop the fastest cruiser to counter the fastest destroyer. These ships, the Capitani Romani class, were designed to outrun and outgun the powerful French destroyers. To do this, they carried a light cruisers armament and powerplant and crammed them into an oversized destroyer hull.
Though twelve of these ships were envisioned by Italy, only four would be completed. Of those ships, only three (Scipione Africano, Attilio Regolo, and Pompeo Magno) managed to be completed before the Italian Armistice. At only 466′ overall and displacing less than 5,500 tons, the ships were small for cruisers. However, with their powerful 125,000 shp engines the Capitani Romani class could exceed 40 knots. During trials, the ships exceeded 43 knots though at combat displacement they could only manage about 40-41 knots at combat loads.
The Capitani Romani class did not see much combat during World War II. Of the three ships, only Scipione Africano saw combat. On the night of July 17, 1943, she ambushed a small squadron of British MTB (Motor Torpedo Boat). Using radar, Scipione Africano detected the British ships and immediately accelerated. Using her high speed, she managed to catch the MTBS by surprise. With rapid, accurate fire, she sank one and damaged another. She rapidly cleared the area before the remaining British ships could mount a counter-attack. After the War, the Capitani Romani class saw more use. Two of the ships were ceded to France where they were refitted and served until the 1970s. The other two ships continued to serve in the Italian Navy, one making it until the 1980s.

Fastest Carrier – Shokaku Class

During the mid 1930s, Japan removed itself from the Washington Naval Treaty. Freed from the treaties’ limitations, Japan sought to produce a new purpose built aircraft carrier that would combine all the best features of previous designs. Ordered in 1937, this new design would become known as the Shokaku class. Entering service in 1941, the Shokaku class might have been the best aircraft carrier design in the World at the time.
Two ships of the class entered service, Shokaku and Zuikaku. Capable of operating up to 84 aircraft, the ships were large with a length of 844′ and a displacement of 31,600 long tons. Getting this bulk through the water was not difficult however as the Shokaku class were fitted with the most powerful power plant ever installed in a Japanese warship. Capable of generating over 160,000shp, the powerplants of the Shokaku class were more powerful than those found in the monstrous Yamato class battleships or the powerful Mogami class cruisers. The powerful engines, when coupled with a sleek hull design and a bulbous bow, gave the Shokaku class an extremely high speed of 34.5 knots.
The Shokaku sisters fought in every major naval battle of the Pacific Campaign. They were arguably the most powerful carriers in the Japanese arsenal. (Taiho might be considered more powerful, but she never carried an experienced airgroup like the Shokaku sisters.) Immediately after commissioning, the carriers began preparing to take part in the Pearl Harbor raid. Following the raid, they then took part in other engagements such as the Battle of Coral Sea and the Indian Ocean Raid. These early engagements resulted in the loss of experienced aircrew. The sisters continued fighting, but not quite at the lethal efficiency they once enjoyed. Shokaku was finally sunk during the Battle of the Philippine Sea by a submarine. Zuikaku was sacrificed as a diversion during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, being sunk by American carrier aircraft.

Fastest Battleship – Iowa Class

Prior to World War II, the United States had long been preparing for a possible conflict with Japan. Realizing the complications from engaging a nation that was on the opposite side of the Pacific, the United States developed War Plan Orange. The plan called for the American fleet to fight its way across the Pacific and engage the Japanese Combined Fleet in a decisive engagement. The of the major issues was the Japanese Kongo class. American planners feared that the high speed of these warships would allow them to simply bypass the main fleet and strike the vulnerable transports and carriers. To counter a high speed battleship, a battleship with even higher speed was needed.
The Iowa class battleships were the result of that requirement. Six ships were ordered, but only four (Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, and Wisconsin) would be completed, the first ships entering service in 1943. The need to carry a powerful powerplant resulted in the largest US Battleship ever produced. The ships were just over 887′ in length overall with a displacement of 57,000 tons at full load. Propelling this bulk through the water was a massive 212,000shp powerplant. At combat loads, the Iowa class could exceed 32 knots. Lightly loaded, New Jersey managed to steam at a remarkable 35.2 knots for six hours during a trial run in 1968.
The four Iowa class sisters had longer careers than any other ship on this list. All four ships served on and off throughout the mid to late 1900s with the ships finally being retired by 1992. During their long service careers, the ships found in not just World War II, but in the Korean War, Vietnam War, and even the Gulf War. This is particularly amazing when you consider the fact that the age of dreadnoughts ended with World War II, 45 years before these ships were finally decommissioned for good.