X-51 Scramjet Engine demonstrator

Compliments of Global Security.org

X-51 Scramjet Engine Demonstrator - WaveRider (SED-WR)

A flight test scheduled for 14 August 2012 reportedly ended in failure according to a tweet from Wired.com's Danger Room on 15 August 2012, which said that a fin problem had caused control of the aircraft to be lost before the main engine could even be started. No official press release from the US Air Force of DARPA on the results of the test or possible rescheduling of the test were available by the end of the day on 14 August 2012. At that time, it was estimated that $250-300 million had been spent on the X-51 program.
In a note sent to the media on 15 August 2012, the US Air Force said that the X-51A test flight had ended prematurely. While the X-51 vehicle had safely separated from the B-52 carrier aircraft and the rocket booster had fired as planned, after 16 seconds, a fault was identified with one of the cruiser control fins. Once the X-51 separated from the rocket booster, approximately 15 seconds later, the cruiser was not able to maintain control due to the faulty control fin and was lost. The control subsystem at fault had not experienced issues in the previous 2 test flights and program officials were to begin to explore the circumstances of the failure. Following the 14 August 2012, one of the 4 X-51A aircraft product up to that point remained, but it was unclear whether that vehicle would be tested in its existing configuration.
The X-51 Scramjet Engine Demonstrator Waverider Program is an advanced hypersonic propulsion development effort funded by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The X-51A Flight Test Program plans to demonstrate the scramjet engine within the Mach 4.5 to 6.0+ range with four flight tests beginning in 2009. The program will set the foundation for several hypersonic applications, including access to space, reconnaissance-strike and global reach.
The first flight 26 May 2010 set a record for duration at hypersonic speed. The flight was about 10 times longer than any previous hypersonic scramjet flight and "80 to 90 percent" of flight test objectives were achieved. By that time, it was estimated that $200 million had been spent on the program. Program officials said 15 March 2011 that the Air Force planned to fly its second X-51A Waverider hypersonic flight test demonstrator as early as 22 March 2011. During the test attempt in March, the scramjet failed to release from the B-52 and the team went to work to create a solution.
A B-52H Stratofortress on loan to Edwards released the experimental vehicle from an altitude of approximately 50,000 feet 13 June 2011. After release, the X-51 was initially accelerated by a solid rocket booster. The hypersonic aircraft was successfully boosted to just over Mach 5 and the scramjet engine lit, but it failed to transition to full power. The second X-51 supersonic combustion scramjet test vehicle actually produced more thrust than expected before the test flight ended in failure. Although the second flight test of the X-51A Waverider scramjet ended prematurely, the coordination and performance of the Hypersonics Combined Test Force and the 419th Flight Test Squadron was flawless. This second flight ended with a controlled landing into the ocean.  Read the rest here

Dishonorable Disclosures

When I was in the service, I was part of the branch that was "always out front".  We did and saw things that most people never saw or will see.  When I was in, one of the things I had besides a security clearance was a 75 year non-disclosure...basically I cannot tell or talk about what I did while I was in.  Any discussions had the possibility of leaking some kind of information that could compromise something.  So we just never talk about it.  I have been out for 21 years and people ask what I did, I make some comment about " I did a lot of things" or I just worked in the mail room or something.(which I did for 90 days).  The point is that we just don't talk about it.  I have been appalled by the leaks that I have seen, the release of the OBL hit right after it happened.  Nothing like putting a bulls eye on somebody or their family.  Remember these people don"t have the same belief in the sanctity of human life like we do.  they would think nothing about taking out the families of Seal Team Six as a form of jihad.  We used to have leaders that respected operation security...these clown are more concerned about getting reelected than doing the right thing.  They are elitist, the people that are at risk are the people from "flyover country".  The ones that didn't get into the right schools... Didn't become part of the apparachik, the cultural elitist, the ones that know what is best for the rest of the dumb masses.
     The people that will have to deal with the fallout from these leaks will not be going to the houses of the Hollywood celebrities for fundraisers, they will not be getting their name in the newspaper for some policy decision,  they will be the ones that stand guard over this country, walking the perimeters at night, going into all the dark places that they go and protect this country like their parents and grandparents have done before them. 

The Future of NATO?

When I was part of the NATO alliance we made jokes that if the romping stomping Red Army came across the Fulda Gap,   We made jokes that we would be speedbumps for the 8th Guards Army out of Weimar.
      patrolling the 1K zone was sobering duty for a young soldier, we had to be ready all the time to go to war so we trained accordingly.  I considered my time in the Big Red One out of Cooke Barracks one of the highlights of my Army time 

I have done other NATO postings here

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (NATO / OTAN)
Flag of NATO[1]
NATO countries shown in green

By Robert D. Kaplan
Whatever one thought of the Libya intervention, the details make for a bad advertisement about NATO. As one U.S. Air Force planner told me, "It was like Snow White and the 27 dwarfs, all standing up to her knees" -- the United States being Snow White and the other NATO member states being the dwarfs. The statistics regarding just how much the United States had to go it alone in Libya -- pushed by the British and French -- despite the diplomatic fig leaf of "leading from behind," are devastating for the alliance.
More than 80 percent of the gasoline used in the intervention came from the U.S. military. Almost all the individual operation orders had an American address. Of dozens of countries taking part, only eight air forces were allowed by their defense ministries to drop any bombs. Many flew sorties apparently only for the symbolism of it. While most airstrikes were carried out by non-U.S. aircraft, the United States ran the logistical end of the war.
"Europe is dead militarily," a U.S. general told me. In 1980, European countries accounted for 40 percent of NATO's total defense spending; now they account for 20 percent. One numbered air force within the U.S. Air Force is larger than the British Ministry of Defense. Western Europe's military budgets are plummeting, even as their armed forces are not allowed by local politicians to do much besides participate in humanitarian relief exercises

Read more: NATO's Ordinary Future By Robert D. Kaplan | Stratfor

Army continues upgrading M1 Tanks

I

I remembered seeing the M1 for the first time on a training area on Hohenfels in Germany.  Anybody that has been in Germany has been to Honenfels or Graf or Wildflicken.  We have seen the M1 Tanks and they are impressive.  I am glad to see the Army upgrading the M1.  Every time in the past, we would go into battle unprepared.  We learned the lessons of the Kasserine Pass where a bunch of American tanks had their asses handed to them by superior German tanks or at the outbreak of the Korean war with Task Force Smith where the American Shermans had problems with the North Korean T34/76 and T34/85 and the IS-2(Josef Stalin) Heavy Tank
      The M1's saw their baptism of fire in the first Gulf war and devastated their Iraqi counterparts.  The T-55/62 and the T72M were no match for the M1's.  No matter what other weapon system is deployed, nothing kills a tank like another tank.  In my opinion if we had our own armor rather than relying on the pakastani's or indians during the Battle of Mogadishu we would have been better served.
     The M1 has built a fearsome reputation since its initial deployment to the first Gulf War, in the past we always had the inferior tank at the start of any war, with the M1 we finally had a tank that was state of the art.
     With the Chinese stirring up problems, the possibility of us facing off against a heavy division of the opponents is possible.  Upgraded Strykers cannot face off tanks.


The Army won’t be sized for big-time wars anymore. American units are going to begin coming home from Europe. There’s a food fight in the works over what roles and missions, including heavy units, sluice down into the Guard and Reserves.
But all that stuff is tomorrow or beyond. Today, the Army is making hay while the sun shines — it’s going forward with its plan to continue improving its flaship M1 Abrams main battle tank.
On Friday, General Dynamics Land Systems announced it had received a $60 million contract to continue work upgrading the Army’s M1A1-variant Abrams tanks to the M1A2 Systems Enhancement Package (SEP) V2 configuration — the king of the jungle. Here’s how GD described them in its announcement:

The most technologically advanced digital tank, the M1A2 SEP V2 includes improved color displays, day and night thermal sights, commander remote operated weapon station (CROWS II), a Thermal Management System (TMS) and a tank-infantry phone.  The M1A2 SEP V2 maximizes the fighting ability of the tank on today’s battlefield while preparing the platform for tomorrow’s challenges. The original order was made under a multi-year contract awarded in February 2008, which authorized the upgrade of 435 M1A1 tanks that have been in the Army’s inventory for more than 20 years.  General Dynamics is continuing the conversion of the tanks in the Army’s active component to the M1A2 SEP V2 configuration.

The question about where those tanks will ultimately end up could become one of DoD’s central questions over the coming year. Everybody loves big, heavy, old-fashioned, rolling-thunder units, ripping up the mud with their treads and shooting the hell out of their targets downrange, but they could start to seem pretty expensive in the austerity Army. There’s a school of thought, broached at last year’s Association of the United States Army trade show and elsewhere, that the Army should move many or most of its active tank units into the Guard and Reserves.
In keeping with the new doctrine of “reversibility,” transferring heavy brigades to the reserve component is the best compromise under the circumstances, advocates might say. If the United States needs to go fight another major land war — which Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey seems to think is quite possible — it will be able to call up heavy units just in case. They won’t be ready as quickly as they might be today, but at least they’d be there. (Besides, what’re the odds of a big force-on-force armor engagement anytime soon in the 21st century?)
On the other hand, although “reversibility” is the new DoD-level buzzword, the Army-level buzzword has long been “balance.” Dialing back some active brigades to zero is exactly the kind of thing Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno and Dempsey, during his brief stint as chief, both warned about. The Army has got to be able to keep its ability to do everything, they argue — with a lower end strength, maybe, but at least in proportion to the rest of the service.
The answers aren’t at all clear, but with hundreds of billions in reduced budget growth hanging over its head, the Army may not have much longer before it must start deciding.

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/01/09/upgrades-continue-amid-questions-about-armors-future/#ixzz1jDAPsr6v
DoDBuzz.com

Explaination of Obunglers policies...

I get an intelligence summary in my e-mail, it usually pertains to international affairs, and despite what we wish sometimes, what happens overseas does affect us at home.  Stratfor wrote a very good piece on the American political system, It mentions things that I already knew and also things that I haven't considered.    You can get free intelligence summaries in your e-mail also.

By George Friedman
STRATFOR does not normally involve itself in domestic American politics. Our focus is on international affairs, and American politics, like politics everywhere, is a passionate business. The vilification from all sides that follows any mention we make of American politics is both inevitable and unpleasant. Nevertheless, it’s our job to chronicle the unfolding of the international system, and the fact that the United States is moving deeply into an election cycle will affect American international behavior and therefore the international system.

The United States remains the center of gravity of the international system. The sheer size of its economy (regardless of its growth rate) and the power of its military (regardless of its current problems) make the United States unique. Even more important, no single leader of the world is as significant, for good or bad, as the American president. That makes the American presidency, in its broadest sense, a matter that cannot be ignored in studying the international system.
The American system was designed to be a phased process. By separating the selection of the legislature from the selection of the president, the founders created a system that did not allow for sudden shifts in personnel. Unlike parliamentary systems, in which the legislature and the leadership are intimately linked, the institutional and temporal uncoupling of the system in the United States was intended to control the passing passions by leaving about two-thirds of the U.S. Senate unchanged even in a presidential election year, which always coincides with the election of the House of Representatives. Coupled with senatorial rules, this makes it difficult for the president to govern on domestic affairs. Changes in the ideological tenor of the system are years in coming, and when they come they stay a long time. Mostly, however, the system is in gridlock. Thomas Jefferson said that a government that governs least is the best. The United States has a vast government that rests on a system in which significant change is not impossible but which demands a level of consensus over a period of time that rarely exists.
This is particularly true in domestic politics, where the complexity is compounded by the uncertainty of the legislative branch. Consider that the healthcare legislation passed through major compromise is still in doubt, pending court rulings that thus far have been contradictory. All of this would have delighted the founders if not the constantly trapped presidents, who frequently shrug off their limits in the domestic arena in favor of action in the international realm, where their freedom to maneuver is much greater, as the founders intended

    Read the rest here

9-11 and the successful war...

By George Friedman
It has been 10 years since 9/11, and all of us who write about such things for a living are writing about it. That causes me to be wary. I prefer being the lonely voice, but the fact is that 9/11 was a defining moment in American history. On Sept. 12, 2001, few would have anticipated the course the resulting war would take — but then, few knew what to think. The nation was in shock. In retrospect, many speak with great wisdom about what should have been thought about 9/11 at the time and what should have been done in its aftermath. I am always interested in looking at what people actually said and did at the time.
The country was in shock, and shock was a reasonable response. The country was afraid, and fear was a reasonable response. Ten years later, we are all much wiser and sure that our wisdom was there from the beginning. But the truth is that, in retrospect, we know we would have done things superbly had we the authority. Few of us are being honest with ourselves. We were all shocked and frightened. Our wisdom came much later, when it had little impact. Yes, if we knew then what we know now we would have all bought Google stock. But we didn’t know things then that we know now, so it is all rather pointless to lecture those who had decisions to make in the midst of chaos.
Some wars are carefully planned, but even those wars rarely take place as expected. Think of the Germans in World War I, having planned the invasion of France for decades and with meticulous care. Nothing went as planned for either side, and the war did not take a course that was anticipated by anyone. Wars occur at unpredictable times, take unpredictable courses and have unexpected consequences. Who expected the American Civil War to take the course it did? We have been second-guessing Lincoln and Davis, Grant and Lee and all the rest for more than a century.

      Read more here

September 11th is approaching...

It is Sept. 1, and that means we are once again approaching the anniversary of al Qaeda’s Sept. 11, 2001, attacks against the United States. In the 10 years that have passed since the attacks, a lot has happened and much has changed in the world, but many people can still vividly recall the sense of fear, uncertainty and helplessness they felt on that September morning. Millions of people watched United Airlines flight 175 smash into the south tower of the World Trade Center on live television. A short while later they heard that another plane had struck the Pentagon. Then they watched in horror as the World Trade Center’s twin towers buckled and collapsed to the ground.

Read more: Why Al Qaeda is Unlikely to Execute Another 9/11 | STRATFOR

America's Strategic Learning Disability

 I have commented more than once that we as a nation has lost its Strategic vision, we do what is politically expedient versus what is right for the long term goals and security of the United States .  We had the stones as a nation to defeat Germany and Japan and the pacific war with japan was particularly nasty with no quarters given.  Since that we have performed half measures especially related to Vietnam and I believe now to Iraq and Afganistan.  I remember U.S. Grant the Union General and later President of the United States had a comment" Better to pay the butchers bill now when it is cheaper than later where the price is higher."  He believed in overwhelming force to crush the enemy to get the war over with sooner.  We are more concerned about political fallout than what is proper course of action.


I got this from here






Via one of the most reliable conduits of truth about the Army — the mysterious stick figure known only as Doctrine Man — here’s a very interesting writeup: Retired Army Lt. Gen. James Dubik has a piece in this month’s Army magazine called ‘A National Strategic Learning Disability’ in which he wonders whether the United States has what it takes at the top leadership level in order to prosecute its national goals.
“Our national strategies and policies have dragged out operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, costing more in lives, sacrifices, money and political will than was necessary,” Dubik writes. The U.S. did not finish key jobs in Iraq or Afghanistan, he argues, because it mistakenly thought it had accomplished goals it hadn’t and didn’t have a full understanding of what it wanted. This leads him to ask four key questions: “Do we have the ability to construct and execute a coherent national strategy? Have we lost the ability to use force decisively? Do we confuse ending a war with an ‘exit strategy’ to leave a war? Do we lack strategic imagination?” Quick answers: Yes; yes; no; yes.
Still there? All right. If you want to keep reading, here’s much more elaboration: Dubik’s assessment about the American ability to contemplate and execute a master strategy is succinct but devastating, and it’s worth quoting in its entirety:

With respect to the war against al Qaeda, we have been out of balance from the start by not really deciding whether to treat al Qaeda as a war enemy or international criminals (it has elements of both) and overmilitarizing, at least initially, the strategy that we did execute. Finally, we have been out of balance from the start in that we have never figured out a way to pay for our operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and against al Qaeda—a key element of any national strategy.
In sum, for a decade our national strategy has been ineffective. Two strategically important results have emerged. First, American military forces have been at war, but for much of this period neither the government nor the nation has been at war. Second, we have spent blood, money and national reputation to not accomplish our strategic aims.

Nearly 10 years later, nobody remembers the voices after Sept. 11 that argued you can’t have a ‘war on terrorism,’ i.e., a tactic, and that cited examples in Europe and elsewhere where terrorists were treated as criminals, with a reactive, law enforcement-style approach, as opposed to an aggressive military campaign. But Americans were in payback mode and wanted revenge, so they did not want to just sit idle and settle for trying evildoers in court. (Many still don’t.) So the U.S. may have chosen the wrong strategy, but it can still build and execute one. Then again, there’s a case to be made that the current strategy of eliminating the threat posed by radical, anti-American Islam is flawed because it requires the impossible: eliminating an idea. At least in the Cold War, ‘containment’ was achievable. In fact, the West fared pretty well, even if there are a few stragglers here and there.
As for force, Dubik argues the U.S. has fallen into a trap of using the least amount possible, requiring commanders to re-learn the painful lesson that doing so doesn’t actually save you anything. “This apparent economy protracts war because it yields the strategic initiative to the enemy. They get to choose whether to ‘up the ante.’ In war, force should be applied in ways that reduce the options of one’s enemies and increase one’s own.” Presidents Bush and Obama eventually had no choice but to resort to “surges,” which appeared to help turn the tide in their respective wars.
This is the critical point: Wars are started by politicians, and the more troops in harm’s way, the more of a political risk to them. Sending more troops means there’s more of a chance average Americans might pay attention to what’s happening, also increasing the risk they might decide they oppose it. It’s just more effective politically to use the least you can of a comparatively small, volunteer force, especially when people ‘support the troops’ no matter what — just so long as they don’t have to do anything else, including sacrifice or serve.
As to Dubik’s next question, it’s difficult to confuse an ‘exit strategy’ with a legitimate end to a war. To return to his first point, the U.S. began its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan without a specific, achievable end state in mind — a flawed strategy. Compare the state of Iraq today to 1991, when President George H.W. Bush set a discrete goal — eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eliminate them as a threat to their neighbors — and accomplished it deftly. It meant he endured slings and arrows from neoconservatives who wanted Saddam deposed, but in retrospect we can see its elegance: Iraq remained a stable, if hollow, version of its former self and a check on Iranian adventurism.
The current American withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan is about cutting losses and crossing fingers — both countries could devolve into violent anarchy within six months of the pullouts. But America is sick of war, broke and becoming resigned to the reality that after a decade and some $4 trillion, Iraq and Afghanistan are as good as they’re going to get. What stops insurgents from just hiding out until American troops are gone? How will both countries afford and maintain their U.S.-trained militaries over the long term? That would require perpetual commitments in both places, which some people support, but most Americans don’t.
Dubik’s final point is that commanders’ lack of ‘strategic imagination’ has continued to trip up military campaigns over the past decade, and will keep doing so unless the brass overcomes it. He writes:

Ten years of evidence that war has more than one form seems to have been insufficient to prompt adequate adaptation—domestically or internationally. Current discussions often find adherents claiming that the conflict in Libya isn’t a war, for example, or that war cannot be waged in cyberspace. Without adequate strategic imagination, America perpetually risks not only applying a strategy that does not match the specific enemy and situation of a given case, but also having a set of institutions and procedures equivalent to attempting to fit a round peg into a square hole. Thus we risk more examples of spending our strategic capital— lives, sacrifice, money and will—in not attaining our strategic aims.

This might be the toughest point of all — can you change culture? And can you change it quickly enough to respond to all of today’s threats?
What do you think?

Read more here

Black Seas fleet will receive new aircraft

I got this from one of my airplane sources.  it does have me concerned with the recent russian militarism and Putin wanting to return the Russians back into the romping, stomping, red army.  With us retreating from the world stage, the Russian and Chinese are expanding.

Russian Black Sea fleet in the next three years will receive not only the new frigates, corvettes and submarines, but also 12 new aircrafts Su-30 CM. They will replace the front-line bomber Su-24, which nowadays are based at the airfield Guards (Crimea).
This is a new modification of the Su-30 MKI, which is capable to gain speed up to 2.1 thousand miles an hour and to fly to a distance of three thousand kilometers. Combat radius of the Su-30 cm is 1.5 thousand kilometers. The aircraft can carry a gun with a total weight of up to eight tons. Earlier it was reported that in 2012, naval aviation was expecting the first batch of new deck-based fighters Mig-29K.
“The first four MiG-29K can be supplied already in 2012. The Armament Department just should make a contract with the weapons industry for the construction and purchase of these aircrafts,” – said the commander of Naval Aviation Navy, General Major Igor Kozhin in an interview to Dni.ru. “But if this does not happen the new aircrafts will be able to get in the combat system of Naval Aviation only in 2013” – he added.

The Arab-Israili problems intensify

I get these in the mail,  As a former analyst, I still like to get information that keeps me up to date in that area.
Israeli-Arab Crisis Approaching By George Friedman | August 23, 2011 In September, the U.N. General Assembly will vote on whether to recognize Palestine as an independent and sovereign state with full rights in the United Nations. In many ways, this would appear to be a reasonable and logical step. Whatever the Palestinians once were, they are clearly a nation in the simplest and most important sense — namely, they think of themselves as a nation. Nations are created by historical circumstances, and those circumstances have given rise to a Palestinian nation. Under the principle of the United Nations and the theory of the right to national self-determination, which is the moral foundation of the modern theory of nationalism, a nation has a right to a state, and that state has a place in the family of nations. In this sense, the U.N. vote will be unexceptional. However, when the United Nations votes on Palestinian statehood, it will intersect with other realities and other historical processes. First, it is one thing to declare a Palestinian state; it is quite another thing to create one. The Palestinians are deeply divided between two views of what the Palestinian nation ought to be, a division not easily overcome. Second, this vote will come at a time when two of Israel’s neighbors are coping with their own internal issues. Syria is in chaos, with an extended and significant resistance against the regime having emerged. Meanwhile, Egypt is struggling with internal tension over the fall of President Hosni Mubarak and the future of the military junta that replaced him. Add to this the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the potential rise of Iranian power, and the potential recognition of a Palestinian state — while perfectly logical in an abstract sense — becomes an event that can force a regional crisis in the midst of ongoing regional crises. It thus is a vote that could have significant consequences       Read the rest of it  here

Intelligence analyst of the Norway bombings

I get intelligence summaries in my mailbox,   This is a good site, you can get in their e-mail list .


      I will be surprised if this is anything other than jihadist trying to make a statement and strike fear in the Scandanavian countries.  Remember a few years ago when the cartoonist drew a cartoon of mohammed and the islamic area erupted in rage.  Of course that seems to be the the normal course of action.  They get upset and expect the west to apologize for what ever transgression is committed.  I of course never see them apologize for anything.  They view the western based world with contempt, they view us as weak.  Such things will become more prevelant as time goes on.  especially with the U.S. starting to withdraw from that area of the world.

Firefighters at the site of an explosion near government buildings in Oslo on July 22
What the Norway Attack Could Mean for Europe July 22, 2011 At least 17 people have died and more have been injured in an explosion in downtown Oslo and a shooting at a Labor Party youth camp outside the Norwegian capital. Norwegian police arrested the shooter at the camp and believe he is connected with the explosion, though others could be involved. The significance of the events in Norway for the rest of Europe will depend largely on who is responsible, and the identity of the culprits is still unclear. However, STRATFOR can extrapolate the possible consequences of the attacks based on several scenarios. The first scenario is that grassroots Islamist militants based in Norway are behind these seemingly connected attacks. Grassroots jihadist groups are already assumed to exist across Europe, and this assumption — along with previous attacks — has bolstered far-right political parties' popularity across the Continent. Many center-right politicians have also begun raising anti-immigrant policy issues in order to distract from the ongoing economic austerity measures brought about by the European economic crisis. If grassroots Islamist militants are found to be the culprits in Norway, it will simply reinforce the current European political trend that favors the far right. That said, some far-right parties, particularly in Northern Europe, could get a popularity boost sufficient to push them into the political mainstream, and possibly into government. If an individual, grassroots or organized domestic group with far-right or neo-Nazi leanings perpetrated the attack, the significance for the rest of Europe will not be large. It could lead to a temporary loss of popularity for the far right, but long-term repercussions for the far right are unlikely since these parties have begun tempering their platforms in order to attract a wider constituency. There is also the possibility that the attacks are the work of a skilled but disturbed individual with grievances against the Labor Party. This possibility would have few long-ranging repercussions beyond a reworking of domestic security procedures in Norway. Another scenario is that the attack was carried out by an international group which may have entered the country some time ago. Regardless of the time frame, if the culprits crossed a border to get into Norway, other European countries will feel very vulnerable; Norway is Europe's northern terminus, and if international militants can get to Norway, they can get to anywhere in Europe. This vulnerability could severely damage the Schengen Agreement, once a symbolic pillar of Europe's unity, which has been under attack in the last several months. The agreement allows visa-free travel between the 25 countries in the Schengen Area (most of which are EU members, but the Schengen Area does include some non-EU members like Norway and Switzerland). The agreement came under pressure when Italy threatened to allow migrants fleeing the Libyan conflict and Tunisian political unrest to gain temporary resident status in order to cross into France. It was Rome's way of forcing the rest of Europe to help it with the influx of migrants. The solution proposed by France and Italy was to essentially establish temporary borders "under very exceptional circumstances." Later, Denmark reimposed border controls, supposedly due to an increase in cross-border crime. The attack in Norway, if it involved cross-border movements, could therefore damage or even end the Schengen Agreement. Other European countries, particularly those where the far right is strong or where center-right parties have adopted an anti-immigrant message, could push for further amendments to the pact. A transnational militant plot against a European country in the contemporary context could also be significant for European defense policy. When the 2004 Madrid attack and 2005 London attack happened, many in Europe argued that the attacks were a result of European governments' support for U.S. military operations in the Middle East. This is no longer really the case for Europe, although European forces are still in Afghanistan. It is much more difficult to blame Europe's alliance with the United States for this attack. As such, Europe could very well be motivated to take ongoing efforts to increase European defense coordination seriously. Current efforts are being led by Poland, which is doing so mainly because it wants to increase security against Russia's resurgence, not because of global militancy. The problem with Warsaw's plan is that it has little genuine support in Western Europe, other than France. An attack on Norway could, however, provide the kind of impetus necessary for Europe to feel threatened by global events. The last scenario is that the attack is linked to Norway's involvement in the campaign in Libya. If the Libyan government is somehow connected to the bombing and/or shooting, the rest of Europe will rally behind Norway and increase their efforts in Libya. This scenario would essentially close off the opening in negotiations prompted by a recent move by Paris and other European governments saying they would be open to Moammar Gadhafi's remaining in Libya.

Libya and the Problem with The Hague By George Friedman | July 12, 2011 The war in Libya has been under way for months, without any indication of when it might end. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi’s faction has been stronger and more cohesive than imagined and his enemies weaker and more divided. This is not unusual. There is frequently a perception that dictators are widely hated and that their power will collapse when challenged. That is certainly true at times, but often the power of a dictator is rooted in the broad support of an ideological faction, an ethnic group or simply those who benefit from the regime. As a result, naive assumptions of rapid regime change are quite often replaced by the reality of protracted conflict. This has been a characteristic of what we have called “humanitarian wars,” those undertaken to remove a repressive regime and replace it with one that is more representative. Defeating a tyrant is not always easy. Gadhafi did not manage to rule Libya for 42 years without some substantial support  More info

U.S. and Pakistan: Afghan Strategies

I got this from Stratfor, since I am a former intel weenie, I still like to get this kind of stuff, keeps me interested in what is going on in other places of the world.

By George Friedman
U.S. President Barack Obama will give a speech on Afghanistan on June 22. Whatever he says, it is becoming apparent that the United States is exploring ways to accelerate the drawdown of its forces in the country. It is also clear that U.S. relations with Pakistan are deteriorating to a point where cooperation — whatever level there was — is breaking down. These are two intimately related issues. Any withdrawal from Afghanistan, particularly an accelerated one, will leave a power vacuum in Afghanistan that the Kabul government will not be able to fill. Afghanistan is Pakistan’s back door, and its evolution is a matter of fundamental interest to Pakistan. A U.S. withdrawal means an Afghanistan intertwined with and influenced by Pakistan. Therefore, the current dynamic with Pakistan challenges any withdrawal plan.
There may be some in the U.S. military who believe that the United States might prevail in Afghanistan, but they are few in number. The champion of this view, Gen. David Petraeus, has been relieved of his command of forces in Afghanistan and promoted (or kicked upstairs) to become director of the CIA. The conventional definition of victory has been the creation of a strong government in Kabul controlling an army and police force able to protect the regime and ultimately impose its will throughout Afghanistan. With President Hamid Karzai increasingly uncooperative with the United States, the likelihood of this outcome is evaporating. Karzai realizes his American protection will be withdrawn and understands that the Americans will blame him for any negative outcomes of the withdrawal because of his inability or unwillingness to control corruption.

Defining Success in Afghanistan

There is a prior definition of success that shaped the Bush administration’s approach to Afghanistan in its early phases. The goal here was the disruption of al Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan and the prevention of further attacks on the United States from Afghanistan. This definition did not envisage the emergence of a stable and democratic Afghanistan free of corruption and able to control its territory. It was more modest and, in many ways, it was achieved in 2001-2002. Its defect, of course, was that the disruption of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, while useful, did not address the evolution of al Qaeda in other countries. In particular, it did not deal with the movement of al Qaeda operatives to Pakistan, nor did it address the Taliban, which were not defeated in 2001-2002 but simply declined combat on American terms, re-emerging as a viable insurgency when the United States became bogged down in Iraq.
The mission creep from denying Afghan bases to al Qaeda to the transformation of Afghan society had many roots and was well under way during the Bush administration, but the immediate origin of the current strategy was the attempt to transfer the lessons of Iraq to Afghanistan. The surge in Iraq, and the important political settlement with Sunni insurgents that brought them into the American fold, reduced the insurgency. It remains to be seen whether it will produce a stable Iraq not hostile to American interests. The ultimate Iraq strategy was a political settlement framed by an increase in forces, and its long-term success was never clear. The Obama administration was prepared to repeat the attempt in Afghanistan, at least by using Iraq as a template if not applying exactly the same tactics.
However, the United States found that the Taliban were less inclined to negotiate with the United States, and certainly not on the favorable terms of the Iraqi insurgents, simply because they believed they would win in the long run and did not face the dangers that the Sunni insurgents did. The military operations that framed the search for a political solution turned out to be a frame without a painting. In Iraq, it is not clear that the Petraeus strategy actually achieved a satisfactory political outcome, and its application to Afghanistan does not seem, as yet, to have drawn the Taliban into the political process in the way that incorporating the Sunnis made Iraq appear at least minimally successful.
As we pointed out after the death of Osama bin Laden, his demise, coupled with the transfer of Petraeus out of Afghanistan, offered two opportunities. The first was a return to the prior definition of success in Afghanistan, in which the goal was the disruption of al Qaeda. Second, the departure of Petraeus and his staff also removed the ideology of counterinsurgency, in which social transformation was seen as the means toward a practical and radical transformation of Afghanistan. These two events opened the door to the redefinition of the U.S. goal and the ability to claim mission accomplished for the earlier, more modest end, thereby building the basis for terminating the war.
The central battle was in the United States military, divided between conventional warfighters and counter-insurgents. Counterinsurgency draws its roots from theories of social development in emerging countries going back to the 1950s. It argues that victory in these sorts of wars depends on social and political mobilization and that the purpose of the military battle is to create a space to build a state and nation capable of defending itself.
The conventional understanding of war is that its purpose is to defeat the enemy military. It presents a more limited and focused view of military power. This faction, bitterly opposed to Petraeus’ view of what was happening in Afghanistan, saw the war in terms of defeating the Taliban as a military force. In the view of this faction, defeating the Taliban was impossible with the force available and unlikely even with a more substantial force. There were two reasons for this. First, the Taliban comprised a light infantry force with a superior intelligence capability and the ability to withdraw from untenable operations (such as the battle for Helmand province) and re-engage on more favorable terms elsewhere. Second, sanctuaries in Pakistan allowed the Taliban to withdraw to safety and reconstitute themselves, thereby making their defeat in detail impossible. The option of invading Pakistan remained, but the idea of invading a country of 180 million people with some fraction of the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan was militarily unsupportable. Indeed, no force the United States could field would be in a position to compel Pakistan to conform to American wishes.
The alternative on the American side is a more conventional definition of war in which the primary purpose of the U.S. military in Afghanistan is to create a framework for special operations forces to disrupt al Qaeda in Afghanistan and potentially Pakistan, not to attempt to either defeat the Taliban strategically or transform Afghanistan politically and culturally. With the death of bin Laden, an argument can be made — at least for political purposes — that al Qaeda has been disrupted enough that the conventional military framework in Afghanistan is no longer needed. If al Qaeda revives in Afghanistan, then covert operations can be considered. The problem with al Qaeda is that it does not require any single country to regenerate. It is a global guerrilla force.

Asymmetry in U.S. and Pakistani Interests

The United States can choose to leave Afghanistan without suffering strategic disaster. Pakistan cannot leave Pakistan. It therefore cannot leave its border with Afghanistan nor can it evade the reality that Pakistani ethnic groups — particularly the Pashtun, which straddle the border and form the heart of the Taliban phenomenon — live on the Afghan side of the border as well. Therefore, while Afghanistan is a piece of American global strategy and not its whole, Afghanistan is central to Pakistan’s national strategy. This asymmetry in U.S. and Pakistani interests is now the central issue.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan joined with the United States to defeat the Soviets. Saudi Arabia provided money and recruits, the Pakistanis provided training facilities and intelligence and the United States provided trainers and other support. For Pakistan, the Soviet invasion was a matter of fundamental national interest. Facing a hostile India supported by the Soviets and a Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan was threatened on two fronts. Therefore, deep involvement with the jihadists in Afghanistan was essential to Pakistan because the jihadists tied down the Soviets. This was also beneficial to the United States.
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States became indifferent to Afghanistan’s future. Pakistan could not be indifferent. It remained deeply involved with the Islamist forces that had defeated the Soviets and would govern Afghanistan, and it helped facilitate the emergence of the Taliban as the dominant force in the country. The United States was quite content with this in the 1990s and accepted the fact that Pakistani intelligence had become intertwined not only with the forces that fought the Soviets but also with the Taliban, who, with Pakistani support, won the civil war that followed the Soviet defeat.
Intelligence organizations are as influenced by their clients as their clients are controlled by them. Consider anti-Castro Cubans in the 1960s and 1970s and their beginning as CIA assets and their end as major influencers of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) became entwined with its clients. As the influence of the Taliban and Islamist elements increased in Afghanistan, the sentiment spread to Pakistan, where a massive Islamist movement developed with influence in the government and intelligence services.
Sept. 11, 2001, posed a profound threat to Pakistan. On one side, Pakistan faced a United States in a state of crisis, demanding Pakistani support against both al Qaeda and the Taliban. On the other side Pakistan had a massive Islamist movement hostile to the United States and intelligence services that had, for a generation, been intimately linked to Afghan Islamists, first with whole-hearted U.S. support, then with its benign indifference. The American demands involved shredding close relationships in Afghanistan, supporting an American occupation in Afghanistan and therefore facing internal resistance and threats in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Pakistani solution was the only one it could come up with to placate both the United States and the forces in Pakistan that did not want to cooperate with the United States. The Pakistanis lied. To be more precise and fair, they did as much as they could for the United States without completely destabilizing Pakistan while making it appear that they were being far more cooperative with the Americans and far less cooperative with their public. As in any such strategy, the ISI and Islamabad found themselves engaged in a massive balancing act.
U.S. and Pakistani national interests widely diverged. The United States wanted to disrupt al Qaeda regardless of the cost. The Pakistanis wanted to avoid the collapse of their regime at any cost. These were not compatible goals. At the same time, the United States and Pakistan needed each other. The United States could not possibly operate in Afghanistan without some Pakistani support, ranging from the use of Karachi and the Karachi-Khyber and Karachi-Chaman lines of supply to at least some collaboration on intelligence sharing, at least on al Qaeda. The Pakistanis badly needed American support against India. If the United States simply became pro-Indian, the Pakistani position would be in severe jeopardy.
The United States was always aware of the limits of Pakistani assistance. The United States accepted this publicly because it made Pakistan appear to be an ally at a time when the United States was under attack for unilateralism. It accepted it privately as well because it did not want to see Pakistan destabilize. The Pakistanis were aware of the limits of American tolerance, so a game was played out.

The Endgame in Afghanistan

That game is now breaking down, not because the United States raided Pakistan and killed bin Laden but because it is becoming apparent to Pakistan that the United States will, sooner or later, be dramatically drawing down its forces in Afghanistan. This drawdown creates three facts. First, Pakistan will be facing the future on its western border with Afghanistan without an American force to support it. Pakistan does not want to alienate the Taliban, and not just for ideological reasons. It also expects the Taliban to govern Afghanistan in due course. India aside, Pakistan needs to maintain its ties to the Taliban in order to maintain its influence in Afghanistan and guard its western flank. Being cooperative with the United States is less important. Second, Pakistan is aware that as the United States draws down, it will need Pakistan to cover its withdrawal strategically. Afghanistan is not Iraq, and as the U.S. force draws down, it will be in greater danger. The U.S. needs Pakistani influence. Finally, there will be a negotiation with the Taliban, and elements of Pakistan, particularly the ISI, will be the intermediary.
The Pakistanis are preparing for the American drawdown. Publicly, it is important for them to appear as independent and even hostile to the Americans as possible in order to maintain their domestic credibility. Up to now, they have appeared to various factions in Pakistan as American lackeys. If the United States is leaving, the Pakistanis can’t afford to appear that way anymore. There are genuine issues separating the two countries, but in the end, the show is as important as the issues. U.S. accusations that the government has not cooperated with the United States in fighting Islamists are exactly what the Pakistani establishment needs in order to move to the next phase. Publicly arresting CIA sources who aided the United States in capturing bin Laden also enhances this new image.
From the American point of view, the war in Afghanistan — and elsewhere — has not been a failure. There have been no more attacks on the United States on the order of 9/11, and that has not been for al Qaeda’s lack of trying. U.S. intelligence and security services, fumbling in the early days, achieved a remarkable success, and that was aided by the massive disruption of al Qaeda by U.S. military operations. The measure of military success is simple. If the enemy was unable to strike, the military effort was a success. Obviously, there is no guarantee that al Qaeda will not regenerate or that another group will not emerge, but a continued presence in Afghanistan at this point doesn’t affect that. This is particularly true as franchise operations like the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula begin to overtake the old apex leadership in terms of both operational innovation in transnational efforts and the ideological underpinnings of those attacks.
In the end, the United States will leave Afghanistan (with the possible exception of some residual special operations forces). Pakistan will draw Afghanistan back into its sphere of influence. Pakistan will need American support against India (since China does not have the force needed to support Pakistan over the Himalayas nor the navy to protect Pakistan’s coast). The United States will need Pakistan to do the basic work of preventing an intercontinental al Qaeda from forming again. Reflecting on the past 10 years, Pakistan will see that as being in its national interest. The United States will use Pakistan to balance India while retaining close ties to India.
A play will be acted out like the New Zealand Haka, with both sides making terrible sounds and frightening gestures at each other. But now that the counterinsurgency concept is being discarded, from all indications, and a fresh military analysis is under way, the script is being rewritten and we can begin to see the end shaping up. The United States is furious at Pakistan for its willingness to protect American enemies. Pakistan is furious at the United States for conducting attacks on its sovereign territory. In the end it doesn’t matter. They need each other. In the affairs of nations, like and dislike are not meaningful categories, and bullying and treachery are not blocks to cooperation. The two countries need each other more than they need to punish each other. Great friendships among nations are built on less.