The Franco-Prussian War of 1871 and some background.

I Remembered hearing about the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 when I was reading a book about "Louis Pasteur" and he was embarrassed and angry about how the French had their butts handed to them by the Prussians.  He also visited his son who was wounded fighting the Prussians near Paris if memory serves.   I started doing some research on the cause of the war and down the rabbit hole I went :) 

Throughout the centuries, the European continent has hosted many wars of conflict, laying waste to its countryside, and killing thousands of its citizens. These outbreaks of violence came about over religion, power, and petty disagreements in wars lasting over one-hundred years in some cases. Even though the human suffering was horrific during these battles, warfare was conducted in an almost elementary approach with strategy as an afterthought. This approach begins to change with the founding and successful expansion of the Prussian Empire across central Europe. The Prussians brought new methods and techniques to the art of warfare through its professional application of strategy as a science and an art. The Prussian Empire during the 1871 war with the French was controlled by the then Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck even the Emperor of Prussia referred to Bismarck due to the power arrangements of the empire. Bismarck had the goal of uniting all Germans under one flag and destroying the threat the French posed from the West.

 

The adversaries of the Prussian Empire were their neighbors to the west; the second French Empire led by the elderly Napoleon III the nephew of Napoleon. The French, up until the late 18th Century relied on its ability in win wars employing strategy called élan. Using this strategy the French believed that they were superior in their ability to mass its infantry on the enemy and win the day. The French believed so much in élan that it led to a false state of security in matters of defense and innovation.

Napoleon III

The concept of strategy or statecraft by using Ends, Ways, and Means shows a clear difference of approach on how both sides tried to impose their will on the other side in both wars. Both the French and the Prussians through some of the elements of Diplomatic,Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) as Statecraft also demonstrate the art and science of strategy. The goals of the Prussian Empire were the unification of all Germans under one flag and turn it forever into a powerhouse of Europe. This was the Ends for Bismarck, the Prussians, and the ultimate objective in Central Europe. Bismarck had been executing his Ends by taking a systemic approach that fell very much in the realm of science, as a strategy leading up to the Battle of 1871, later becoming the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck‘s strategy as a science gains further creditability with his usage of DIME as a statecraft even before the fighting starts. Bismarck understood the need to apply diplomatic pressure on France, and at the same time, attempt to cast the country as the villain of Europe.

Otto Von Bismark

Bismarck used diplomatic pressure by attempting to put a low nobility German Prince on the vacant Spanish throne. Prince Leopold, a prince from the royal House of Hohenzollern would be the instrument used by Bismarck to execute the diplomatic phase of DIME. If the Prussians could get Leopold on the Spanish throne, they could essentially box the French in on all sides. This action almost created a potential trading block allied to the Prussians. 

On July 2, 1870, that the Spaniards were about to crown Leopold, this led to an outcry in France. The French were caught sleeping to the threat and acted very slowly to recognize the danger being created by Bismarck. Further endangering the French to this maneuver was the fact Napoleon III tried to look the other way and not engage. The citizens of France immediately took to the streets throughout France in protest. This action caused French society to consider this an insult to France leading to the population and political leaders demanding war to protect their honor. French military leaders were also worried about the possible influence that Prussia may be able to bring in Spain with a fellow compatriot of theirs on the throne. The Prussians were truly using diplomatic actions and strategy of science by turning the tables on the French by making them confront the possibility it will be them facing a two front war by boxing them in between Spain and Germany. This action was a stroke of pure genius by Bismarck even before any fighting begins against the French. Bismarck’s actions caused so much pressure on French leadership that Napoleon III looked weak and out touch with reality. The French press and politicians vilified the Emperor for allowing their country to be slighted by Bismarck and the Prussians. 

The Kaiser in response to the fury caused decided to attempt a sort of reconciliation with Napoleon III by sending the French leader a letter offering peace. The crafty old Bismarck intercepted the letter and changed the wording blaming the French for causing upheaval. This letter became famously know as Ems Depesche, Bismarck actions were the information piece of using statecraft in DIME. This aroused nationalist outrage in Germany and France causing the French to declare war on the Prussians. By using the information actions within DIME, Bismarck forced Napoleon III hand.


The Emperor of France looked like fool and a laughing stock in European circles of power because the Prussian got the best of him. Napoleon III realized his position and his country appeared weak and it was his time to try his hand as strategy as a science. Since he did not want a war, he tried to check the Prussians growing power by using back door political moves, and at the same time quiet the growing opposition in the streets of Paris. These secretive moves would be the Emperor’s ends and ways to achieve the ends and ways, on statecraft of diplomatic and, informational actions to further his cause. He first dealt with his critics at home by trying to roll back the powers of the Parliament. When this body of politicians tried to check his moves toward more power, he simply jailed the leaders of the movement. The Catholic

Church was another obstacle in the quest of power by the Emperor and again he jailed Church leaders and drove the rest out of the country. Both groups became targets of an informational campaign to align them with the communist threat, and to show the French people that they were political agents and enemies of the Republic.

With the streets of Paris now cleared, Napoleon attempted to demonstrate his foreign diplomatic prowess by purchasing the Duchy of Luxembourg from the then owner, the King of the Netherlands. With the purchase of the Duchy, the Emperor wanted this land as a buffer from the ever-growing threat of the Prussians. This land grab also put the Prussians at a huge strategic disadvantage by funneling them and their efforts into deadly killing zones once war did begin with the French. 

Bismarck quickly met this challenge by simply putting intense pressure on the Dutch Royals not to sell the Duchy of Luxembourg to the French. The Prussians communicated the danger of selling this land through diplomatic channels by threatening hostilities if the sale took place. The Dutch quickly got the message from the Prussian that their existence might be in jeopardy if the sale took place. Using attempted diplomatic strategy would have been a masterstroke of genius by Napoleon if it could have succeeded. By using this type of strategy, the French leader failed to appreciate the ability of Bismarck to checkmate his moves with his own strategy. Bismarck showed just how cunning he could be by releasing the messages on the possible sale of Luxembourg from the Dutch to the French with revised sentences. The changing and doctoring of the messages showed that Napoleon and the French people are not be trusted in Europe. The Prussians appeared to be the victims of further French aggression, marginalizing their efforts for German unification. With just a few faked sentences and threatening messages added from Bismarck he achieved his prewar Ends, Ways, and Means through information warfare aided by technology.

The disaster caused by the Prussians exposing the attempted sell of the Duchy of Luxembourg caused major domestic problems for Napoleon at home. He had to send Soldiers into the streets of Paris again and have them fire on protestors marching on his palace. The French labor unions and communist parties also did battle with Napoleon’s troops exposing further damage caused by the attempted failed purchase of Luxembourg. These violent uprisings caused a knee jerk response by Napoleon by jailing and exiling thousands of innocent French citizens.

The French people were demanding war, and seeing the chance to look like the bold leader when Napoleon declared war of the Prussians. Napoleon had several goals for his ends, ways, and means to deal for the last time with Prussians. Most important was to look strong, check the growing Prussian Empire, and maybe win a small war. Napoleon attempted to use the strategy of the military inside DIME and was met with disaster due to no planning for the war. The ultimate task for the French would have been to fight a war using the military and to put the citizens on a war footing by using their economic means to attack the Prussians. The French found out it is much easier to chant shout slogans like on to Berlin as a strategy than to execute the mission. 

The French failure in the 1871 War with the Prussians goes back several years without a clear strategy of preparations in the mobilization of its military. The mobilization of armies clearly failed in the realm of strategy as a science. No longer could militaries win wars by just valor and élan, however, this was the approach the French tried to use and failed.

French Soldiers 1871

The French failed to invest in weapons technology and found themselves vastly outgunned and outranged by their enemy even before the battles had begun. The Prussians simply killed the French in the rear areas of the battlefield by using their advanced artillery. There were not any safe areas for the French to regroup, refit and rest during the fighting. They had no safe places except the French capital of Paris to adjust their strategy of art. The distances to the front caused further delays and false starts due to the poor communication nodes that the French failed to update as technology advanced.

The movement of troops to the front lines depended on the railroad first getting them to cantonment areas to form into battle formations. Often times, these areas turned into nothing more than masses of men drinking themselves into a state of drunkenness. Discipline further eroded due to reserve troops arriving with no clear chain of command and lacking training for modern warfare. The French had become little more than a peasant army that was over seven-five percent illiterate as the fighting started. This was due to a system set up previously that allowed a person of means to avoid any responsibility to defend his homeland of France.





French Officer Corp

Just the opposite of the uneducated peasants was a very educated officer corps in France that could have executed to a certain degree the strategy of science and art when deploying to their borders. Like many segments of French society during this time to include Napoleon and French politicians failed to grasp the needs and obligations of modern warfare. They failed to invest in new technologies of the day and adopt strategies that they could achieve. The only true strategy the French used was the need to rush to the border and attack with their faith in Elan. This strategy might have worked in previous war were only valor and fixed bayonets were needed but not in 1871. The French were facing an enemy in the Prussians that adopted a learning approach to execute both phases of science and art in in modern strategy. 

Prussian and Bavarian Soldier 1871

The Prussians took a vastly different approach on how to best execute their strategy of uniting all Germans and to neutralize the threat posed by France. They had become a learning organization that fostered technologies that enabled them to better execute the strategy as a science and art through prewar planning and education. Such advancements as providing medical care, hot meals, and railroads usage allowed the Prussians to see their dreams of a homeland for all Germans become a reality.

Prussian "War Kitchen" as part of a medical train.

Providing something as simple as a hot meal to the troops in war provided a positive outcome on the fighting spirit and morale of the men doing the killing for Prussia. The Prussians knew this due to doing research and promoting strategy as a science by developing mobile kitchens. These kitchens were able to provide returning and arriving troops to the front a hot meal. The kitchens were also mobile enough to follow near to the troops for any major operation. The French had no such things as mobile kitchens to feed their troops on the battlefield. As the French Soldiers learned quickly by starting a fire to warm a meal, it almost certainly invited enemy artillery to attack them in their cantonment areas. Along with hot meals, the Prussians understood the need to have proper medical care for the troops fighting. They were the first in Europe to embrace the concept of marking medical wagons with the now excepted Red Cross emblem signify medical. Military doctors were given complete control of all medical operations when it came to the care of the wounded. The French did none of these actions in regards to medical operations on the battlefield.

Prussian Train Ambulance

Without any true strategy for fighting the Prussians, the French charged to the border without much guidance are even strategy. They learned quickly that it was not logical or even safe to race to the border with just their infantry. These mad dashes to the border allowed for the capture of the city of Saarbrucken for one day by the French. The French had to retreat across the border due to their inability of orders for advancement arriving and the failure to move the strategy as art. They failed to understand the early need for combined arms to wage war and left many troops isolated on the battlefield.

Battle of Sedan and the Humiliation of France.

During the unorganized retreat from the border, the French moved into fortified depots on the false assumption that could reorganize and wage war again. The Prussians quickly demonstrated the art of strategy by encircling these French holdouts and decimating them until surrendering. Napoleon III became one of the thousands of prisoner of war when the fortress town of Sedan fell to the Prussians.

Napoleon III conversing with Otto Von Bismark after his Capture at Sedan.

The result of these failures on the battlefield allowed for Bismarck to dictate the terms of the peace to the French. He quickly moved back into strategy as a science by ensuring that the threat from France would be forever neutralized. This included the partition and loss of the lands Alsace-Lorraine and the demand of payment from the French for the sum of five billion francs.

By successfully demonstrating both the understanding and the need to embrace the strategy of both science and the art phases, the Prussians won the war in 1871. In doing so, they were able to unite all Germans under the new German Empire. Additionally they neutralized the threat from the French to their new German Empire. The lack of strategy for both planning and fighting doomed the French to defeat for many years to come.

    The new German Empire reputation was greatly burnished by the abject humiliation of France and the new country became a force to be reckoned with especially by England who had viewed the defeat of France with some interest and the New German empire started having expansionist goals outside of its borders of Europe and that greatly impacted Great Britain who was at the Zenith of her power and the Germans started building a Navy to challenge the Royal Navy on the High Seas.  The defeat of France indirectly set the seeds of WWI 50 years later.

    This new Blogger interface of sucks...it is a pain to manipulate pictures and import them.*Bleh*

Some unique German Armored Cars for WWII

One of my models...SD/251 "Stummel"

I ran across this article and I remembered the unique vehicles the Germans made during WWII.

The "KubelWagon" model that I also have along with my "Custer's last stand" a couple of German "Assault Troops" and an M-1 hiding behind a shotgun shell.

 

During the Second World War, the Germans made extensive use of military vehicles to master a new form of warfare, in which the combustion engine replaced horse power and armored formations dominated battlefields. To do this, they developed a wide range of military vehicles, including a series of armored cars.
     Though Hitler and his ministers did much of the work in turning Germany towards mobile, armored warfare, their predecessors were not ignorant of the power of fighting vehicles. In 1932, the year before the Nazis came to power, the German army commissioned its first widely used armored car
    The Kfz 13 was meant to fulfill two roles. In the long term, it would act as a reconnaissance vehicle, giving German scouts the speed, range, and protection they needed to safely observe enemy positions. In the short term, it would provide a stopgap vehicle for armored units until more tanks and specially built combat vehicles were available.

Kfz 13 (left).Photo: Bundesarchiv, Bild 102-04719A CC-BY-SA

To make production quick and cheap, the Kfz 13 was built by welding a steel hull onto the chassis of a commercially available car, the Adler Standard 6, and equipping it with a machine gun. Because of this design, it didn’t do well when traveling off road and it had a high center of gravity that led to accidents. Its armor wasn’t thick enough to properly protect the two-man crew even from small-arms fire.
The Kfz 13 was still in use in 1941, when some were used in Operation Barbarossa. It also proved useful as a training vehicle.
Left: a Kfz 13; right: an armoured Sd.Kfz. 232 with large loop antenna (6-wheeled radio and command vehicle).Photo: Bundesarchiv, Developed by Auto-Union/Horch and serving from 1935, the Sd Kfz 221 was the smallest of the specialist armored cars that superseded the Kfz 13. This time, the chassis was specially developed for military purposes, with a rear engine, four-wheel drive, low-range gears suited to cross-country travel, and sloped side armor. Its open-topped turret usually carried a 7.93mm machine gun, though some were equipped with an anti-tank rifle.

A Leichter Panzerspähwagen Sd. Kfz. 221 lies knocked out in Bredevad on April 9th, 1940

In 1938, an improved version was produced – the Sd Kfz 222. As well as minor changes to the design of the hull, this saw the turret weapon replaced with a 20mm automatic cannon and the engine upgraded to improve its power.
These vehicles saw service throughout the war.

British soldiers inspecting a captured German SdKfz 222 armoured car, 24 June 1941.

Though work on designs began in the late 1920s, it took until 1933 before the German army was equipped with its first six-wheeled armored car, the Sd Kfz 231.
The Sd Kfz 231 appeared in different models from three different manufacturers – Daimler-Benz, Bussing-NAG, and Magirus. All three models were built to the same specification, so despite differences in detail, they were largely similar.

SdKfz 231 6-rad from an unknown unit – Poland 1939

Each chassis was built around the commercial truck design of the relevant manufacturer, strengthened to make it suitable for a military role. The engine was at the front and could be operated either from there or from a secondary driving position at the rear, letting the vehicle travel at top speed in either direction. Bulletproof tires and armor 8-15mm in thickness gave the vehicle some durability.

Sd.Kfz. 231 Heavy armored scout car
    The Sd Kfz 231’s turret was hand operated. It carried either a 20mm cannon or a 7.92mm machine gun. Variations included a communications vehicle with a distinctive aerial array.
Around 1,000 Sd Kfz 231s were produced by 1936. At that point, they were superseded by an eight-wheeled vehicle and so manufacturing stopped, but the existing cars remained in service. They were used in the invasions of Poland and France, then relegated to internal security and training work.

Army Corps with Heavy Armored Car (Sd.Kfz. 231). Photo: Bundesarchiv,

Shortly after the development of the six-wheeled Sd Kfz 231, the military put out a requirement for an eight-wheeled armored car. Bussing-NAG had previously created a chassis for an aborted eight-wheeled cross-country truck, and this was adopted to form the basis of the new armored car, which became the Sd Kfz 232.
8 Rad Sd.Kfz. 232 radio vehicle of the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking in Russia, 1941.Photo: Bundesarchiv, BildThe Sd Kfz 232 had an armored body built over a relatively slender chassis. It was originally equipped with a 7.92mm machine gun and a 20mm automatic cannon, but this was later upgraded to a short 75mm gun, with this more heavily armed vehicle given the designation Sd Kfz 233. Despite its complex mechanical layout, this series of vehicles became very popular with the army and they were widely used.
The most distinctive feature of these vehicles was the way their wheels were arranged. They were divided into two sets of four, each mounted on a separate bogie, one at the front and one at the rear. All eight wheels were both steerable and driven, given power by a series of transfer boxes and differentials from the engine at the rear.

Sd Kfz 233 armored car

In most circumstances, the rear bogie was locked and the front wheels used to steer, but this arrangement could be reversed in emergencies, allowing a rear driver to steer the vehicle backward.
     By 1940, the eight-wheeled armored vehicles had already seen their engines improved, but now a more substantial redesign was ordered, resulting in the Sd Kfz 234.
This time, the chassis and suspension were integral to the hull. Thicker armor was added, along with greater fuel capacity and air brakes.
One of the big reasons for the redesign was so that the vehicle could be tailored to fighting in hotter conditions, as Axis troops were engaged in fighting against the British in North Africa, a theater were armored vehicles played a leading role. As a result, the Sd Kfz 234 was equipped with an air-cooled engine.

Sd.Kfz. 234/2 Puma

Sd.Kfz. 234 4 Pakwagen, Munster Panzermuseum, Germany

British and American troops inspect captured German guns and a Puma armored car, near Foy Notre Dame, 29 December 1944.

Panzerspähwagen Sd.Kfz. 234 3 Stummel (7,5-cm KwK L 24)

Schutzpolizei in front with several Puma Radpanzer Sd.Kfz 234 2 probably in Bruck an der Leitha Austria.

Problems with this engine slowed down the development of the vehicle and by the time it was ready the campaign in North Africa was over, thanks in part to the arrival of American forces. But the Sd Kfz 234 still found a useful place fighting against the Soviets.
Germany’s eight-wheeled armored cars were among the country’s best vehicles of the war, used widely and effectively in campaigns across Europe.

Politics in Weimar Germany

The cooperation between the communist and Nazi parties in Germany to undermine social democracy must be one of the strangest and most extreme partnerships in politics. In the 1920s the Stalinist leadership of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) declared that their main target was the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
The SPD was the dominant political force in the Weimar Republic until the eventual Nazi takeover. In the Stalinist mindset, the only true socialism was Stalinism, and all others were to be opposed. The KPD decided that the way forward in Germany was to do whatever it took to undermine the SPD government, even if this meant working side-by-side with Nazis.
Based on the assumption that the working class would turn to Stalinist communism after the inevitable failure of a Nazi government, the KPD endorsed a referendum to overthrow the SPD government in Prussia. It also supported strikes alongside the Nazis to undermine local SPD power.

Even the KPD’s paramilitary wing, the Roter Frontkämpferbund, often targeted Social Democrats and unions rather than Nazis. Ultimately, this division in the left played a significant role in allowing the Nazis to rise to power. Some Nazi leaders even used it as a tool to drive working-class voters to Hitler.

KPD in Essen, 1925.  By Bundesarchiv Bild

The divide between the Social Democrats and the Communists in Germany was bitter and long-lasting. Although today social democracy most often refers to the very left-wing of capitalism (sometimes called the “Third Way” between capitalism and socialism), during the 20s and 30s it was wholeheartedly a socialist ideology. However, in contrast to Stalinism, it emphasized democracy, participating in electoral politics, anti-communism, and a reformist path to establishing socialism instead of violent revolution.
In the late 1910s, a revolutionary socialist and member of the KPD, named Rosa Luxemburg, supported a revolution intended to overthrow the newly established SPD government. In response, leaders of the SPD worked with a right-wing paramilitary organization in a series of actions that led to her execution.

Rosa Luxemburg, 1915.

In the following years, the divide would only deepen as the communist orthodoxy under Stalin was set in place. Stalin’s purges in the Soviet Union are well known, but similar purges happened in Soviet-backed communist parties around the world, including in Germany. Democratic Socialists, Libertarian Socialists, Anarchists, and Trotskyists were all removed from the party. It was under these conditions that Ernst Thälmann would rise to the leadership of the KPD.
Thälmann, like Stalin, believed that a communist revolution was imminent and that social democracy was all that held it back. In fact, the Communist International’s official position was that social democracy formed “the left-wing of fascism.” Thälmann declared that “today the Social Democrats are the most active factor in creating fascism in Germany,” even more than the actual fascists.

KPD election poster, 1932. The caption at the bottom reads ‘An end to this system!.

The Comintern soon coined the phrase “Social-Fascism” as an epithet for social democracy and declared that social democracy should be targeted even at the expense of fighting the Nazis. This policy would remain until 1935 when Stalin would declare the need for a “united front” between Communists, Social Democrats, and Liberals. By then Hitler had already risen to power, ended the Republic, and banned both the KPD and SPD.
Perhaps the most significant example of a “red-brown alliance” can be seen in the 1931 Landtag Referendum in Prussia, where the Communist Party endorsed, at Stalin’s behest, a Nazi referendum to overthrow the SPD government.

SPD activists calling for the National Assembly elections in 1919. By Bundesarchiv Bild

Soon the KPD was referring to the Nazis as “working people’s comrades.” The justification for this, as Thälmann himself put it, was “After Hitler, Our Turn!” They hoped that it would only be a matter of time before a Nazi government betrayed the working classes and incited a communist revolution. Fortunately, many of the rank-and-file of the KPD rejected this command and voted against the referendum.

Ultimately, the referendum failed to gain enough votes. Nonetheless, other leftists at the time condemned the move. Among the most prominent objectors was Leon Trotsky, an exiled communist from the Soviet Union. He remarked that “In the conduct of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, everything is wrong: the evaluation of the situation is incorrect, the immediate aim incorrectly posed, the means to achieve it incorrectly chosen.
Along the way, the leadership of the party succeeded in overthrowing all those “principles” which it advocated.” However, these complaints fell on deaf ears, and collaboration between the leadership of the KPD and the Nazis continued.

Former SPD minister president of Oldenburg, Bernhard Kuhnt, humiliated by Nazis in 1933. By Bundesarchiv Bild 

The red-brown alliance was strong in Berlin where it had been a long-standing strategy. As far back as 1923, the leader of the KPD in Berlin, Ruth Fischer, had given a speech to fascist college students and attempted to appeal to them with abhorrent antisemitism, declaring that, “Those who call for a struggle against Jewish capital are already class strugglers… You are against Jewish capital and want to fight the speculators. Very good. Throw down the Jewish capitalists, hang them from the lamp-post, stomp on them.”

Nazis and communists would continue to collaborate. In 1932, on the eve of Hitler’s rise to power, the two factions united to support transportation and rent strikes which crippled Berlin and led to rioting. In some cases, “Communists and Nazis stood arm in arm collecting money for the strike.” The SPD had traditionally maintained a close relationship with labor unions, but on this occasion, it did not support the strike.

Ruth Fischer (1895-1961), dissident German Communist Party leader

This would later cause the SPD to lose some support among the working classes, despite Berlin having long been an SPD stronghold. Given that the Nazis had little chance of rising to power in the city, some speculate that Nazi support for the strike was a plot to undermine the SPD’s working-class support and make the KPD the most powerful party in Berlin. Regardless of intent, the KPD gained significant support in Berlin in following elections, thus costing the SPD seats in the Reichstag.

At times, the fight between social democracy, communism, and fascism took to the streets in the form of clashes between paramilitaries from each of the parties. Right-wing paramilitary units had existed since shortly after the First World War, often comprised of those veterans who had returned from war and felt that the republic would fail to avenge their loss.

“The election campaign for the upcoming big Reichstag election on September 14!” A propaganda car of the Reichsbanner advertises in the streets of Berlin (August 1930). By Federal Archives CC-BY-SA 3.0

The first of the major party affiliated paramilitaries to form was the infamous Nazi Sturmabteilung, often abbreviated SA, which would later spawn the SS. Several years later both the KPD and the SPD would form their own paramilitary branches, with the Roter Frontkämpfer-Bund (RFB) supporting the KPD, and the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold being aligned with the SPD.
These forces would all come into conflict with one another. There were frequent fights when one organization would try to disrupt the meeting of another. For example, social democracy was generally popular among labor unions, and both the RFB and the SA would attempt to break up union meetings guarded by Reichsbanner troops. Open conflict between SA, RFB, and Reichsbanner members would often break out when any of the parties held a public rally.

Standards for Roter Frontkämpferbund, c. 1925, and Iron Front (Eiserne Front), 1932

It should be noted that this article primarily focuses on the decisions of the leadership of the parties involved and that all parties involved had conflicting factions. Even after purging its dissenters, the KPD was not totally united when it came to the grassroots membership of the party. This was evident from the KPD members who voted against the Landtung referendum.
In some instances, SPD and KPD members joined together to form neighborhood and shop-floor alliances, and even formed the original Antifa together. Another example is the SPD trade union members who participated in the Berlin strikes, despite the Social Democrats’ official opposition. There were times when the average worker was clearly more aware of the dangers of Nazism than their leaders were.

Reichsbanner-Gautag in Brandenburg an der Havel 1928.  By Bundesarchiv Bild

A few months after the Berlin strikes, the SPD and its coalition of pro-democracy parties were unable to win enough seats in the July 1932 election to form a coalition government. This failure was in no small part due to the decision of the Communist Party of Germany to attack, both violently and rhetorically, social democracy.
The failure to form a government set off a series of elections every few months until the Nazis, through the use of violence, eventually won enough seats to form a government.

Nazi Party rally 1934. By Bundesarchiv Bild

When the Reichstag met to pass the Enabling Act that would grant Hitler the powers of a dictator, SA stormtroopers swarmed inside and outside the building to intimidate any potentially reluctant moderate representatives. The KPD’s representatives had already been arrested or fled into exile.

Abandoned by their moderate allies, the Social Democrats stood alone against the Act, providing all 94 votes against it. With 444 votes in favor, democracy had fallen while the left devoured itself. The KPD, and shortly after the SPD, were banned, and so the Third Reich began.