End of Air Assault?

 I got this off another Intelligence report that shows up in my email at my work, I don't know enough about rotorwing assets to wonder if the high threat envelopes in the Ukraine is a factor and if that is something we really need to worry about if we face off against the Russians/Chinese or their Proxies.  I do know that the Russians are having a lot of problems controlling the battlespace with their helicopters right now.

 Ukrainian servicemen unloaded FIM-92 Stinger Manpads provided by the U.S. in February

Wars teach many lessons. Most are harsh, many are forgotten after previous conflicts, and some are plain false. Among the latter, the U.S. and its allies returned from Iraq and Afghanistan with unrealistic (or to be more generous, nontransferable) ideas about air operations. They took air dominance as a given, with air support (whether fighter jets or attack helicopters) on call 24/7 and an ability to maneuver sometimes large formations of helicopters at will over large expanses and wholly unmolested until the last minute of the landing phase or takeoff.

The Ukraine war is turning such cozy assumptions on their heads. The upper airspace over Ukraine clearly belongs largely to Russian triple-digit (S200/300/400) surface-to-air missiles (SAM). No close air support aircraft can loiter there. And U.S. and European deliveries of very short-range man-portable air defense missiles (Manpads) have turned the airspace below 3,000 ft. into a no-go zone for Russian aircraft and helicopters.

These unpleasant reminders of the realities of high-intensity warfare against near-peer adversaries are in turn undermining the case for further investment in and maintenance of Western air assault capabilities, whether fixed- or rotary-wing.

Russia started the war with apparently strong air assault capabilities. Such desant operations have been a core element of Russian (and previously Soviet) doctrine since the Cold War. But the failure of the Hostomel Airport operation (one that all too closely resembled U.S., UK and French air assault doctrines and practice) should have been a shock to many observers. The Ukrainians reinforced more quickly, denying the Russians the all-important but oft-overlooked rapid- and follow-on air/land phases. Artillery and Manpads made sorties by a mix of Ilyushin Il-76 transports and attack and assault helicopters too dangerous.

Since those early days of the war, the air defenses of both sides have had a clear deterrent effect on helicopter operations. This has had the greatest impact on Russia, which expected attack helicopters to roam far and wide in support of its armored thrusts. Ukraine’s operations therefore look like a valuable template for future wars: Armies have become smaller, and their deployments are both dispersed and fragmented—there is no “front line” anymore. But the battlefield also has become more technologically dense, especially with sensors and missile systems. Absent air superiority, it is an especially harsh environment for helicopters and sweeping airborne maneuvers.

The case for future investment in attack and armed reconnaissance helicopters was weakening before the invasion of Ukraine. A major part of their role, surveillance and missile attack on ground targets, is increasingly being assumed by armed UAVs. That these are less operationally flexible and still vulnerable is arguably far less important than hard economics. The price per UAV can be as little as 1/20th that of a new-build Boeing AH-64 Apache, and a UAV has an even smaller logistics footprint.

The other challenge is the need for greater protection of crewed air assets deployed at low altitudes over a fragmented battlefield. Cockpit armor directly subtracts from payload, and directed-energy countermeasures demand electrical power and storage from airframes that have little to spare. Attack and assault helicopter designs will have to become physically larger and hence more expensive.

Interestingly, the U.S. Air Force has been the first to acknowledge this new scenario with its curtailment of the Sikorsky HH-60W Jolly Green II combat search-and-rescue helicopter program due to the helicopter’s lack of survivability over current battlefields.

Western defense budgets—even in Germany, whose proposed €100 billion ($105 billion) equipment plus-up equates to nearly twice its annual pre-war defense spending—are likely to remain under pressure, given the costs of reversing the downsizing and hollowing out of conventional forces over the last three decades. We see investment priorities focusing on core areas of air defense, UAVs, armor and indirect fire. Air assault operations are likely to be relegated by both the U.S. and European nations to niche roles in out-of-area operations, sealing off penetrations in defense.

Boeing, therefore, probably will retain its dominance over this shrinking market. The AH-64E is the clear choice for attack helicopters this decade. But of the two new U.S. vertical-lift programs, the justification for the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft looks especially weak, and the market size for the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft will most likely shrink.

The two European manufacturers, Airbus and Leonardo, have achieved civil helicopter leadership despite the commercial failure of their attack helicopter product lines (the Tiger and A-129 Mangusta, respectively). They would be ill-advised to throw good money after bad to maintain a presence in a segment that is in such flux.

 

The Seawolves HA(L)-3

 I shamelessly clipped this from a Vietnam Website, I have in the past asked my Dad about the Vietnam stuff I have posted, because I have used him as an "Advisor" because I wanted to be accurate as possible.  he had ridden on many helicopters belonging to the Army(Mostly), Marines, Navy and Airforce all over Vietnam as part of his duties and responsibilities.  I would have asked him if he had heard of this unit, and Yes I miss my Dad greatly, this is my first Vietnam War post I have done since his passing.  Here is to you Dad.

Steeped in the political turmoil of an unpopular war and faced with unfamiliar terrain, embedded enemy supply practices, and tactics keying on stealth, by 1965, the US faced new and novel threats from Viet Cong forces with no ready recourse. Striving for any means to achieve supremacy, the Army turned to tried-and-true tactics while seeking a breakthrough military strategy. The answer, formation of the all-volunteer Navy Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron 3, quickly renowned by their call sign "Seawolf." Utilizing hand-me-down equipment acquired from the Army and newly trained personnel, the unit would go on to become the most highly decorated squadron in naval aviation history.

During the squadron's five-year tenure, the Seawolves flew more than 120,000 missions with two-hundred wounded and forty-four KIA, earning the following commendations and landmark recognition.

But just how was such unprecedented success possible in the face of antiquated equipment and the absence of both deeply experienced personnel and significant weapons technology. Still further, why did the unit remain a lesser-known chapter in naval aviation history for over 40 years?

Predating the Vietnam War, the Army had a principal interest in the use of helicopters for Search and Rescue, Medical Evacuation, and pioneering efforts in ground support operations. Though the Army had gained valuable experience in combat support tactics, it was constrained to daytime and clear weather conditions that severely limited practical applications. Meanwhile, with a bias for fixed-wing aircraft, the Navy constrained helicopters to replenishment, minesweeping, and anti-submarine duties. So, entering Vietnam, the military was not fully equipped or trained for operations that would be needed to prevail.

In 1965 there was recognition that Communist forces were infiltrating coastal and interior waterways of the Mekong Delta to supply one-third of all men and arms while conducting terror campaigns among villages. In response, the Navy implemented Operation Market Time and Operation Game Warden, whose mission was to disrupt enemy activities utilizing larger Swift Boats along the coast and smaller, more rapid River Patrol Boats inland. Close air support was critical to success, provided initially by elements of the Army already deployed in the area, but experience early in 1966 demonstrated failing operations. More specifically, "boats were being blown out of the water," and according to Admiral E. Zumwalt (Chief of Naval Operations), Navy fatalities were outpacing the ability to train replacement sailors; meanwhile, the effectiveness of Seal Team and other Special Ops suffered.

A closer review revealed several principal factors shaping this outcome; competing Army priorities for air support and restrictions that thwarted nighttime and foul weather conditions when enemy operations were at their height (Seal Team and Special Ops as well). Ultimately, it was determined that dedicated Navy resources were necessary to turn the tide, leading officially to the formation of HA(L)-3 on April 1, 1967, and led by CDR Robert Spencer beginning in May. Lacking equipment, human resources, and training, it was further agreed the Navy would take over the existing four Army detachments and what has been described as war-weary UH-1B (Huey) helicopters. Comprised of two helicopters and four-person crews each, the detachments flew from strategically placed LSTs, barges, and limited ground locations across the Mekong Delta. In doing so, the detachments could achieve mobility and proximity to the fight. To bridge the skills gap, Army personnel provided on-the-job training during actual combat missions through September.

From the outset, HA(L)-3 was a different kind of unit, comprised initially of eighty volunteers chosen from across the fleet. Interestingly, the unit's patch was fashioned after the lion logo featured on Lowenbrau beer cans with the addition of a trident and shield. The squadron routinely conducted search and destroy patrols, reconnaissance, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), SEAL Team insertion and extraction, but new rules of engagement and close air support tactics were needed to become a truly effective fighting force. A hallmark of the Seawolves were twenty-four-hour operations conducted irrespective of weather conditions, and rapid reaction practices that together with detachment mobility meant the Seawolves were typically engaging the enemy fifteen minutes following a call. According to LTCDR Bud Barnes, "…the horn would go off, and the 1MC would sound ‘Scramble the Seawolves', that whole evolution from sound asleep to in the air was less than three minutes". Similarly, the squadron adopted a tree-top philosophy (typically eighty to one-hundred feet) that both introduced new dangers (for example, ricochets) and personalized the fight, "you can see them, and they can see you." When on patrol, "if you took fire the gunner would immediately drop a flare (at night) or smoke grenade (in daylight) to mark the target, and the lead helicopter would typically be the first in." A further innovation enabling crews to continue the fight was a ‘hot turn,' wherein a helicopter could return to base to rearm, refuel and then reengage without ever shutting down the rotor. According to Larry Rogers (Door Gunner '69-'70), "We just made-up things as we went along." Perhaps more to the point, "I felt like we were renegades of the Navy; no one knew how to handle us, and no one knew any more than us, so they just said go do it- and we did."

However impressive these tactical developments were, squadron performance was equally dependent on helicopter transformation by maintenance and support staff. Reconfigured to enable night missions, the gunship's offensive capabilities were enhanced to add multiple weapon systems (twin M60, twin.30 Cal MG, automatic grenade launchers, and 6 barreled Miniguns), rapidly change out gun barrels and alternative machine guns while under fire. These innovations were adopted as standard equipment across the fleet once proven under combat conditions in many cases. One Maintainer observed, "They gave us equipment below their standards but not below ours cause we had Maintenance people that were whiz kids." This creativity was an ongoing necessity as "conditions there were sparse as were materials, necessitating creative ways to accumulate equipment outside the normal supply chain." "We were the McHale's Navy of Vietnam; a cross between McHales's Navy and the Black Sheep (a highly decorated WWII Marine Fighter Squadron). "

The Seawolves' story is certainly one of courage, teamwork, dedication, and innovation under extreme conditions, but more, a selfless willingness to place themselves in harm's way on behalf of others. Though combat operations alone will forge a bond among seamen, such esprit décor requires unilateral acceptance of the mission and common, underlying values. Captain Dick Catone observed, "… members took pride in the mission entrusted to them", while others recalled, "we trusted each other with our lives," "you're never going to leave someone behind; if you put them there by God, you're going to get them out, even if it cost your life." This commitment to SEAL Team and Special Op extractions, in particular, has cemented relationships that are as strong today as they were over forty years ago. In support of this culture, one Seawolf explained, "There was no Officer-Enlisted separation; the crew and pilots were all one group." This notion was further borne-out by Captain Robert Spencer (Commanding Officer), "We didn't function as a group; we functioned as one person, we thought as one person, we fought as one person."

HA(L)-3 fought with distinction from its inception through decommissioning on March 16, 1972. Once again, the Seawolves secured another first in naval history as the only squadron formed and disestablished overseas. Together with the effects of an unpopular war and personnel who never sought fame, the Seawolves have been uncelebrated for over forty years.  Nonetheless, there is no denying that for one moment in time, volunteers came together as Brothers and not only accomplished their mission with courage and devotion but achieved a level of greatness that will live on long beyond them in the annals of naval aviation history.