Webster

The Constitution was made to guard the people against the dangers of good intentions." --American Statesman Daniel Webster (1782-1852)


Showing posts with label U.S. Military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.S. Military. Show all posts

Thursday, June 12, 2025

250 Years of Infantry Long Rifles.

 I enjoyed "clipping" this article from "American Rifleman especially since I own 3 examples of the rifles shown, well until that durn kayak accident*sniff*Sniff*.

   There they are in the case, before that durn Kayak....*sniff*  I owned the 03 since the late 1980's brought her from Germany.   Bought the Garand much later.



On the firing Line.  I use 150 grain bullets as to not overstress the "OPROD" on the Garand.  I need to find time to go to the CMP and buy some "Garand" ammo.



  Here is my original AR-15, built her in 1991, before the AWB.  before all the drama.  Durn Kayaks and canoe's should be registered weapons of mass destructions lemme tell you. 





Bunker Hill To Baghdad collage text on image noting FROM BUNKER HILL TO BAGHDAD 250 YEARS OF U.S. INFANTRY LONGARMS
Painting by Don Troiani, Photo by Sean A. Foley/U.S. Army

Following the outbreak of conflict in Massachusetts in April 1775, the Second Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia in May 1775 to function as a de facto government for the fledgling and tenuous colonial union. When the delegates met, a British army was bottled up in Boston by armed militiamen who had come from surrounding counties and colonies. A countryside uprising fomented by British attempts at arms confiscation had, by late spring, developed into an organized military body, and the Congress recognized it as such on June 14, 1775, when it declared that the 22,000 men arrayed outside Boston were troops of the Continental Army. By unanimous vote, the assemblage appointed George Washington as commander-in-chief.

Just three days later, the Army would face its baptism by fire at the Battle of Bunker Hill, when the ragtag group of upstart colonials poured deadly volleys into the British troops advancing up the slopes of Breed’s Hill. Though the Army was eventually forced to retreat from its entrenchments, the British paid dearly for the ground gained, suffering more than 1,000 casualties across three assaults. The men who fought at Breed’s Hill initiated a martial tradition within the American spirit that continues into the present day. They were civilian-soldiers—armed with hunting fowlers, captured military arms and cobbled-together gunsmith creations—facing off against the supreme military power of the age. Soon after the Continental Army’s fight on the heights outside Boston, some semblance of standardization began to creep into its makeup, starting with its infantry arms.

Of course, a survey such as the one that follows cannot possibly be comprehensive, as countless volumes could be (and have been) filled with the stories and details of U.S. martial firearms, ammunition and equipment, along with the men who employed them, across the past 250 years. But, at this momentous anniversary, it’s worth appreciating, at least in a succinct way, how far U.S. small arms development has come, as well as how, in some ways, so little has changed.


Model 1763/66 Charleville flintlock smoothbore longarm with wood stock and right-side lockwork
Model 1763/66 Charleville
Shortly after the establishment of the Continental Army, the Second Continental Congress acknowledged the severe shortage of suitable military arms, ammunition and supplies by authorizing secret communications with France for the purpose of obtaining war materiel. These negotiations resulted in the arrival of several shiploads of arms by April 1777, bringing quantities of older French Model 1763/66 “Charleville” flintlock muskets to American shores. By war’s end, the Charleville would be widely issued within the Continental Army and would serve as one of the principal military longarms into the early American era. According to arms historian George Moller, French arms shipments during the Revolution totaled well over 100,000 guns, and the true number may be significantly higher. The smoothbore French musket stood out from common civilian-pattern arms used in and around the siege of Boston by its cut-back forestock that exposed several inches of the barrel behind the muzzle, providing space for a rectangular metal lug that enabled it to mount a 17" triangular bayonet. Its standardized, .69-cal. bore eased the logistics of supplying ammunition to the new Army. By order of the Continental Congress, Charleville muskets in U.S. service were marked with a “United States” surcharge mark commonly found on the lock, barrel and stock of surviving arms. By 1780, this marking would be changed to a simple “US” stamp.

Overall Length: 
60"
Barrel Length: 44"
Weight: 8 lbs., 6 ozs., to 10 lbs., 4 ozs. (depending on model)
Caliber: .69
Infantry Load: 24 to 40 paper cartridges (depending on cartridge box pattern)
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


Model 1795 Springfield flintlock smoothbore musket right-side view wood stock silver metal work shown with bayonet
Model 1795 Springfield
With Gen. Washington’s approval, the site that would eventually become Springfield Armory was first set up in 1777 at the confluence of the Connecticut and Westfield rivers as the nation’s first military arsenal. But in its early years, the site was employed for storage and cartridge fabrication rather than armsmaking. Congress officially established Springfield Armory in 1794 as a location in which to build military small arms, a process that began with the Model 1795, which was patterned after the French flintlock muskets used to win American independence. So closely did these arms resemble the French guns that, at the time of manufacture, they were referenced as “U.S. Muskets, Charleville Pattern.” Due to the hand-fitting required in building 1795s, as well as the logistical challenges of establishing a new arms factory, only a few thousand of these muskets were made before the turn of the 19th century. Eventually, the establishment of a new federal armory at Harper’s Ferry, Va.—now in West Virginia—along with the use of several independent contractors and the increasing self-sufficiency of the Springfield Armory, increased quantities of available arms. Springfield Armory alone manufactured more than 100,000 before production ceased in 1815. While supplemented by various civilian contract muskets, the 1795 served as the principal infantry arm for the U.S. military during the War of 1812.

Overall Length: 60"
Barrel Length: 44"
Weight: 9 lbs., 8 ozs.
Caliber:
 .69
Infantry Load: 
38 paper cartridges
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


Model 1816 Springfield flintlock smoothbore longarm right-side view with wood stock brass parts right-side lock
Model 1816 Springfield
Early U.S. military muskets were largely built by hand, making manufacturing and repair slow and cumbersome. During his ambassadorship to France, Thomas Jefferson became familiar with the concept of interchangeable parts, as pioneered by Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval and Honoré Blanc, then being applied to the production of Model 1777 Charleville muskets used by French troops. Jefferson recommended that such manufacturing methods be implemented in American industry and supported early efforts by armsmakers, notably Eli Whitney, toward those ends. By 1812, several men, notably Commissary Gen. Callender Irvine and Ordnance Chief Decius Wadsworth, worked to incorporate interchangeable parts into American military arms. These efforts met varying degrees of success from the early 1800s until the 1840s.

Of the several infantry muskets produced during that period, the Model 1816 Springfield emerged as the most notable and widely produced variant, seeing use in various guises for nearly half a century. Largely based on the Model 1777 Charleville, save for a slightly shorter barrel and modified stock, the Model 1816 saw use in the Texas Revolution, the Mexican-American War and the early years of the Civil War. More than 700,000 were produced until the mid-1840s by various makers, more than any other U.S. martial flintlock, and the design saw its zenith in the short-lived Model 1840 flintlock musket, which was produced with interchangeable parts.

Overall Length: 58"
Barrel Length: 42"
Weight: 9 lbs., 11 ozs.
Caliber: .69
Infantry Load: 38 paper cartridges
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


Model 1842 Springfield percussion sidelock rifle Mississippi rifle wood stock three band configuration
Model 1842 Springfield
Small-arms evolution and the advent of the American System of Manufacture in the first half of the 19th century gave rise to several innovations, notably the development of true parts interchangeability and the use of a percussion ignition system in place of a flintlock. Both advancements culminated in the Model 1842 Springfield, the first percussion-primed musket widely adopted by the U.S. Army, as well as the first U.S. infantry musket to be built entirely from machine-made interchangeable parts at both national armories.

Externally, and aside from its use of a percussion lock and bolster, the 1842 borrowed many features from the pre-existing Models 1816 and 1840 muskets and remained a smoothbore arm offering limited range and accuracy compared to contemporary service rifles. The advent of the rifle musket saw a number of 1842s later rifled for longer-range use. Production commenced in 1844, and while it saw little employment during the ensuing Mexican-American War, the Model 1842, in both rifled and smoothbore guises, served in large numbers during the Civil War. More than 270,000 were produced by the federal armories at Springfield and Harper’s Ferry.

Overall Length: 58"
Barrel Length: 42"
Weight: 9 lbs., 13 ozs.
Caliber: .69
Infantry Load: 40 paper cartridges
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


Model 1855/1861 Springfield percussion rifles two comparison view wood stock longarms
Model 1855/1861 Springfield
French ordnance officials continued to spearhead innovations in firearm technology in the mid-19th century, and by the 1840s, Claude-Etienne Minié, building on the earlier work of Henri-Gustav Delvigne, had developed a hollow-base, cylindrical bullet with an iron plug that could be loaded easily into the bore of a muzzleloading rifle. When fired, the bullet would expand into shallow rifling grooves that provided spin and stability to the projectile in flight. Experiments at Harper’s Ferry Armory resulted in a variant of Minié’s projectile designed by Master Armorer James Burton. A version of this hollow-base bullet designed by Lt. James G. Benton would subsequently become the standard projectile used in the Model 1855 Springfield rifle musket, the first general-issue U.S. longarm to be rifled. Its unique Maynard priming system used a roll of waxed paper, dotted with pockets of percussion priming compound, that uncoiled and advanced with the cocking of the hammer, obviating the need for percussion caps.

By the eve of the Civil War, nearly 60,000 Model 1855s had been produced, but the wartime demand for huge quantities of shoulder arms necessitated a simplified variant that could be produced quickly and easily. The complicated and finicky Maynard primer system of the 1855 was eliminated in the Model 1861. By war’s end, more than 1.1 million Springfield-pattern muskets had been produced by Springfield Armory and many civilian makers contracted by the U.S. government to fulfill the huge demand for guns.

Overall Length: 56"
Barrel Length: 
40"
Weight: 9 lbs., 3 ozs.
Caliber: .58
Infantry Load: 40 paper cartridges
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


Model 1873 Springfield sidelock percussion rifle shown with leather sling wood stock gun right-side view
Model 1873 Springfield
Wartime experiences in the 1860s underscored the utility of the self-contained metallic cartridge, and leading military powers quickly sought suitable shoulder arms that could make use of such technology. With prodigious quantities of muzzleloading rifle muskets on hand at the end of the Civil War, U.S. ordnance officials found an expedient solution from Erskine S. Allin, master armorer at Springfield Armory. Allin’s conversion process transformed now-obsolete muzzleloading rifle muskets into single-shot breechloaders through a hinged “trapdoor” that swung up and forward, simultaneously opening the breech end of the gun while also extracting and ejecting a spent cartridge. Early Allin conversion mechanisms were standardized in newly built U.S.-issue arms with the short-lived .50-cal. models of the late 1860s, but the adoption of the .45-70 Gov’t cartridge in 1873 resulted in a new rifle and carbine. Variants of the “Trapdoor Springfield” served the U.S. Army from the Indian Wars into the twilight years of the 19th century, and many saw active use with U.S. troops during the Spanish-American War.

Overall Length: 52"
Barrel Length: 32"
Weight: 8 lbs., 13 ozs.
Chambering: .45-70 Gov’t
Infantry Load: 70 cartridges
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


Model 1892 Krag-Jorgensen bolt-action rifle right-side view wood stock gun shown with leather sling
Model 1892 Krag-Jorgensen
Once again, French ordnance innovation spurred a new small-arms race at the end of the 19th century. Paul Vieille’s discovery of Poudre B, the first practical smokeless propellant, transformed rifle design by enabling the use of smaller-bore, higher-velocity ammunition. U.S. ordnance officials trialed several competing rifles in the early 1890s, and the design from Norwegians Ole Krag and Erik Jorgensen emerged as the winner and served as the U.S. Army’s first general-issue bolt-action service rifle in several model variations from 1894 to 1903.

Notable for its unique box magazine protruding from the right side of the action, the Krag-Jorgensen was the first repeating rifle to be generally issued to the U.S. Army. A magazine cut-off enabled it to be loaded and fired singly, a common feature in early bolt-action military rifles. The anemic performance of the .30-40 Krag cartridge for which it was chambered, along with inherent weaknesses in the receiver design, caused the Krag to be among the most short-lived U.S. military arms. Nearly 475,000 Krag rifles and carbines were produced under license by Springfield Armory from 1894 to 1904.

Overall Length: 49"
Barrel Length: 30"
Weight: 8 lbs., 7 ozs.
Chambering: .30-40 Krag
Infantry Load: 100 cartridges
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


Model 1903 Springfield right-side view of bolt-action rifle wood stock
Model 1903 Springfield
During the Spanish-American War, U.S. Army troops faced Spanish soldiers armed with the Model 1893 Mauser, and captured examples were examined and tested by U.S. ordnance officials. After failed attempts to enhance the capabilities of then-issued Krag rifles, development began on what eventually became the Model 1903 Springfield. In terms of receiver design, much was borrowed from extant Mauser designs, notably the Models 1893 and 1898, along with some features from the pre-existing Krag—such as the magazine cut-off.

More than 3 million Model 1903 Springfields were produced, in all variants, from 1903 until 1944. While heavily supplemented by the Model 1917 during World War I, the Model 1903 remained the official U.S. service rifle until 1936 and saw heavy use during the early years of World War II. In its Model 1903A4 sniper configuration, the bolt-action Springfield saw service through the Korean War. Its .30-’06 Sprg. chambering would be an Army standard for more than 50 years and remained an outsized influence on ammunition design beyond the mid-20th century.

Overall Length: 43.5"
Barrel Length: 24"
Weight: 8 lbs., 11 ozs.
Chambering: .30-’06 Sprg.
Infantry Load: 100 cartridges (20 five-round stripper clips)
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


M1 Garand right-side view wood-stocked rifle semi-automatic
M1 Garand
Several semi-automatic rifles emerged in the early 20th century but saw limited military use. In the waning years of World War I, American inventor John Pedersen designed and built a device that allowed existing Model 1903 Springfield rifles to function as semi-automatic carbines, but the November Armistice of 1918 ended the conflict before the so-called Pedersen Device could be deployed. Further American development of semi-automatic designs continued into the 1920s before Springfield Armory engineer John C. Garand’s experimental T1E2 emerged as a clear winner for America’s first semi-automatic service rifle.

Using a unique, C-shaped en bloc clip holding eight staggered rounds of .30-’06 Sprg., the M1 was loaded through the top of the action and made ready to fire by allowing the reciprocating operating rod handle to move forward under spring pressure, thereby closing the rotating bolt. Propellant gas siphoned from a fired round entered a hole at the bottom of the barrel near the muzzle, which filled the gas cylinder below the barrel, propelling the operating rod and bolt rearward to extract a fired case and pick up the next round at the top of the en bloc clip. Once empty, the clip would spring from the locked-back action, prompting soldiers to insert a fresh clip.

Nearly 5.5 million M1 Garand rifles were produced from 1934 to 1957, and it served as the primary U.S. military longarm through World War II and the Korean War.

Overall Length: 43.5"
Barrel Length: 24"
Weight: 9 lbs., 8 ozs.
Chambering: .30-’06 Sprg.
Infantry Load: 80 cartridges (10 eight-round en bloc clips)
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


M14 wood-stocked rifle right-side view shown with web sling and detachable box magazine wood stock flash hider
M14
Throughout World War II, Springfield Armory trialed several experimental versions of the M1, including the T20, a Garand-designed prototype that allowed for full-automatic fire and used detachable box magazines in place of the en bloc clip. A new short-stroke gas system developed by Earl Harvey was incorporated into the design, and, by the early 1950s, the experimental T44 was selected over the Belgian FAL and ArmaLite AR-10 to become America’s next service rifle: the M14. Simultaneously, NATO member countries standardized on a single service cartridge to ease potential logistical issues in another European war, with most nations settling on the 7.62 NATO, a shortened derivative of the .30-’06 Sprg. cartridge with a similar ballistic profile.

Consequently, the 7.62 NATO-chambered M14 served as the primary American service rifle from the late 1950s until the early 1960s and continued to be used in specialist roles until the early 21st century. Conceptually, the M14 was envisioned by U.S. ordnance officials to be a “universal” option that could replace several different arms in the U.S. military arsenal. However, by 1963, production delays and concerns over the M14’s controllability in full-automatic fire and effectiveness as a general replacement arm caused then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to halt production. More than 1.3 million M14s were made between 1959 and 1964.

Overall Length: 44.3"
Barrel Length: 22"
Weight: 9 lbs., 3 ozs.
Chambering: 7.62 NATO
Infantry Load: 100 cartridges (five 20-round magazines)
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


M16A1 rifle right-side view shown with web sling
M16A1
Mounting concerns over the M14 in the early 1960s spurred several defense officials to explore alternative platforms. A .223-cal. variant of the earlier ArmaLite AR-10 had been developed by Eugene Stoner and gained popularity following several successful tests. By 1963, experimental XM16E1 rifles were being produced for the U.S. Army. Standardized as the M16A1 in 1967, the new service arm officially replaced the M14 in U.S. service by 1969. Its 5.56x45 mm cartridge (standardized as 5.56 NATO in 1980), weighed about half as much as the 7.62 NATO cartridge, enabling troops to carry twice as much ammunition in a standard combat load. Recoil was more manageable, making the M16A1 more controllable in full-automatic fire. The use of aluminum forgings for the receiver set, along with polymer in the handguard, buttstock and grip, significantly lightened the rifle as compared to earlier M14s and M1 Garands. The M16A1 saw substantial use in Vietnam, and subsequent variants continued to be employed by U.S. forces into the 21st century. By the early 2000s, it had been estimated that more than 8 million M16s in all variants had been manufactured, making it the most widely produced U.S. military rifle of all time.

Overall Length: 38.8"
Barrel Length: 20"
Weight: 6 lbs., 6 ozs.
Chambering: 5.56 NATO
Infantry Load: 200 cartridges (10 20-round magazines)
Photo courtesy of Rock Island Auction


M4A1 right-side view rifle black gun simliar to ar-15
M4A1
Despite the lightweight and easily controllable nature of the M16A1, some U.S. troops found the platform to be unwieldy in select scenarios, due to its fixed buttstock and 20" barrel. Early experimental carbine variants, notably the CAR-15s, saw use by special forces units in Vietnam. By 1967, an experimental XM177E2 model was in service with MACV-SOG and was employed until the early 1980s. In 1982, development began on a new carbine variant of the M16, and by 1987, the XM4 had been tested by both the Army and Marine Corps. In 1993, after the First Gulf War, Colt began producing M4 carbines for the Army. By 2005, most soldiers carried M4s, and the design saw heavy use during conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. By 2010, M4 carbines were being updated to the M4A1 standard, adding a heavier-profile barrel that would dissipate heat during rapid fire, a full-automatic trigger group to replace the three-round-burst fire mechanism in the original M4 and a bilateral selector switch. The M4A1 is currently the principal service rifle for both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, with more than 500,000 produced as of the early 2000s.

Overall Length: 33.8"
Barrel Length: 14.5"
Weight: 7 lbs., 12 ozs.
Chambering: 5.56 NATO
Infantry Load: 210 cartridges (seven 30-round magazines)
Photo courtesy of FN America


Recent Decades & The Future
Despite the dominance of the M16/M4 platform in U.S. service, several testing programs in recent decades explored alternatives designed to increase the hit probability and lethality of U.S. military small arms. The Advanced Combat Rifle (ACR) program, begun in 1986, explored several experimental models, but by 1990, none had met the Army’s criteria for a new firearm, and the project was shelved. Soon after, the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) program of the late 1990s picked up where the ACR program had left off, and it eventually explored designs intended to replace several existing U.S. small arms, notably the M16/M4 platform. A spin-off of the OICW program resulted in the Heckler & Koch XM8 rifle, but despite extensive testing, the project was canceled in October 2005. In August 2010, the Army invited manufacturers to submit models to the Individual Carbine open competition as potential replacements for the M4/M4A1 carbine. Testing concluded in June 2013, with the Army stating that, of the eight entrants, “ ... none of the competitors met the minimum requirements.” In 2017, the U.S. Army began its Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program, designed to explore potential upgrades to the M4A1 platform, with particular emphasis placed on the 5.56 NATO-chambered carbine’s ability to penetrate bulletproof vests fielded by near-peer adversaries. In April 2022, the U.S. Army awarded a 10-year contract to SIG Sauer to replace its existing M4A1 carbines with the company’s 6.8x51 mm NGSW-R design, officially designated as the XM7.

Friday, July 5, 2024

"Fixing the Military requires a dying art called Leadership"

 

This ties in with the post I posted a week ago?, I shamelessly snagged this off "Townhall.com".  The rot started in the mid 90's under the Clinton administration with the "Political Zampolits" that Hillary was espousing pushing for women's rights even to the determent of the service. and it expanded its fiefdom as succeeding democrat presidents  and influential politicians pushed the agenda to be all encompassing. to include all "Marginalized groups" which means basically anyone that isn't white and male...unless you are gay.  Then people wonder why there is a huge recruiting gap when the red state kids ain't signing up because they ain't buying what you are selling.  


On this Independence Day, we all know our military has been shattered into fragments of what it was back in the early 1990s, when it was the undisputed most lethal force on earth and certainly one of the greatest armies in human history. America’s victory in Desert Storm, nearly forgotten by a force now more concerned with the strategic threat allegedly posed by warm weather and with catering to the gender-delusional, was on par with the victories of Hannibal, Alexander, and Caesar. That’s no exaggeration. A Cold War military that spent decades ready to hold the Fulda Gap against the red hordes annihilated a nation’s entire military in 100 hours and barely broke a sweat. But today, our military is a disaster. It can’t win wars and it can’t even convince normal Americans to join or stay very long if they do. This disaster has to be undone, and only a Trump victory can do that. Another Biden term and it’s over, but after President Golem botched the debate we have a good chance of getting Trump 2.0 and a shot at rescuing our men and women in uniform from the Perfumed Princes of the Pentagon.

So, how do you go about fixing the Pentagon? 

You start with leadership. Not just shinier stuff. Not smarter policies. Not better plans. Good, solid, old-fashioned leadership. That’s the key.

Yes, we have terrible procurement problems. Our equipment is aging, and we cannot seem to buy effective new gear for a reasonable price within a reasonable timeframe. And yes, we are a strategic mess, with a senior officer corps that has failed to grapple with our real enemies and instead focuses on the trendy boogeymen that terrify leftist civilian poobahs, like “extremism” and the climate hoax. But the most pressing issue our military faces is cultural. Without morale, and without a laser-focus on winning, you will fail. Our military today is less a military than a huge, woke HR department that occasionally drops bombs. 

War is a people business. Our people are alienated. They feel abused and betrayed because they have been. They sense our strategic drift. They do not trust our uniformed leaders, and not unreasonably. The generals’ and admirals’ grotesque betrayal of the troops during COVID was a disaster, but that was only one of many failures. Getting our troops killed in Kabul – with no accountability for the people in charge might I add – was another. Whoever put our magnificent warriors at Abbey Gate under those conditions should be making big rocks into little rocks at Leavenworth, not enjoying a cush retirement gig on the board of some outfit like Boeing.

But heaven forbid a trooper misplace his M4 – now that’s a real crisis!

We need real military leadership again, starting at the top. We need a new commander-in-chief, but we also need a new Secretary of Defense, one who leads our military instead of managing it. He cannot be a bureaucrat cloistered in a fancy office in the Pentagon and hope to fix this mess. The Secretary of Defense, though a civilian, is in the chain of command, so he should command. He must get his intent out there in no uncertain terms. He must expect that his orders reforming the military be swiftly and efficiently carried out. And he must nuke any resistance he gets without hesitation or mercy.

A commander who doesn’t command is no commander. He’s a joke, a clown, a Vindman. We’ve had far too many of them in the officer corps for far too long.

The next Secretary of Defense must be a veteran, someone who has commanded soldiers in uniform. Certainly, the task facing the next Trump SecDef is a bit more complex than that of a new company or battalion commander taking command, but the principles of leadership are the same. You take “command.” You don’t take “suggestion.” You don’t take “go along, get along.” You take command.

You get one chance to set the tone. Go in soft, and ramping up is nearly impossible when you find people are not doing what you direct. Go in hard. Firm. Clear. Not jerky, not obnoxious. Too often bad leaders mistake angry and mean for clear and firm. The troops want a commander who takes charge and sets out a clear and commonsense intent to accomplish the mission. He must give the orders – not suggestions – to move the military toward his objective, a lethal combat-oriented force. The new SecDef needs to do that on Day One.

How does this work in practice? What does it look like at the Pentagon on Day One of the Second Trump administration? 

He must immediately re-establish that the United States Armed Forces is a military organization and will function as such. This is a resource-tight environment – there’s no time or money for fluff or nonsense. Anything that does not go toward deterring or destroying America’s enemies must go. That’s the guiding principle, and he must take steps to implement that by making unequivocal changes to the current regime.

First, get rid of DEI. It’s done, over, gone. No more “X Month,” not more babble about how “diversity is our strength.” Our strength is our strength, meaning our ability to kill the enemy. The diversity pap posters come down, the civilian DEI personnel are terminated as excess, and any uniformed personnel in DEI slots are reassigned to real jobs. This will be accomplished in seven days; each joint chief will report personally to the SecDef that it has been done. When asked if his order has been carried out, the only acceptable answer is “Yes, sir.”

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Some of those joint chiefs will be new because some are getting retired on Day One. They are lucky – in the future, fired generals and admirals will not be allowed to retire at their current rank. Relieved officers will be retired at the rank at which they last served satisfactorily, and that’s never the rank they held when they were fired. This innovative personnel management policy will work wonders to focus the attention and action of our senior military leaders.

Second, the priority is fighting and the skills that go along with fighting. No more climate hoax nonsense, no more babble about green tanks, no more non-military military education—the military academies and war colleges have lost their way. Their job is to turn out killers. Too often, they turn out woke losers. Fire the heads of all the service schools and replace them with new leaders who get that their mission is to churn out fighters, not schmoozers.

Third, rebuild the trust the military lost because of its COVID policies and the pandemic of toxic leaders at the unit level. Focus on unit-level leadership. Make it clear that the noncommissioned officer corps is the backbone of the military – it’s what made our military work back when it did work. There is such thing as “NCO business” that officers should have no part of – officers don’t know how to conduct sergeant’s business, and when they try, they not only screw up but they tell their NCOs that they don’t trust them. The SecDef’s choice – he must make it his choice – for the senior enlisted advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SEAC) is a critical one. The SecDef should snag the SEAC from the chairman and keep him close by his side as his personal sanity tester and bullSchiff detector.

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He must rebuild the officer corps. Too often, our troops see not warfighters but timeservers and ticket-punchers in command who chose their careers over taking care of their troops. That needs to end. Not everyone is fit to be a commander even if they hold the required rank – the formal board system to assign officers to command slots has failed. The new SecDef must take a hands-on approach to pick aggressive, capable future leaders within the force as George Marshall did with his legendary notebook of officers to watch. Scrap the boards and have the SecDef and his designees manage the officer corps directly. Personnel is policy. The SecDef must pick his team down to the O5 (lieutenant colonel and Navy commander) level. Some will call subjective assignments unfair; what’s unfair is saddling our troops with commanders who look good on paper but can’t lead or fight.

The bureaucracy will attempt to bury the SecDef in the bowels of the Pentagon so it can co-opt him using the mushroom treatment – keep him in the dark and feed him manure. He must physically break out of there and reserve blocks of time to visit the field. He should start Day One by walking the Pentagon halls and dropping in on his troops – it’s called “leadership by walking around,” and it works. 

He needs to make short-notice trips to see what’s really happening elsewhere. “Ladies and gentlemen, this afternoon I am flying to – let’s see – how about Newport News to look at ships? I want a helicopter on the pad in an hour. Don’t tell the base commander. It’ll be a surprise.” And then he needs to go, along with some Navy subject matter expert straphangers, and ask questions like, “Admiral, why is that destroyer covered in rust instead of gleaming? Wait, let me ask your second-in-command because he’s now in charge since you are relieved.”

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The SecDef cannot be everywhere, so he needs personal representatives outside of Pentagon channels to visit bases to find out the ground truth in the field and reinforce the SecDef’s intent. They should be pairs of retired senior officers and senior noncommissioned officers. Having NCO participation is critical. Private Jones knows the real story but he won’t tell some retired colonel. He will tell a retired first sergeant. These Special Representatives of the Secretary of Defense will be his independent eyes and ears. They need a travel budget and the credentials that make clear that they are present on the SecDef’s personal behalf. After the first general who tells the SecDef’s reps they can’t come onto his airbase gets relieved, that will be the end of the overt resistance.

But there will be covert resistance to the SecDef’s reforms. That’s why he must trim the Pentagon’s bloated civilian staff starting Day One. There is a lot of talk about how you cannot fire civil service personnel. That’s not so – you just have to do it right. And you don’t necessarily need to fire them – you can solve the problem by transferring them. Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska will get a bunch of new civilian workers. But mostly you have to work the system. Fire them or move them and then let them fight it. By the time their case is resolved, the SecDef will be retired and the lazy civil servant will be old.

There are many specific things the new SecDef must do, but a single general one. He must lead. This next Secretary of Defense cannot be a bureaucrat and hope to fix the primary problem with our military – the fact that it has stopped functioning like a military. This is why we fail to win wars. This is why our enlistees and junior officers leave the service. This is why vets dissuade young people from joining. We definitely cannot have another failure like Robert McNamara or Mark Esper. But we also do not necessarily need a George Patton or a Douglas MacArthur. Another George Marshall or Dwight Eisenhower, commanders who commanded without fanfare, would be great. Regardless, we need a real leader in the Pentagon. And starting Day One of Trump 2.0, he needs to lead.

Wednesday, June 26, 2024

U.S. Military Has Turned Into ‘Vast DEI Bureaucracy’ Under Biden, Study Finds

   Still working all the OT. 

Word on the street is that the services are having a hard time getting recruits becuase the white guys don't want to join because they saw the DEI in action in school and they don't want to deal with the same crap in the service where they are blamed for everything and see people less qualified getting promoted because of "DEI". How can you get kids to defend your civilization after telling them for 12 years that they are the root of all evil in the world.

    I saw this article in the "Tampa Free Press"




The U.S. military and Pentagon have turned into a “vast DEI bureaucracy” under the Biden administration, according to a study released on Tuesday.

The Biden administration has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, which first started to be implemented roughly four decades ago, in the military since President Joe Biden took office in January 2021.

A year-long study by the Arizona State University Center for American Institutions, examining online and published materials, alleges that current DEI policies and programs are creating a “race and sex-based scapegoating and stereotyping” environment in the military and hampering defense effectiveness.

“It’s no surprise that young people are turning away from military service in record numbers. As this comprehensive report illuminates, DEI indoctrination has become a core component of military training that begins for officers even at the service academies,” Matt Lohmeier, former Space Force commander, said in a statement on Tuesday. “How can we be prepared to confront our adversaries if our warfighters aren’t laser-focused on the mission but instead are divided and distracted by ideology?”

The study lists examples of DEI policies and initiatives among different branches; an Air Force Combat Command “toolkit” for training and holding “courageous conversations” about white privilege and unexamined bias. An Air Force article on retention advocates for servicemembers to “add personal pronouns to email signature blocks” because “it can influence whether someone will stay in their organization.

The study lists examples of DEI policies and initiatives among different branches; an Air Force Combat Command “toolkit” for training and holding “courageous conversations” about white privilege and unexamined bias. An Air Force article on retention advocates for servicemembers to “add personal pronouns to email signature blocks” because “it can influence whether someone will stay in their organization.

The Navy’s training for anti-extremism considers Black Lives Matter (BLM) a non-political topic, despite the BLM organization advocating for defunding the police, according to the study. The study also points to two high-level officers in the Marine Corps who advocated against racial “colorblindness” because it promoted racism and promoted white supremacy.

DEI policies also extend to service academies, which have diversity and equity offices that perform training and support racial and gender-based “affinity groups,” according to the study. “Eyes and ears” programs are implemented to encourage individuals to report anything they overhear that challenges DEI norms.

The study points to examples of DEI initiatives being implemented in service academies; a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) filed by the watchdog group Justice Watch compelled the Air Force Academy to release coursework material advocating for critical race theory through the 1619 Project, a controversial project that claims America’s “true founding” was when slaves first arrived in 1619. The Naval Academy’s “peer education” program aims to recruit midshipmen to host mandatory conversations about DEI with their colleagues.

“Knowledge of the nation that cadets defend is elective. DEI is the core,” the study reads.

The study says that DEI’s focus on addressing “white supremism” as a core problem plaguing the military and country undermines servicemembers’ mission because it asks them “to defend a nation that is an alleged cesspit of racism and discrimination.” There is “little or no evidence” that white supremacy is a problem in the military, pointing to the Department of Defense only being able to identify 100 white supremacists among 2.1 million servicemembers in 2021.

The notion of dividing servicemembers into different racial and gender categories is “Orwellian” and “sows distrust and undermines unit cohesion and teamwork,” the study claims, because it undermines the goal of having a united military dedicated to protecting the country.

The study urges that the military return to the “outstanding tradition” of merit-based selections and promotions and enforcement of non-discrimination among races and genders. The study also calls for all training and coursework taught in social science and humanities at service academies to be made publicly available.

But “the surest way to eliminate the concerning trends we have identified, and the growth of race and sex-based scapegoating and stereotyping in the U.S. military, is to altogether end the DEI bureaucracy there,” the study reads.

The Pentagon didn’t immediately respond to the Daily Caller News Foundation’s request for comment.