Right now NATO couldn't win a war against Russia

 

I was getting "Red Storm Rising" feelings when reading this article that I saw on Bongino Reports.  Remember that quote, "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."  NATO has lost the skill and the manufacturing base they used to have, thanks to the environmental movement that wanted no industry and pollution, so it was either shut down or throttled, and a lot of it was outsourced to the 3rd world because it is ok if they pollute, it is in the name of "equity" or something. as long as the western based world doesn't pollute. Also they have until recently not even met their 2% of GDP as required by treaty obligation because the provincial Americans will do it and defend them, so the Europeans spent their money on their social system and sneered at the backwater Americans.  Now the piper is coming due and they are scrambling.  The eastern Europeans are being serious about it, they still remember the Russian threat, whereas the Western Europeans have forgotten, and viewed the Soviets er the Russians as friends, and started buying their gas from them, thereby financing Putin's war against Ukraine.  Funny that. 

    I shamelessly clipped off "Responsible Statecraft"

   Summer Exercise between American, Polish and Latvian forces (from Duck,Duck,Go)

In 2024, reflecting a popular Western belief, former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said: “NATO is the most powerful and successful alliance in history.” Yet just two years earlier in 2022, after a 15-year campaign, NATO was defeated by the Taliban, a rag-tag group of poorly armed insurgents.

How can NATO’s humiliating defeat and Austin’s view be reconciled?

Of course NATO was never the most powerful military alliance in history — that accolade surely goes to the World War II Allies: the U.S., Russia, Britain, and the Commonwealth nations. Nevertheless, after 1945, NATO did its job, did it well, and those of us who served in it were proud to do so.

Since the Berlin Wall’s fall, though, its record has become tarnished. Satisfactory in Kosovo. Humiliated in Afghanistan. Strategic failure looming in Ukraine. Are we really sure NATO is up to the job of defending democratic Europe from a supposedly expansionist Russia in the doomsday scenario of a conventional NATO-Russia war?

The doomsday NATO-Russia war scenario is the defining way to explore this question. “Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics,” and our strategic analysis needs to start all the way back in NATO’s logistics rear areas, then work forward to a future line of battle on the continent of Europe.

First, unlike Russia, no major NATO nation is industrially mobilized for war, as evidenced by the fact that Russia is still outproducing NATO on 155mm shells for Ukraine. Which, incidentally, gives the lie to the view that Russia is poised to take more of Europe — if we in NATO truly believed this, we would all be mobilizing at speed.

More importantly, it is not clear that NATO could mobilize at the speed or scale needed to produce the levels of equipment, ammunition, and people to match Russia. And certainly not without a long build up that would signal our intent. This is not just about lost industrial capacity, but also lost financial capacity. Of the largest NATO nations, only Germany has a debt to GDP ratio below 100%.

Second, to have the remotest chance of success in this doomsday scenario of a NATO-Russia war, U.S. forces would need to deploy at scale into continental Europe. Even if the U.S. Army was established at the necessary scale — with a 2023 establishment of 473,000, under one third of the current Russian Army, it is not — the overwhelming majority of American equipment and logistics would have to travel by sea.

There, they would be vulnerable to Russian submarine-launched torpedoes and mines. As a former underwater warfare specialist, I do not believe that NATO now has the scale of anti-submarine or mine-warfare forces needed to protect Europe’s sea lines of communication.

Nor, for that matter, would these forces be able to successfully protect Europe’s hydrocarbon imports, in particular oil and LNG so critical to Europe’s economic survival. Losses because of our sea supply vulnerability would not only degrade military production, but also bring accelerating economic hardship to NATO citizens, as soaring prices and energy shortages accompanying an outbreak of war rapidly escalated the political pressure to settle.

Third, our airports, sea ports, training, and logistics bases would be exposed to conventional ballistic missile attack, against which we have extremely limited defenses. Indeed, in the case of the Oreshnik missile, no defense.

An Oreshnik missile arriving at Mach 10+ would devastate a NATO arms factory, or naval, army and air force base. As in Ukraine, Russia’s ballistic campaign would also target our transport, logistics, and energy infrastructure. In 2003, while I was working for the British MOD’s Policy Planning staffs, our post 9/11 threat analysis suggested a successful attack against an LNG terminal, such as Milford Haven, Rotterdam, or Barcelona, would have sub-nuclear consequences. The follow-on economic shock-waves would rapidly ripple across a European continent, now increasingly dependent on LNG.

Fourth, unlike Russia, NATO nations’ forces are a heterogenous bunch. My own experience, while leading the offshore training of all European warships at Flag Officer Sea Training in Plymouth, and later working with NATO forces in Afghanistan, was that all NATO forces were exceptionally enthusiastic but had very different levels of technological advancement and trained effectiveness.

Perhaps more contemporarily important, other than a handful of NATO trainers forward deployed in Ukraine, our forces are trained according to a pre-drone “maneuver doctrine" and have no real-world experience of modern peer-to-peer attritional warfighting. Whereas the Russian Army has close to three years experience now, and is unarguably the world's most battle-hardened.

Fifth, NATO’s decision-making system is cumbersome, hampered by the need to constantly communicate from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to national capitals — a complexity made worse each time another nation is admitted.

Worse still, NATO cannot do strategy. Shortly after arriving in Afghanistan in 2007, I was shocked to find that NATO had no campaign strategy. In 2022, notwithstanding numerous Russian warnings about NATO expansion constituting a red-line, NATO was wholly unprepared, strategically, for the obvious possibility of war breaking out — as evidenced again by our inability to match Russia’s 155mm shell production.

Even now, in 2025, NATO’s Ukraine strategy is opaque, perhaps best summarized as "double-down and hope.”

In summary, NATO is positioning itself as Europe’s defender, yet lacks the industrial capacity to sustain peer-to-peer warfighting, is wholly dependent on U.S. forces for the remotest chance of success, is unable satisfactorily to defend its sea lines of communication against Russian submarine, or its training and industrial infrastructure against strategic ballistic bombardment, is comprised of a diverse mix of un-bloodied conventional forces, and lacks the capacity to think and act strategically.

An easy NATO victory cannot be assumed, and I am afraid that the opposite looks far more likely to me.

So what? Conventionally, we could now work out how to redress the manifest weaknesses revealed. Strategic audits to confirm the capability gaps. Capability analyses to work out how to fill the gaps. Conferences to decide who does what and where costs should fall. Whilst all the time muddling on, hoping that NATO might eventually prevail in Ukraine, notwithstanding all the evidence to the contrary.

But without unanimous agreement of the NATO nations to increase military investment at scale, we would be lucky to solve these capability shortfalls within ten years, let alone five.

Or we could return to consider — at last — the judgement of many Western realists that NATO expansion was the touchpaper for the Russo-Ukraine War. The Russians warned us, time and again, that such expansion constituted a red line. So too did some of our very greatest strategic thinkers, starting with George Kennan in 1996, Henry Kissinger, Jack Matlock, even Bill Burns in his famous ‘Nyet means Nyet’ diplomatic telegram, and most recently John Mearsheimer with his 2014 forecasts. All ignored.

The truth is that NATO now exists to confront the threats created by its continuing existence. Yet as our scenario shows, NATO does not have the capacity to defeat the primary threat that its continuing existence has created.

So perhaps this is the time to have an honest conversation about the future of NATO, and to ask two questions. How do we return to the sustainable peace in Europe that all sides to the conflict seek? Is NATO the primary obstacle to this sustainable peace?

Steve Jermy

(Ret.) Royal Navy Commodore Steve Jermy commanded warships in the 5th Destroyer Squadron and Britain’s Fleet Air Arm. He served in the Falklands War and in the Adriatic for the Bosnian and Kosovo campaigns, and retired after an operational tour, in 2007, as Strategy Director in the British Embassy in Afghanistan. He is the author of Strategy for Action: Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century and now works in offshore energy.

The T62, The Testament to Soviet Engineering Prowess.

 

 I shamelessly clipped this from "Military.blog", The material would have augmented my "Red Storm Rising Post" I did back in 2017 and I enjoyed doing that one immensely because it is my favorite Tom Clancy book.

 

                                            Modified T-62 with reactive armor.

In the annals of military history, the T-62 stands out as a remarkable symbol of Soviet engineering. Introduced in 1961, this main battle tank was the successor to the T-55 and the final tank design under the aegis of Joseph Stalin. The T-62 was a global presence, exported widely and participating in several wars, including the Yom Kippur War, the Soviet-Afghan War, and the Gulf War. Its last combat use by the Soviet Union was during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The T-62 was a significant upgrade from the T-55, boasting the first Soviet tank to be equipped with a smoke grenade launcher. Its higher hull and improved armour made it resilient against anti-tank missiles. However, the absence of a Turret Basket posed a challenge in reloading the main gun.

The T-62: A Symbol of Soviet Military Might

The T-62 was a testament to Soviet engineering prowess and played a crucial role in the Soviet Union’s military strength. It was an integral part of the Soviet strategy of using tanks in mass formations to overpower adversaries. The T-62 was designed to be more potent and sophisticated than the T-55, the mainstay of the Soviet tank fleet. It featured a 115mm gun, improved armor, and tracks, and a new diesel engine that was more fuel-efficient than the T-55’s petrol engine.

View of Soviet main battle tank T-62, Kislovodsk, Russia

The T-62: Keeping Pace with Technological Advancements

When the T-62 was launched in the 1960s, it was a state-of-the-art tank that helped the Soviet Union stay abreast with the latest in tank technology. The T-62 was significantly different from the previous generation of Soviet tanks, most notably in its use of a 115mm smoothbore gun. This gun, designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov, was capable of firing both conventional shells and anti-tank guided missiles, making the T-62 a versatile and formidable tank.

The T-62: Reliable and Rugged

The T-62 was one of the most reliable tanks produced by the Soviet Union. It was rugged and easy to maintain, making it a favorite of Soviet tank crews. The T-62 was used extensively in the Soviet military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya. It proved to be a capable and reliable tank in both mountain and urban warfare.

The T-62: A Formidable Force on the Battlefield

The T-62 was armed with a powerful 100mm gun that could destroy most enemy tanks. The 100mm gun was the most powerful tank gun in the world at the time and could penetrate the armor of any tank. The T-62 was also equipped with a 12.7mm machine gun which was effective against lightly armored vehicles and infantry. The T-62 was one of the most feared tanks in the world and played a major role in the defeat of the Western forces in the Gulf War.

The T-62: A Mainstay of the Soviet Tank Fleet

The T-62 was a mainstay of the Soviet tank fleet for over two decades and saw action in a number of wars, including the Soviet-Afghan War. Even today, the T-62 remains in service in several countries and continues to be a formidable force on the battlefield.

The T-62 was a defining tank for the Soviet Union and a symbol of their military might during the Cold War. It was a reliable and effective tank that saw action in numerous conflicts, including the Soviet-Afghan War. The T-62 was a Soviet triumph, and a key part of their tank fleet for over two decades.

 

The Failed MBT 70 Project

 I touched on this a bit when I was doing my "Red Storm Rising" posts a few years ago and I had discussed the "M1 Tank", The failed MBT 70 project was touched on that posting, the United States and West Germany had different ideas on Armor development and Tank usage. THe end results are that both nations built the 2 best MBT's in the world.   I shamelessly snagged this from "SOFREP".

 

(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

World War II came and went, and defeated Germany had been divided into two, with the eastern half falling under the influence of the communist Soviet Union and the western region working alongside the United States.

When tensions grew, and the Cold War era took hold in the late 1940s, western allies perceived the communist region’s rising power as an imminent threat. More potent main battle tanks were developed in case eastern forces decided to attack using their own war machines. This eventually became a race between the two sides to build the most innovative, powerful tanks.

When Russia introduced its T54/55 series, American and West German forces unveiled the MBT (main battle tank) M60 “Patton” and Leopard 1 as the former tank’s capable rival. Soon, however, US intelligence discovered the development of the Soviet Union’s advanced T-62 MBT equipped with powerful arms modifications, and they decided it was time to sprint ahead of the competition.

Subsequently, then-Defense Secretary Robert McNamara proposed an unprecedented “super tank” and initiated the joint battle tank program between the US and West German forces. During this period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states lacked cohesion on common military equipment, which McNamara saw as needing improvement.

MBT-70 prototype undergoing a speed test at Aberdeen Proving Ground. (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

By 1963, Germany and the US signed a memorandum of understanding that guaranteed both nations equal input in the tank’s design and features. This turned out to be the first big misstep in the program as engineers from both sides later couldn’t agree even on the smallest details, such as which system of measurement use.

“As testing continued, they realized they had another big problem. Because the driver would be located inside a turret that would be rotating in battle, the tank’s designers had come up with the solution of mounting the driver inside his own contra-rotating cupola within the turret. Regardless of the direction the turret was facing, the cupola would automatically face forward. The drivers, however, accustomed to being located in a stationary position at the front of a tank’s hull, were becoming disoriented and suffering from motion sickness.” via Defense Media Network, 2016.

Dubbed MBT-70 by the Americans and KPz-70 by the Germans, the designed super tank comprised promising, ahead-of-its-time features, which caused its eventual cancellation.

Couldn’t Agree on the Design

The main design of the super tank includes a steel-layered tungsten alloy armor and an inner protective shell capable of buffering Soviet ammunition.

But negotiations on the overall design of the tank were riddled with disagreements. Both superpowers had different requirements and standards, not to mention the language barrier. It was almost impossible for the US and German forces to meet halfway.

Nonetheless, prototypes for each side’s versions were produced, with the American MBT-70 powered by a Continental 12-cylinder air-cooled diesel engine that could generate up to 1,470 horsepower and the German KPz-70 powered by a Daimler-Benz MB-873 diesel engine that was later replaced by an MTU diesel engine capable of producing 1,500 hp. Both tanks could speed up to 43 miles per hour within a 400-mile range, making the MBT-70 prototype the world’s fastest MBT at the time.

Designers aimed to hydro-pneumatically lower the height of the MBT-70 compared to its predecessors, seeking to develop a tank with an extremely low profile on the battlefield. As a result, the prototype of the US-German tank was  29.9 feet (9.1 meters) in length, 11.6 ft (3.53 m) in width, and 8.6 ft (2.62 m) in height. The low-profile objective, however, significantly sacrificed the space in the interior, leaving no room for its driver in the hull. Instead of adjusting the compact lower structure of the tank, designers opted to place the driver along with the rest of the crew—in the turret.

 

While, at this time, this concept may sound ingenious, putting the driver in a revolving turret was just not viable. Why? For obvious reasons, this causes extreme disorientation, and you don’t want to be throwing up when it’s “go time” on the battlefield. Despite adding a “special cupola,” which designers would ensure the driver faces forward regardless of the turret’s direction in an attempt to emulate the driver being the hull, this concept was eventually discarded.

Another radical concept that caused significant technical issues was the tank’s weapons system. Both MBT-70 versions were fitted with a 20mm anti-aircraft cannon and a 7.62mm general coaxial purpose machine gun, The trouble began when they looked at a main weapon. While the German 120mm smoothbore gun looked promising, the American 152mm XM-150E5 main gun mounted on an M551 Sheridan had serious problems. For one thing, the rounds swell when soaked, essentially making them unusable. Moreover, the incorporation of the 152mm Shillelagh guided missile system also gave the engineers headaches. It was an exciting concept—if successful, the MBT-70 would be among the first tanks to be armed with guided missiles. The main problem was that the recoil from firing the Shillelagh completely threw off the missile optics, basically rendering it useless as a precision-guided weapon.

MBT-70 prototype test firing an MGM-51 missile (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

With Problem after problem, the development of the super tank spiraled out of control over the years. Despite efforts to alter and modify the machine, the increasingly high cost and expanding tonnage of the MBT-70 finally prompted everyone involved to abandon the project entirely.

By 1970, the promising yet ambitious super tank collaboration between the US and West German forces had been canceled. The introduction of the USSR’s T-62 and T-64 into service a few years prior also prompted the western allies to have a dependable tank in mass production ASAP, and the MBT-70 apparently was not going to be that tank.

It didn’t go all to waste, though. Yes, the super tank may have never seen the light of day on the battlefield, but this jointly constructed armored vehicle had significantly contributed to future MBT capabilities, notably the development of “XM1,” which would eventually become the famed M1 Abrams family of tanks we have today. Meanwhile, West Germany moved on by developing what later became the Leopard 2.

Both countries produced 14 prototypes of the failed tank throughout the program, with some still being displayed in museums. They serve as a reminder of a once-promising concept that never saw the battlefield. Still, through all of the frustrations, the project managed to help pave the way for future main battle tanks.

 

 

Profile in the E-3 Sentry (AWACS)

 This post was supposed to drop yesterday, but I ran into problems, For some reason, "Blogger" decided to unpublish a bunch of my older posts that I did years ago and the common thread seemed to be "Barky The LightBringer" or "Obummer"  and "Obungler"and the religion of Islam. and I didn't even use the election of 2012 or the election of 2016 as a reference.   For those of y'all that have been reading my post for many years, know that I spent a LOT of time on that subject, it was a happy hunting ground for me and many other bloggers, kinda like shooting fish in a barrel for us.  Well I had to spend a lot of time appealing the decisions and got most of them restored except for 3 of them.

Back in 2017 I did a bunch of of  "Red Storm Rising" post, and I really enjoyed writing them, it was a lot of fun for me.  The book is one of my all time favorite books, and I considered Tom Clancy a "Warrior Bard" and anybody from the Military community in the 1980's and 90's knew who Tom Clancy was.   Anyway this popped up in my "Aviation News feed, it is a profile on the E-3 and I thought it was pretty good and I shamelessly "Nicked it".

Credit: U.S. Air Force

[Editor’s Note: More profiles of major military aircraft programs are available to Aviation Week Intelligence Network subscribers at awin.aviationweek.com.]

The E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft based on the Boeing 707-320B commercial airliner. The aircraft is powered by four Pratt & Whitney TF33-PW-100A jet engines supplying 20,500 lbf. (91.2 kN) or General Electric CFM56-2 turbofans supplying 24,000 lbf. (106.8 kN) of thrust at sea level each.

Program History

Features

The E-3 carries a pulse-doppler mechanically scanned S-band radar in a 30-ft. rotating dome suspended 11 ft. above the fuselage by a pair of struts. This radar is the AN/APY-1 or APY-2, depending on the E-3 variant. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) quotes the radar’s effective range at “more than” 217.2 nmi (402.3 km).

The “rotodome” also contains an identification friend-or-foe (IFF) antenna and antennas for the aircraft’s datalinks. Originally, the E-3 used the Link 4A (TADIL-C) datalink to communicate with fighter aircraft. To facilitate a 360-deg. field of view, the dome is hydraulically rotated at 6 rpm. When not operating the dome rotates at 1/24 of this speed to heat the lubricant and prevent it from congealing.

The E-3 can operate beyond 29,000 ft. (8,840 m). USAF also says the E-3 can operate more than 5,000 nmi (9,260 km) from its base. This estimate goes for aircraft equipped with the TF33. Boeing, for its part, quotes an endurance of six hours at a mission radius of 870 nmi (1,610 km).

The E-3 uses an IBM CC-1 mission computer. Most of the avionics are air cooled, though the radar transmitter has a liquid cooling system. Nine Situation Display Consoles (SDCs) are carried for operators, yielding a typical aircrew of 13. Later variants carry additional consoles and can deploy with more operators.

The aircraft features a refueling slipway above the cockpit to enable in-flight refueling by a boom-type refueler.

 

Variants

EC-137D

The EC-137D was the designation for E-3 prototypes, two of which were built by and retained by Boeing. These were later upgraded to the E-3B standard.

E-3A [Block 10/15]

E-3A aircraft come in two configurations, the “Core” Block 10 and the “Standard” Block 15. Block 15 features the APY-2 radar, an upgraded APY-1 with sea-search capability. Counting the prototypes, the first 25 E-3s are Block 10s. All aircraft produced thereafter carry the APY-2.

E-3B [Block 20]

The E-3B is a modernized E-3 variant upgraded to the Block 20 standard. Block 20 includes five new Situation Display Consoles (SDCs), the IBM CC-2 computer, radio teletype capability and maritime surveillance capability for the APY-1. Five new UHF radios and one HF radio also were fitted, and the UHF radios included feature HAVE QUICK frequency-hopping capability. Block 20 and Block 25 modifications began in 1984.

E-3C [Block 25]

The E-3C is a further upgrade standard similar to the E-3B, but for aircraft with the APY-2.

E-3D

The E-3D is the E-3 variant procured by the United Kingdom. It features CFM56-2 engines, the APY-2 and the Loral EW-1017 ESM system.

E-3F

The E-3F is the E-3 variant procured by France. Like the E3-3, it uses the CFM56-2 and carries the APY-2. It was not initially equipped with an ESM system but received one after delivery.

E-3G [Block 40/45]

E-3s receiving Block 40/45 modifications are known as E-3Gs.

KE-3

The KE-3 is a tanker/cargo derivative of the E-3. It does not feature any elements of the E-3 mission system but has a ventral refueling boom, wingtip drogue pods, a cargo door and a cargo floor. These aircraft are powered by the TF-33.

RE-3A

The RE-3A is a signals intelligence derivative of the KE-3. It features the Tactical Airborne Surveillance System (TASS), a sensor system mounted in two large rectangular fairings on either side of the forward fuselage. These fairings are similar in shape to those seen aboard the USAF RC-135V and RC-135W Rivet Joint. Other small antennas also are present on the underside of the airframe.

RE-3B

The RE-3B is a more advanced derivation of the RE-3B.

Upgrades

Block 30/35

The first significant series of E-3 modifications brought aircraft to the Block 30/35 standard. The new Block includes electronic support measures (ESM) capability, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) to support the Link 16 datalink, GPS and new computers. These features improve location accuracy for targets passed over Link 16 or Link 11 by a factor of 200.

The main Block 30/35 contract was awarded to Boeing in May 1987. Other upgrades, including GPS capability, were added later. In 1994 Boeing was awarded a $16.8 million contract from NATO and a $127 million contract from the U.S. to procure ESM integration kits for their E-3s. The first Block 30/35 upgrades were completed in October 1995, and the program was finished in 2001.

Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP)

The RSIP program began at the direction of USAF in 1989. It was intended to increase the sensitivity of the E-3 radar system and would bring USAF and NATO APY-1 and APY-2 radars to a common standard. The upgrades improved the electronic countermeasures (ECM) resistance of the system, replaced operators’ consoles, introduced a new radar processor and included new software. NATO joined the program in 1994 as operational test and evaluation of the upgrades was well underway. The UK also joined the program in 1996 when it awarded a contract to Boeing to upgrade all seven of its E-3Ds.

Full rate production began in 1997, with the first kits delivered in 1998. The U.S. installed the kits at Tinker AFB during regularly programmed depot maintenance cycles. NATO kits were installed by Daimler-Benz Aerospace (later EADS and now Airbus) in Germany. In February 2002, France awarded a $133 million contract to Boeing for its own RSIP kits.

Extend Sentry

Starting in October 1994, the Air Force began a series of E-3 upgrades intended to allow the aircraft to serve to 2025. This predominately included obsolescence management and maintainability improvements

Diminishing manufacturing sources Replacement of Avionics for Global Operations and Navigation (DRAGON)

DRAGON is an E-3 upgrade program jointly pursued by NATO and the USAF. It is intended to replace the E-3’s analog cockpit avionics with a glass cockpit and improve compliance with air traffic management mandates from ICAO and the FAA. This includes ADS-B (Out) capability, a new weather radar, an enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) and Mode 5 IFF. DRAGON has been pursued concurrently with Block 40/45, and the USAF received the first modified aircraft in January 2017. The upgrades reduce the minimum flight crew from four to three by eliminating the navigator.

Block 40/45

The Block 40/45 upgrade brings E-3s to a common E-3G standard and represents an all-around modernization of the E-3 mission system. The upgrades were pursued concurrently with the E-10, the Boeing 767-based replacement for the E-3 and E-8 J-Stars. Block 40/45 testing began in 2006. The upgrade program cost approximately $2.6 billion. It became vitally important after the E-10 program was terminated in 2010.

The upgrade includes the Telephonics AN/UPX-40 IFF system, which provides enhanced clutter rejection over the old system. It also includes new MIDS JTRS Link 16 radios. Most critically, it replaces the computing backend for the aircraft. The flight computer is replaced with a Red Hat Linux-based system and the operator stations are replaced with new Microsoft Windows-based consoles.

Block 40/45 also includes the Internet Protocol Enabled Communications (IPEC) program. IPEC fields an INMARSAT based satellite communications capability on the E-3, enabling full internet connectivity in flight. USAF uses this for IP chat, email and air tasking order and airspace control order dissemination. Aircraft with IPEC carry a rectangular SATCOM antenna just aft of the wing center section.

AWACS Communications Integration Program (ACIP)

ASIP will field a Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) and Second Generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) radio capability to the USAF E-3 fleet. The FY23 budget provides $95.2 million for ASIP from FY23 through FY25.

Production and Delivery History

The first E-3s were delivered to the USAF in March 1977. Production terminated in 1992.

United States

Initial operating capability (IOC) for the U.S. E-3 fleet was declared in April 1978. The last aircraft were delivered to the Air Force in 1984. Thirty-four were procured in total. On Sept. 22, 1995, a USAF E-3 77-00354 crashed in Alaska. Of the remaining 33 aircraft, 31 remain in service. Twenty-seven of these are based at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma under Air Combat Command, while the remaining four are based at Kadena AB, Japan, and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, under Pacific Air Forces.

The FY15 USAF budget request reduced the active inventory from 31 to 24 aircraft, but the inventory was restored in budgets from FY17 through FY19. The see-sawing inventory disrupted the Block 40/45 upgrade program but in FY19 a contract was awarded for the seven remaining Block 30/35 aircraft.

The FY23 Air Force budget proposal decreases modernization funding in view of the Air Force decision to procure a replacement AEW&C aircraft. This includes terminating Block 40/45 funding from FY23 through the FYDP.

The Air Force included $227 million in RDT&E funds for an E-3 replacement in its FY23 budget request. The funds will be used to procure a prototype, which the Air Force says will be delivered in 2027. Another prototype would be bought in FY24 with a production decision in FY25. The Air Force formally selected the Boeing E-7A Wedgetail on April 26, 2022. All prior sales of E-7s have been conducted through Direct Commercial Sales rather than Foreign Military Sales – meaning different intellectual property, financial and other regulations would apply to a prospective USAF acquisition.

The Wedgetail is a Boeing 737-700 carrying Northrop Grumman’s L-band Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA). This electronically scanned radar is a generational leap over the APY-1/2 capability and is fully mature, having served with the Royal Australian Air Force for over ten years.

This lengthy development phase is interesting in light of the maturity of the E-7 capability and of new Air Force plans to dramatically cut the E-3 fleet in the near term. The FY23 budget request envisions divestment of 15 of the Air Force’s 31 E-3s in FY23 and FY24. The Air Force previously intended to keep its 33 E-3s in service until 2035. It is unclear if Congress will authorize E-3 divestment since it will generate a capability gap spanning the rest of the decade, if not longer. Rep. Tom Cole (R-Okla.), for example, said at a May 13, 2023, House Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing that the E-3 retirement plan was a “big risk” and one that “is not wise to take.” For more on the replacement plan, see Aviation Week’s program profile on the E-7 .

Also noteworthy is a lone ex-RAF E-3D bought by the U.S. Navy in June 2021. This E-3D will have its mission equipment removed and will be used by the Navy as a trainer for E-6B Mercury flight crews. Procuring a dedicated trainer will increase the operational availability of the E-6B fleet by reducing the requirement for these aircraft to fly training sorties. For more information on the E-3D acquisition and the E-6 fleet, see Aviation Week’s program profile on the E-6.

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided in December 1978 to acquire a joint AEW&C capability. It opted to procure 18 E-3As. The first was delivered in January 1982, and all were delivered in E-3A Block 15 configuration. One of these was lost in an accident in 1995 and another was parted out for spares in 2015. One each was retired in 2017 and 2018, leaving 14 in service as of June 2022.

In October 1980, NATO formed its Airborne Early Warning and Control Force. The command controls NATO’s E-3 fleet and controlled the RAF E-3D force before its retirement. The aircraft fly out of forward operating sites in Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey. NATO’s E-3s began flight operations in 1982.

The Force is managed by a group of sixteen NATO countries comprising the NAEW&C Programme Management Organization (NAPMO). As of 2022, the NAPMO members are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey and the United States. The UK was never a full NAPMO member but contributed its E-3Ds to the force. France is a NAPMO observer, and coordinates to maintain the interoperability of its E-3 fleet.

In December 2019, NAPMO signed a $1 billion contract with Boeing for a Final Lifetime Extension Program to bring the service life of the NAEW&C force to 2035.

Saudi Arabia

In 1981, Saudi Arabia signed a contract to acquire five E-3As and six KE-3 aerial refueling aircraft. The contract included an option for an additional four KE-3s, which was exercised in 1984. All aircraft were delivered by the end of 1987. Of the KE-3s, four were converted to RE-3As. Three of these later received the more extensive KE-3B upgrade. Another KE-3 was retired, leaving only five of these in service.

Starting in August 2001, Boeing applied mission computer upgrades to the Saudi E-3 fleet. The $60 million contract included related hardware and software changes and was completed in 2003. In September 2007, the Kingdom contracted for the installation of JTIDS terminals. The same year, it requested access to the RSIP upgrade – a contract was awarded in 2008.

From 2009, the fleet began receiving new MIDS/LVT sets, new crypto equipment and new radios. Finally, in 2019, a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract was awarded for UPX-40 sets for the fleet. While the Royal Saudi Air Force has not brought its fleet to the Block 40/45 standard outright, its aircraft now have many of its capabilities.

United Kingdom

In 1986, the UK released a solicitation for proposals for an AEW&C aircraft to fill the gap left by the imminent cancellation of the Nimrod AEW3 program. AEW3 would have been an AEW&C derivative of the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft, with air search radars mounted to the nose and tail. By September 1986 the E-3 was the only remaining alternative to the Nimrod, and it was selected in December. Six were to be procured for the Royal Air Force (RAF), with the CFM56-2 engines. An option for a seventh was exercised in late 1987. The first aircraft was delivered in March 1991, with deliveries complete in May 1992. Britain’s E-3s were equipped with probes to support the probe and drogue refueling system used by its air force and with new radio equipment.

The UK’s 2021 Integrated Defence Review included a decision to retire the E-3D force ahead of the incoming Boeing E-7A Wedgetail, its replacement. Retirement of the aircraft by the end of 2021 created a capability gap, as the E-7 will not enter RAF service until 2023.

France

France ordered three E-3Fs in February 1987 in a similar configuration to the British aircraft. This includes the refueling probes and radio upgrades. Later that year the French government exercised an option for a fourth aircraft. The aircraft were delivered from May 1991 to February 1992.

In June 2022, only four E-3s are still operational. These four all received Block 40/45 upgrades starting in 2014 under a 2010 FMS contract, while the three remaining aircraft were retired.

Chile

Chile has signed a contract with the UK to procure three retired E-3Ds to replace the Chilean air force’s lone IAI Phalcon (known in Chile as the Cóndor). The Phalcon is a modified Boeing 707-385C. The E-3Ds are likely to enter service by the end of 2022.

Russian Military satellite appears to be stalking new American Satelllite

 Back in May 2017 I had started a bunch of "Red Storm Rising"post, it is one of my all time favorite books written by the warrior poet "Tom Clancy".  Here is the quick plot summary:

Militants from Soviet Azerbaijan destroy an oil production refinery in Nizhnevartovsk, threatening to cripple the Soviet Union's economy due to oil shortages. After much deliberation, the Soviet Politburo decides to seize the Persian Gulf by military force in order to recoup the country's oil losses. Knowing that the United States had pledged to defend the oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf, the Soviets decide that neutralizing NATO is a necessary first step before its military operation can take place. With West Germany neutralized and occupied, the Soviets believe that the United States would not move to rescue the Arab states since it could meet its oil needs from the Western Hemisphere alone.

"To divert attention from the impending operation, the Politburo embarks upon an elaborate maskirovka to disguise both their predicament and their intentions. The Soviets publicly declare their arms reduction proposal to scrap their obsolete nuclear missile submarines. The KGB then carries out a false flag operation involving a bomb being detonated in a Kremlin building, framing a KGB sleeper agent as a West German intelligence spy involved in the incident. The Politburo publicly denounces the West German government and calls for retaliation."

 Now in the book the Soviets used a "Hunter Killer" Satellite to fire an object for a kinetic kill on our reconnaissance satellites right before hostilities commence to hide the disposition of their forces.  This article reminded me of that incident in the book.

    (I'm trying to incorporate "Twitter" links for the first time in a blog post, so it will be interesting to see how it goes.)

 I saw this article on "The Bongino Report" in their International News column and it reminded

Russia has launched satellite 14F150 Nivelir into orbit under a mission dubbed Kosmos-2558, and its current orbital path could soon place it in close proximity to what is reported to be the spy satellite designated USA-326. Unconfirmed rumors that the asset will serve as an 'inspector' satellite to covertly spy on nearby spacecraft have begun to circulate online following the launch and would line up with Russia’s known on-orbit anti-satellite weapons capabilities and developments. 

 The Kosmos-2558 satellite was launched on August 1 at 20:25 UTC from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Russia as a payload on the Soyuz-2.1v rocket. Kosmos-2558, which the Russian Ministry of Defense itself said is a military satellite in an official statement, was then deployed into a Sun-Synchronous Orbit (SSO), which pertains to satellites that travel over the polar regions of the globe so their orbital paths are synchronous with the Sun. Its exact purpose is unknown at present, but it has been described as an "inspector" satellite, a term that is often associated with so-called “killer satellites.”

 https://twitter.com/RussianSpaceWeb/status/1554207604641075201?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1554207604641075201%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fgame-of-chicken-with-u-s-and-russian-satellites-may-be-underway

https://twitter.com/SpaceIntellige3/status/1554498849976324097?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1554498849976324097%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fgame-of-chicken-with-u-s-and-russian-satellites-may-be-underway 

Despite Kosmos-2558’s mission having not yet been specifically disclosed, it is important to note that the USA-326 satellite is also currently deployed into an SSO. In fact, Jonathan McDowell, an astronomer at the Center for Astrophysics, or @planet4589 on Twitter, has noted that Kosmos-2558’s current orbital path will soon place it within 80 km of what is believed to be the USA 326 satellite. For reference, the Center for Astrophysics is a collaborative effort run jointly by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory and Harvard College Observatory.

Independent analysts online also used a Notice to Air Missions provided by the Federal Aviation Administration to compare Kosmos-2558’s launch window to the orbital plane of USA 326 and were quick to point out that the American satellite would be passing over Plesetsk at approximately 20:25 UTC on August 1. As expected, Kosmos-2558 was launched at the exact time USA 326 passed over the region and has since settled into an orbital altitude that will allow it to maneuver closer to the American satellite in the coming days.

https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1554316928927375360?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1554316928927375360%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fgame-of-chicken-with-u-s-and-russian-satellites-may-be-underway 

https://twitter.com/Marco_Langbroek/status/1554247462944129030?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1554247462944129030%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fgame-of-chicken-with-u-s-and-russian-satellites-may-be-underway 

Why Russia would want to use Kosmos-2558 to spy on USA-326 could be explained by the American satellite’s mission. USA-326 was launched in February of this year by a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket out of Vandenberg Space Force Base, its mission designated NROL-87, which is a classified national security operation led by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in partnership with SpaceX. A press release shared by the NRO following the initial launch claimed that NROL-87 was designed, built, and now operated by the NRO to support its “overhead reconnaissance mission,” which is largely centered around protecting national security through the exploitation of space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

Independent analyst Dr. Marco Langbroek, a lecturer for optical space situational awareness at the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, has gone on to speculate about the type of satellite that USA-326 may be. In one of his blog posts, Dr. Langbroek wrote that the spacecraft could possibly be a next-generation electro-optical imagery intelligence (IMINT) satellite, which would line up with what we do know of the USA-326 mission’s ISR focus. IMINT satellites are used primarily to monitor ground and sea activity, and U.S. military capabilities in this space exceed any other on the planet.

https://twitter.com/Marco_Langbroek/status/1554621489928085505?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1554621489928085505%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fgame-of-chicken-with-u-s-and-russian-satellites-may-be-underway 

https://twitter.com/katlinegrey/status/1554219400768659457?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1554219400768659457%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fgame-of-chicken-with-u-s-and-russian-satellites-may-be-underway 

In his blog post, Dr. Langbroek goes on to add that there are indications from USA-326’s orbital characteristics that the satellite is part of a follow-on program to the NRO’s KH-11 spy satellite that Russia deployed an inspector satellite named Kosmos-2542 to observe in 2020. If Dr. Langbroek is correct and USA-326 is a next-generation IMINT satellite or is distinct in some other capacity like being a follow-on to KH-11, it could help explain why Russia would want to, at the very least, get a closer look at it. However, the Kremlin may also have more detailed intel on the specific kinds of operations USA-326 will be carrying out that could have further inspired the suspicious launch and orbital path.

This wouldn’t be the first time that Russia has deployed an inspector satellite to monitor the United States' space presence either. In 2018, Russia announced that four objects would be launched into space, which directly conflicted with data obtained by the U.S. military's Combined Space Operations Center showing that five objects had actually breached the atmosphere. Officials then began to suspect that the fifth object was an inspector satellite, as Russia had previously announced the launch of four such satellites between the years 2014 and 2017. The last of which subsequently deployed an additional three subsatellites that were launched in the summer and fall of 2017.

 

The Kosmos-2558 launch at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Russia. Credit: Russian Ministry of Defense

While Russia, China, and the United States have been working on proposals for a robotic space vehicle (or “space apparatus inspector” as coined by Russia) to carry out benign inspections and repairs on-orbit and could have been the fifth object, these systems have a darker secondary potential use — to manipulate and surveil adversary satellites in orbit. It's also possible that the fifth 'inspector' satellite, could still be equipped with surveillance technologies, electronic warfare and other jamming capabilities, or even weapons. At the very least, it could smash into another satellite, disabling or destroying it.

In 2019, a small Russian satellite maneuvered threateningly close to a U.S. national security satellite and released a projectile in an on-orbit anti-satellite weapons test that Space Force General David Thompson later said was clearly an example of Russia sending a message. On top of that, six months after Kosmos-2542 was observed "shadowing" the NRO's KH-11 spy satellite, Space Force confirmed that the Russian government had fired on-orbit projectiles during two anti-satellite weapons tests conducted in the three years prior.

The rocket and payload for the Kosmos-2558 mission at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Russia before launch. Credit: Russian Ministry of Defense

Kosmos-2543, which Russia also describes as a "space apparatus inspector," was reported to be the spacecraft that fired the projectiles, and outside of an anti-satellite exercise, its small size and high degree of maneuverability can allow it to get very close to an intended target. In fact, it is this level of maneuverability that usually signals the presence of a potential spy satellite as it allows the asset to get close enough to its target for various anti-satellite attacks that could range from the firing of projectiles, electronic warfare jamming, releasing aerosols, to the employment of directed energy weapons. The latter can include something as simple as using a laser to blind the optics of a spy satellite.

Similar maneuvers can be seen occurring right now with Kosmos-2558 as it moves its way closer to USA-326. Initial data dictates that, in its current orbital path, Kosmos-2558 will pass within 80 km of the NRO's USA-326 satellite at about 14:50 UTC on Thursday, August 4 if neither of the satellites maneuver away from or closer to each other before then. McDowell does not expect that Kosmos-2558 will maneuver within 50 km of USA 326 as an observational mission can be accomplished from outside that distance, but that doesn't change the fact that the threat to U.S. orbital systems is growing very quickly, which you can continue to read more about in this past War Zone piece here.

https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1554312461175627776?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1554312461175627776%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fgame-of-chicken-with-u-s-and-russian-satellites-may-be-underway

Needless to say, it will be interesting to see how it plays out if McDowell’s assumption is later proven to be incorrect. Russia's launch made no apparent attempt to hide the close orbital proximity between the two satellites, and it’s difficult to see why Kosmos-5228 would have been deployed if not to be near USA-326. Close eyes will surely be kept on the satellites’ orbital paths as Thursday approaches.