Monday Music "Rocky" by Jay Stevens sung by Dickie Lee

I had this song on my "Ronco " Records and I remembered playing this song in the mid 70's and it was upbeat yet sad.  I haven't heard the song for many years, but I recalled some of the lyrics and figured I would give them a try. 

"Rocky" is a 1975 song written by Jay Stevens (aka Woody P. Snow) and performed by Dickey Lee. On the country chart, "Rocky" was Lee's most successful single, and his only number one. It spent fourteen weeks on the chart, including one week at number one.

In a paradoxically upbeat melody in a major key, Rocky, the title protagonist, tells the tragic story of his young wife in first person. He first recalls the day four years earlier where, as an 18-year-old college student, he met his wife-to-be (unnamed in the song) and recalls how well they hit it off. She accepts Rocky's marriage proposal, and they spend the next several months fixing up an old house to make their home. The two soon learn they are expecting their first child, a girl.

Although the family has its usual problems, the happy memories outweigh the bad. One example is a particularly rambunctious first birthday party for the couple's daughter. With things going well and the family settling in on a content life, Rocky soon gets devastating news: his wife has been diagnosed with an apparently inoperable illness — the specific illness is unidentified in the song — and that she has only a short time to live.

All of this is told in flashback, as in the final verse, his young wife has died. Rocky is now a widower and raising his daughter alone. He feels a sense of sadness every time he looks at his daughter, who strongly resembles her mother, and now doing the same things alone that he once did with his wife. However, he feels a sense of hope, with his wife looking down on him and the couple's daughter and reassures that his love for her will always remain safe.
Each of the first three verses — telling one of the chapters in the couple's life — ends with the woman having a sense of fear of the unknown, expressed through the refrain's statement, "Rocky, I've never...," followed by the appropriate follow-up ("been in love before," "had a baby before," "had to die before") and the unassured, "Don't know if I can do it." However, both he and she realize that the strength they have in each other can help them meet each challenge head on. At the end, Rocky says that "if the world would end, your love is safe with me." The fourth refrain has Rocky envisioning hearing his deceased wife reassure, "Rocky, you know that you've been alone before, you know that you can do it," and that in her own way, she can still advise him in his time of need.

The Battle of Wakanda, An AAR after the fact.

I have used stuff from "Angry Staff Officer" For years, he uses cinematic movies to make a point on  Military doctrine.  Normally he uses "Star Wars" or other cultural references to better explain the lessons that he is trying to impart.  In this case a different person keys in on the "Battle of Wakanda"  from the Marvel's "Infinity War".  When I watched the movie, I wondered the same thing, it seemed that the defending forces had squandered their advantages to enter into melee combat with a numerically superior force.  That was just my impression.  Apparently another person dug deeper into the movie and came up with several reasons for loss.  I wish I had thought of it but I didn't.   I have commented before, my friend Mack has met the author before and according to Mack, the guy "really is Angry" or cynical I suppose..The video clip and some of the pics are compliments of "Google".

By Matthew Ader
The world is blessed that Steve Rogers never made it past captain. The Battle of Wakanda in Avengers: Infinity War is a master class in how not to use an infantry battalion. However, from his failure, we can extract some fundamental lessons:
STAY MOBILE

To set the stage – Captain Rogers and his host nation ally Black Panther positioned a Wakandan infantry battalion in close order on the plains outside Benin Zana, the capital city of Wakanda. While they were transported to the battlefield by vehicle, these craft were sent away. This dramatically cut down on the tactical mobility of the overall force and forced an engagement at that location. Given the enemy had superior numbers, this complete disregard of manoeuvre was a critical mistake.
It is true that the transport craft were unarmoured and open-topped. If fighting an adversary with strong anti-armour or indirect fire capabilities, sending them away would be reasonable. However, the Thanosian forces lacked this entirely. Their troops were incapable of using ranged weapons, or indeed, higher brain functions. They traveled on foot and bit the opposition to death.
Captain Roger’s disregard for vehicles is perhaps excusable as being on brand for a career light infantry officer. However, his next sin was far more grievous.
KEEP A RESERVE 

Captain Rogers failed to keep any sort of reserve force back from the fighting. Instead, he committed them all into one action. The only unit not so engaged was Scarlet Witch, who was the last line of defense protecting Benin Zana. However, re-tasking a unit from a critical role is not the same as having a dedicated reserve force.
This criticism over a lack of a reserve is not just an angry insistence on proper procedure. It had a real tactical cost. Wakanda was surrounded by a shield which killed the majority of the enemy forces trying to penetrate it. However, some did get through, necessitating a conventional ground force behind the shield. The Avengers decided to open the shield and invite a decisive encounter for fear that the enemy would use their superior numbers to send a flanking force to penetrate the shield in another area while fixing the infantry battalion in their original position.
If they had had a reserve – or even (gasp) available vehicles – then they could have repositioned troops to deal with any flanking threats without sacrificing the first position. Instead, the lack of a reserve necessitated giving up their biggest defensive advantage.
EXPLOIT CANNALIZATION
Deciding to open the shield was not necessarily a stupid idea. It made a gap just a few metres wide through which the enemy tried to push a light infantry brigade. Despite the Wakandan military lacking in indirect fires, this still presented an excellent opportunity. Any fire on the gap would be guaranteed to hit the enemy. The effectiveness of the canalization could perhaps be improved by field engineering works, although time was limited.
Captain Rogers and his host nation allies decided against this policy. Instead, when the gap was opened, they ordered their battalion to charge into melee combat. While capable close combatants, the Wakandan troops were desperately outnumbered. Breaking formation and fighting as individuals discarded their advantage in firepower and coordination. Moreover, it entirely surrendered any mobility they did have. Luckily for them, the Thanosians committed themselves entirely to the decisive battle. If they had flanked as originally planned, then the entire Avengers-Wakandan force would have been defeated very swiftly.
COORDINATE MULTI-DOMAIN FIRES 

While lacking in indirect fires, the Wakandan force did possess a flight of multirole gunships, along with the heavily armed War Machine, and Falcon. However, these aviation assets were poorly coordinated. War Machine mounted a bombing run against the attacking enemy force – but only those within the shield, achieving little effect. If he had been directed to attack those outside the shield, he would have had significantly more impact. He later did provide air to ground fires against the shield gap, but this was not coordinated. Therefore, he only began firing after the shield had been open for a over a minute. This allowed a large hostile force to move through.
This applies to the gunships as well. Instead of firing on the enemy main body, they were initially absent and later attacked the – by then empty – enemy dropships. This failure to coordinate fires with the ground component commander’s intent deprived the Wakandan ground troops of a key advantage over the enemy. Moreover, the commitment of the entire Wakandan force to melee combat complicated the close air support task immensely.
TO CONCLUDE…
The Battle of Wakanda is a short and approachable case study in what not to do with an infantry battalion. While the tactical challenge facing Captain Rogers was a difficult one, he went to seemingly every length to make it harder. While the unexpected arrival of Task Force Thor did ultimately tip the balance in his favor, that does not excuse the manifold failures found throughout his conduct of the battle.
I shudder to think what his OER will look like. If he has any sense, so should he.
Editor’s note: Luckily for Captain Rogers’ career, his rater and senior rater are slightly fragmented at the time of writing this. His inability to integrate natural and man-made obstacles to create an engagement area, combined with his inability to mass fires at the point of penetration, surely stands as a black mark against his otherwise excellent record. While no one can doubt Captain Rogers’ physical and personal courage, his ability to manage multidomain battle leaves much to be desired.

Spanish language version of the "Battle of Wakanda"

"We Got Tanks in the Wire"

When I was in high school I studied the Vietnam War extensively  and the NVA use of  "Tanks" during the "Tet" Offensive was mentioned.  The "Tanks" mentioned by the beleaguered SF detachment was actually the PT-76, which was a light reconnaissance tank predominately used by the Soviet Airborne forces.  It would come out in second best in a tank vs tank contest, but if used against people that didn't have any armor or any ways to destroy it, the "tank" would be insurmountable to the opposing forces.

In February of 1968, 12 Soviet-made PT-76 tanks supported by more than three battalions of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infantry assaulted a United States Special Forces Camp near Khe Sanh. It was the first time that the NVA had used tanks against American or South Vietnamese positions in the war, and the defenders were ill-prepared for the circumstances.
Eight Green Berets and several South Vietnamese and indigenous soldiers were trapped in the base’s command bunker where they were subjected to grenade, tear gas, and high explosive attacks for a day while awaiting rescue.

U.S. Special Forces were deployed in the 1960’s to the northwest corner of South Vietnam near the Laotian border and just south of the demilitarized zone that separated North and South Vietnam. The Green Berets assigned to the area operated out of the Lang Vei operating base, training Montagnards and other minority groups in South Vietnam known as CIDG’s (Civilian Irregular Defense Groups).
In late 1967, the U.S. forces began constructing a new operations center about half a mile away on top of a hill, and the former base became known as “old Lang Vei.”

CIDG Unit Training

The Green Berets’ mission was to train the CIDG forces with the help of South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) Special Forces to defend the area and to help monitor NVA troop activity. Additionally, a CIA-funded unit of Laotian soldiers called BV33 of the Royal Laos Army across the border in Laos coordinated with the Green Berets in monitoring the Ho Chi Minh trail near their outpost at Ban Houei Sane.
Lang Vei relied on artillery and air support from U.S. Marines at the Khe Sanh base located only 6 miles to the east and from three nearby hilltops, 861, 831N and 831S, that were also occupied by U.S. Marines.

SSG Alvin J. Rouly taught a Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) trainee how to use a M79 grenade launcher. Camp Trai Trung Sup, Republic of Vietnam, was the 3rd Corps’ Basic Training Center for CIDGs . The camp was commanded by the Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) and advised by Detachment A, 5th US Special Forces Group.

Beginning in the late 1967 up to the end of January of 1968, reports continued to come in of increased levels of NVA troop activity with estimated NVA strength of between 20,000 and 80,000 soldiers.
Making matters worse were signs of Soviet armor that were being reported from various sources including North Vietnamese defectors. However, these reports were largely discounted by commanders as being unlikely due to the lack of good roads and because the NVA had never used armor in previous engagements.

Map showing location of hills around the Khe Sanh area

On January 21st and 22nd, NVA forces attacked and overran Khe Sanh Village and began their encirclement and assault on the Khe Sanh base. The following day, the 23rd, NVA forces attacked the Laotian outpost at Ban Houei Sane with the help of five PT-76 amphibious tanks.
The BV33 battalion at the outpost was routed and fled east toward old Lang Vei with their families. Roughly 8,000 civilians in the area fled with them. Medical supplies, food, and other items were then airlifted to old Lang Vei.

Destroying enemy bunkers after assault on Hill 875, 2nd Bn., 173rd Abn. Bde., Vietnam, 1967.

Nonetheless, the Green Berets were supplemented with 100 M72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW) rockets delivered to Lang Vei in early February. The camp also had use of two 106mm and four 57mm Recoilless Rifles, but had little anti-tank (AT) ammunition. They also lacked any anti-tank mines.

Additionally, the camp was reinforced with a Mobile Strike Force (MIKE) of indigenous troops, bringing the total soldiers at Lang Vei to over 500.
On the afternoon of February 6th, the NVA began bombarding Lang Vei with mortars and 152mm howitzers.

Company G, 2/3 Marines assault Hill 881N

Just after midnight on February 7th and immediately following another bombardment, the NVA attacked the base at Lang Vei in force. Two NVA companies of sappers armed with satchel charges, thermite grenades, and flamethrowers launched a three-pronged assault. A dozen PT-76 tanks and three full battalions of NVA regular infantry supported them.
Captain Willoughby, who was in command of the defenders, called in air support from a AC-119 Shadow gunship and other air strikes on the approaches to the base. Artillery from U.S. Marines also targeted these ravines, but the NVA broke through the perimeter too quickly

Attack on Lang Vei

Two tanks were initially destroyed by one of the 106mm Recoilless Rifles, but that position and others were silenced rapidly by sappers throwing satchel charges and by the blasts of the 76mm guns on the tanks.
The defenders were overrun by the NVA assault in only 13 minutes of fighting. Many of the surviving Green Berets fell back to the Tactical Operations Command (TOC) bunker. Willoughby requested Marine reinforcement from Khe Sanh, but was denied.
Others formed anti-tank squads using the LAWs to try and destroy the NVA armor. Unfortunately, the LAWs often malfunctioned or misfired. Even direct hits on the Soviet-made tanks merely bounced off the armor without detonating, but at least one additional tank was destroyed through their efforts.

A PT-76 tank, destroyed by American anti-tank weapons, lies dormant along a road after the battle at the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp

Four Green Berets and a group 50 CIDG troops found themselves isolated from the TOC, which was under bombardment from the NVA tanks. These troops attempted to extricate themselves from the base and move to old Lang Vei to get help.
As they made their way out of the camp, they became engaged with a sizable number of NVA troops. Only two of the Americans and ten Vietnamese made it the half-mile to old Lang Vei.
At the TOC, eight Green Berets and nearly 30 South Vietnamese or CIDG troops had taken refuge in the large steel-reinforced concrete bunker. Its entrance was destroyed by the blast of one the 76mm tank guns, leaving only a narrow gap to enter or leave.
Over the next eight hours, the NVA would use a multitude of weapons in their attempt to smoke out or kill the survivors in the TOC, with little or no success.

                Photograph taken by  U.S.Air Force reconnaissance aircraft showing 2 destroyed PT-76 tanks in Lang Vei

The NVA troops first tried to collapse the bunker by rolling one of the tanks over the top of it. While this proved unsuccessful, it did destroy the communication antennas, which effectively cut the trapped soldiers off from help.
Next, the NVA threw thermite grenades and tear gas into the bunker. These caused some minor injuries and confusion, but the Americans had been trained well and been exposed to tear gas before, so the group endured.

However, the Vietnamese and CIDG soldiers succumbed to the pressure and were coaxed out of the bunker by NVA soldiers. They decided to leave their arms and climb the stairs out of the bunker to surrender. The NVA executed all of them.

Khe Sanh Bunkers and burning Fuel Dump

The Americans were then told to surrender, but refused. Their rebuff was answered by fragmentation grenades. For nearly an hour, the NVA dropped a steady stream of grenades into the TOC. Nearly every soldier was wounded, one severely.
And yet, the soldiers stood their ground and refused to surrender through the night, hoping that reinforcements would arrive and air attacks would resume on the NVA with daylight.
Meanwhile, one U.S. soldier at old Lang Vei organized several dozen Laotian soldiers to assist him in attacking the NVA at the base. Sergeant Eugene Ashley led several assaults on the base camp to relieve his stranded comrades at daylight.

An Army 175-mm M107 at Camp Carroll provides fire support for ground forces

Each attempt was thrown back by the NVA, and the soldiers of BV33 became more and more hesitant to advance towards the base. On his third attempt to reach the base, Ashley was shot in the chest and later died from an artillery blast.
The NVA made one more attempt to oust the remaining eight Americans from the TOC by placing several bricks of C-4 in the ventilation shaft and detonating it. The resulting explosion was enormous, but failed to kill any of the soldiers.
Instead, it opened a hole in one of the walls that allowed the trapped soldiers to use a remaining radio to contact a forward air controller flying nearby.
Expecting another assault by the NVA on the TOC at any moment, the trapped soldiers called in airstrikes and planned to make a breakout.

A US Marine Corps sniper team searches for targets in the Khe Sanh Valley

Following three rounds of airstrikes, seven of the Green Berets burst out of the TOC and fought their way towards old Lang Vei. One of the soldiers was left behind as his legs were too badly injured for him to walk.
The remnants of the TOC met the remaining Americans and were soon all evacuated by helicopter. The CIDG and BV33 soldiers and their civilian followers were forced to elude the NVA and travel to the Khe Sanh base on foot.
Of the 24 American Special Forces soldiers, 7 were killed, 11 wounded, and 3 were captured. Sergeant Ashley was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his efforts and sacrifice to save his fellow soldiers.

Khe Sanh, South Vietnam. March, 1968: U.S. Marines scramble for cover as another volley of PAVN shells lands on a besieged base.

Over 300 South Vietnamese and CIDG troops were killed with 64 wounded and another 122 captured. A total of about 6,000 Laotian soldiers and civilians arrived at Khe Sanh out of over 8,000 who had set out for it.

     The official NVA report listed 90 KIA and 220 wounded, with 7 of their 12 tanks as destroyed or damaged. Although Lang Vei was lost, Khe Sanh withstood the NVA assaults.
TET Offensive attacks were rolled back and defeated throughout South Vietnam in short order, including Hue and the brief breach of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, despite the mischaracterization by the media at the time.

German Assault troops from WWI

I have several "Historical" posts in the works, I also have one that that talks about the drug use and the American troops in Vietnam, but that one I will have my Dad "Proof" the article since he was an MP his first tour and "El CID" his second tour and he knows a lot about the subject.  I know that I occasionally make mistakes on my historical stuff but I try to be accurate when I can.  This one comes from the German Front of WWI.  I have blogged on several articles about the Germans in WWI and the "Interwar" period.

German Assault Troops getting ready for a raid on the trenches of the Allies

In recent years, the term “stormtrooper” has come to mean something out of the science fiction world of Star Wars. It wasn’t an accident that George Lucas used the term. Before his movies, the word was used to describe the men of the SS, Hitler’s fanatical bodyguards.
But it was also no accident that Hitler and others used the word to describe his elite unit. In the front lines of WWI in 1918, where Hitler was a runner in the trenches, the new and innovative German infantry units dubbed “Sturmtruppen” led the last great German offensive of the war.

 Otto Von Bismark taking the oath of allegiance from the various states of the German nation to form the NAtion of Germany.  After soundly trouncing the French in the Franco-Prussian War in 1970 where Bismark was the architect of the stunning victory over the hated French.

In the Romantic Era of the late 19th century that saw Germany become a united nation, the word “storm” was popular. It denoted power and impending doom. Nothing could have described the German troops of 1918 better, but the truth is, these specially trained German soldiers were not the only “stormtroops” of the war.
Italy had its “Arditi” – “the Ardent Ones,” and elements of the British Lancashires actually referred to themselves as “stormtroops” and underwent specialized small-unit training towards the end of the war, as a way to (hopefully) break the log-jam of trench warfare, which was not only costly but also kept each side from its larger objectives. Other nations such as Canada and Austria experimented with similar ideas.

Hitler (far right, seated) with his army comrades of the Bavarian Reserve Infantry   Regiment 16 (c. 1914–18)

The impetus in developing new infantry tactics came from the bloody stalemate of trench warfare and the new weapons of war which made it necessary, primarily the machine-gun. It is an axiom of warfare that armies tend to fight their next war the way they fought their last.
Though infantry weapons had become much more deadly in the late 18th century, men still organized themselves on the battlefield as if they were on the parade ground. This was primarily to increase firepower and casualties on the enemy, but also was because many of their officers were not capable of maneuvering troops freely outside of formation.

The result? The hundreds of thousands of men cut down in rows by machine guns.

German soldiers of the 11th Reserve Hussar Regiment fighting from a trench, on the Western Front, 1916

This went on for years, but behind the scenes, even in 1915, the Germans were working on training specialized units in new tactics and weapons. In this, the Germans had a significant advantage and head start over their rivals: their command structure.
Though the stereotype of the German soldier is one that rigidly obeyed orders like an automaton, this in many ways was far from the truth. Long before other nations developed the modern infantry tactics of today and the type of command and control necessary to coordinate them, the Germans were innovating them.

German Army hussars on the attack during maneuvers

Basically speaking, years before most of the other great powers, the German army trained each man, from the bottom to the very top, in the job of the man one rung higher than him on the ladder.
For example, should a sergeant fall on the field, the corporal under him would have not only trained as a corporal but would have known the sergeant’s job as well, and thus could fill his role. The sergeant would have known the lieutenant’s job, etc., up to the top.
This sounds completely mundane today, but in 1914-1918 this was pretty unheard of – you didn’t learn the job of the man above you until you had earned it.
The Germans’ departure from that mindset meant that in the chaos of battle, the death of one man might not stop an attack in its tracks. Of course, this is an oversimplification, but the German Army showed a great deal more flexibility in this regard than any of its foes.

German soldiers (wearing distinctive pickelhaube helmets with cloth covers) on the front at the First Battle of the Marne during World War I

Another factor that contributed to the development of stormtroop tactics in 1918 was another idea that seems to run counter to the image of the German/Prussian military man as a mindless military machine.
From the top down, officers and men were given objectives, and perhaps a framework to work within, but within each planning stage, all the way down to squad level, officers and men were (generally) responsible for working out a plan at their level for achieving their objective.
For example, a captain commanding a company might be given the assignment of capturing a small town. How he did this was up to him – given the equipment allotted to him, timetable, etc. Typically, he would assign each platoon commander an objective and they would work out with their sergeants (and they with their corporals, and so on) how they would go about the attack.
In many of the other armies of 1914, generals and colonels with no knowledge of the objective would plan out the assault for company commanders and very little deviation was allowed. Today the German idea does not sound revolutionary at all, but back then it was, and it laid the foundation for modern infantry tactics.

 Some German gear from WWI

In the spring of 1915, a German unit was developed under the name “Sturmabteilung” (“Assault Section”). Yes, this was the same name given to Hitler’s early “Brownshirts” or “SA,” many of whom had served in these type of units during the war. Later, as the unit grew, it was referred to as a “Sturmbataillon” and the men within it as “Sturmtruppen.”

In charge of training this group of men was Captain Willi Rohr, who had been in the army since he was 14 years old. He had come up through the ranks and had also served in a specialized “Jäger,” or “Hunter,” division.

Captain Willy Rohr, Commander of Storm Battalion No. 5 (Rohr).

The Jäger were specialized troops that operated in forests and woods, and many of the men within them had been gamekeepers, hunters, and even poachers. They had different and camouflaged uniforms before most of the rest of the German Army did, and had a strong esprit de corps.
They were also given a much greater degree of autonomy than many other troops since they would be out of the reach of communications for days or weeks at a time. The wooded areas in which they drilled and were deployed also called for a more flexible formation strategy. All of this evolved into the first stormtrooper units.
Among the first changes that Rohr made were to the units’ field artillery. Many German units had organic artillery within them, both of relatively small caliber: 37mm and a heavier 3-inch (7.5 cm) support gun. Rohr and his men reduced the weight of both of these weapons, making them much more portable.

German Stoßtruppen (stormtroopers) rising from trenches to attack

Rohr also changed the footwear of the men – instead of the traditional jackboot we’re all familiar with, he equipped them with more resilient and flexible Austrian mountain boots, which were lighter and quieter as well. Different camouflage patterns were developed and the uniform itself was equipped with elbow and knee patches made of cloth and leather to help with crawling and to prevent injury.

 German Uniforms of WWI

The most obvious changes came in the form of weaponry. First and foremost, Rohr reached back into the past, using the old grenadiers of the Prussian Army as a model. Like these men, his stormtroops would be equipped with satchels full of grenades, making virtually every man a walking arsenal.
The standard German infantry rifle, the famous Mauser 98k, was made lighter and shorter for easy movement and firing. Later in the war, the stormtroops were the first to receive sub-machine guns, those weapons whose development was owed to the need to clear trenches. Shotguns were also deployed.

Stormtrooper of the Assault Bataillon Rohr

Rohr initially developed body-armor, but the materials of the time were too heavy and impeded movement, and fast movement combined with overwhelming violence was key to the stormtroops’ success. Other nations, particularly the Italians, did develop and used body armor.
One piece of equipment did stay and was eventually used by the entire German army – the coal scuttle helmet, which provided much greater protection than the spiked “Pickelhaube” helmet of the wars’ first years.

German Reichswehr soldiers wearing WW1 Stahlhelms.  As I recall in this pic was when Adolph Hitler had the German Army swear personal loyalty to him instead of the German Republic

Rohr, and others such as future legend Erwin Rommel, developed infiltration tactics designed to surprise and overwhelm the enemy. They realized that the hours-long artillery bombardments that took place all along the line didn’t inflict the desired casualties, but did alert the enemy of a pending attack.
Accordingly, Rohr and the subsequent stormtroop units either gave up the barrage entirely, or focused a short and intense barrage on the one part of the line they were planning to assault. Sometimes this was a ruse, and the units used the noise down the line to cover their movements while attacking elsewhere.

Soldier of a German stormtrooper assault group with his Bergmann MP18.1 and a Parabellum P08, Northern France, Spring 1918.

 

As in WWII 20-some years later, the men of the stormtroops attempted to seize the weakest part of the enemy line, break through, and assault the rest of the enemy position from the rear. The men would be right behind the barrage, which became known as a “rolling barrage” when the British used the tactic in the last part of the war.
Before the enemy could recover their senses, the stormtroops were on them, using their grenades, shotguns, machine-guns and small field artillery under direct fire. Once in the trenches, the men of the stormtroops used their own brutal and primitive armament: clubs with nails, medieval spiked maces, trench knives with grooves and skull crackers, and of course, the sharpened shovel.

A German stormtrooper on the Somme wearing a body armour. Note two potato mashers-grenades he is armed with.

In the spring of 1918, General Ludendorff launched the last German offensive of the war. Leading the way were the stormtroops, many of whom infiltrated enemy lines before the main attacks. For the first days of the offensive, they caused shock and panic among the Allies, driving them miles from the starting point.

However, as the offensive continued, attrition and exhaustion took their toll on the men of Sturmtruppen and many of them simply collapsed. In more than one case, deprived German troops, overrunning French supply depots, filled themselves with bread, cheese, and gallons of wine. The result? A lot of German POW’s.
The German Offensive of 1918 failed for a number of reasons, but the tactics of the stormtroops live on today on almost every battlefield in the world.

Monday Music "Kung Fu Fighting" by Carl Douglas

I am still very busy and trying to catch things up....

I remembered this song in the early 70's.  We were in the family car a 1972 Dodge Demon, it had a 340 Cubic Inch Displacement and was a bad to the bone car.  I am a Ford guy but I do like the dodges..especially the older ones.

We were shipping the car to Germany where my Dad had orders to report.  We had left Macon Georgia to go to Charleston South Carolina to put the car on a boat to Bremerhaven.  This song came on 7 times on the radio before we got there and it was a catchy little song  

Kung Fu Fighting" is a disco song written and performed by Carl Douglas and composed and produced by Biddu. It was released as a single in 1974, at the cusp of a chopsocky film craze, and eventually rose to the top of the British and American charts, in addition to reaching number one on the Soul Singles chart. It received a Gold certification from the RIAA in 1974, won the 1974 Grammy Award for Best Selling Single,and popularized disco music. It eventually went on to sell eleven million records worldwide, making it one of the best-selling singles of all time. The song uses the quintessential Oriental riff, a short musical phrase that is used to signify Chinese culture.
"Kung Fu Fighting" was rated number 100 in VH1's 100 Greatest one-hit wonders, and number 1 in the UK Channel 4's Top 10 One Hit Wonders list in 2000, the same channel's 50 Greatest One Hit Wonders poll in 2006 and Bring Back ... the one-hit Wonders, for which Carl Douglas performed the song in a live concert.
   

The song was originally meant to be a B-side to "I Want to Give You My Everything" (written by Brooklyn songwriter Larry Weiss, and sung by Carl Douglas). The producer Biddu originally hired Douglas to sing "I Want to Give You My Everything" but needed something to record for the B-side, and asked Douglas if he had any lyrics they could use. Douglas showed several, out of which Biddu chose the one that would later be called "Kung Fu Fighting" and worked out a melody for it without taking it too seriously.
After having spent over two hours recording the A-side and then taking a break, "Kung Fu Fighting" was recorded quickly in the last ten minutes of studio time, in only two takes, due to a three-hour time constraint for the entire session. According to Biddu, "Kung Fu Fighting was the B-side so I went over the top on the 'huhs' and the 'hahs' and the chopping sounds. It was a B-side: who was going to listen?" After hearing both songs, Robin Blanchflower of Pye Records insisted that "Kung Fu Fighting" should be the A-side instead.
Following its release, the song didn't receive any radio airplay for the first five weeks and it initially sold poorly, but the song began gaining popularity in dance clubs, eventually entering the UK Singles Chart at #42 on 17 August 1974 and reaching the top on 21 September, after which it would remain at the top for three weeks. It was then released in the United States, where it was equally successful, topping the Billboard Hot 100 chart. The single would eventually go on to sell eleven million records worldwide.

Busier than a.....You guessed it..

I am out of battery and  will be a couple more days before I can post.  Go read the people on the sidebar, they are way better than I am.

Monday Music "Signs" by Five man Electrical Band

I decided to roll with the 70's channel on the way home since the 80's channel was playing "prince", nothing wrong with Prince, but they play his music a LOT so I surfed and this song came on and I remembered this song, it is a staple of the rock music channels.  I figured that I would throw in an early 70's song into the Monday Music mix.

"Signs" is a song by the Canadian rock group Five Man Electrical Band. It was written by the band's frontman, Les Emmerson and popularized the relatively unknown band, who recorded it for their second album, Good-byes and Butterflies, in 1970. "Signs" was originally released that year as the B-side to the relatively unsuccessful single "Hello Melinda Goodbye" (#55 Canada).
Re-released in 1971 as the A-side, "Signs" reached No. 4 in Canada and No. 3 on the US Billboard Hot 100 chart. Billboard ranked it as the No. 24 song for 1971. It became a gold record.

The song's narrator describes four instances of encountering signs that anger or concern him, as follows:

• A notice that "long-haired freaky people need not apply" for a job opening. He stuffs his hair into his hat in order to get an interview, then contemptuously reveals it once he has been offered the job.
• A "no trespassing" warning outside a house. He climbs onto the perimeter fence and berates the owners for keeping people out and fencing in the land's natural beauty.
• Being told to leave a restaurant because he does not meet its dress code or have a membership card, both of which are displayed on a sign.
• A sign inviting people to worship at a church. When an offering is taken up at the end of the service, he makes a sign telling God that he is doing well, as he has no money to contribute.

   This video is 8 minutes long, and it is a live performance.  The problem with selecting the early groups is that finding a video is hit or miss.

The Fairey Swordfish.

The first time I heard of this airplane,was when I read a book called "Sink the Bismark" by CS Forester,

    My copy was printed in 1976, I bought it from the Stars and Stripes bookstore in Frankfurt Germany where my Dad was stationed at.

The Second World War was a period of greatly accelerated development in the field of aviation: this was the first war in which jet fighters were used, and bigger bombers than the world had ever seen rained down death from the skies.
It is tempting to think that these types of airplane – the biggest, fastest, most powerful, most technologically advanced models – were solely responsible for winning the air war.
However, in focusing entirely on the flashiest, most impressive planes, it’s easy to lose sight of the plainer, simpler and smaller aircraft that played an equally important role in the Allied victory. One of these models was the Fairey Swordfish, nicknamed the “Stringbag,” a basic torpedo bomber biplane used extensively by the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Navy during WWII.
 

A Swordfish I during a training flight from RNAS Crail, circa 1939–1945

It was one of these humble planes that, reminiscent of Luke Skywalker taking out the Death Star in Star Wars, managed to disable one of the German Kriegsmarine’s most gigantic ships. Another Stringbag was also the first Allied plane to sink a German U-boat, and then later yet another of these unassuming airplanes was the first to sink a U-boat at night.
Stringbags also relentlessly harried the Axis shipping fleet in the Mediterranean, accounting for over a million tons sunk by the end of the war – not a bad tally for an outdated biplane!

Workers carrying out salvage and repair work on a wing of a Swordfish

Looks and performance-wise, the Fairey Swordfish bore a much closer resemblance to the airplanes of the First World War rather than those of the Second. With its open cockpit, fixed landing gear and its pair of stacked wings, by no stretch of one’s imagination could this humble plane have been described as “cutting edge” even in 1933, when the first prototype was built.
However, despite its outdated design, it was no less important to the Allied war effort than its more technologically-advanced compatriots. Indeed, the Swordfish’s antiquated appearance was deceptive – not so much in terms of its flat-out performance, but rather in terms of the roles it was able to perform.

A Fairey Swordfish floatplane being hoisted aboard the battleship HMS Malaya in October 1941

In addition to being armed with two basic but reliable 7.7mm machine guns, one fixed in position for the pilot in the front and one trainable at the rear for the gunner, the Swordfish was able to carry a wide variety of ordnance: anti-ship mines, depth charges, bombs, flares, or a ship-sinking 1,610-pound torpedo.
The plane was also used for a variety of roles, including reconnaissance, bombing, escort duty, or naval artillery spotting.

Swordfish on the after deck of HMS Victorious, 24 May 1941. The next day, nine Swordfish from Victorious attacked Bismarck.

Because of the variety of ordnance the Swordfish could carry and the diversity of its roles, it was given the nickname “Stringbag,” likening the plane to a popular style in women’s handbags at the time. Humorous as it was, the nickname was apt and it stuck.
As a basic three-seater biplane with a simple Bristol Pegasus motor that cranked out 690-odd horsepower, the Stringbag wasn’t going to be breaking any speed records in the air. However, the simple design meant that maintenance of the aircraft was easy, and that the planes were reliable.

A Swordfish, circa 1943–1944

The twin wings meant that the Stringbag had an excellent lift and could take off or land on a relatively short strip of land. This made Stringbags perfect for use on naval aircraft carriers, with their very limited landing and takeoff space.
Stringbags were also extraordinarily maneuverable, making up for their slow speed with excellent agility. Their fabric-covered, all-metal under-structures were sturdy enough to deal with harsh landings, and this meant that they were ideal for night use – an excellent advantage, when they could fly all but invisible to Axis ships or other targets below.

A Swordfish taking off from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, with another passing by astern, circa 1939

These planes weren’t without their disadvantages, of course. They were at a severe disadvantage when it came to air-to-air combat against Axis fighter planes, and the open cockpit meant that the men in the plane would suffer immensely in the cold. Early in the war, Stringbags didn’t have communication radios, so they had to rely on hand-held signalling devices.
Nonetheless their advantages generally outweighed their disadvantages, and Stringbags saw extensive use throughout the war. In one of the most famous incidents in which they were involved, a Stringbag was instrumental in the sinking of one of the Kriegsmarine’s mightiest ships, the battleship Bismarck.

The Royal Navy’s HMS Ark Royal in 1939, with Swordfish biplane fighters passing overhead. The British aircraft carrier was involved in the crippling of the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941

The Bismarck was, at the time of its production, the most powerful warship ever made. In a sortie into the Atlantic aimed at crippling Britain’s crucial supply lines, the Bismarck battled and sank the British battle cruiser HMS Hood.
Realizing the Bismarck had to be stopped, Britain launched a pursuit, but the Bismarck managed to evade her pursuers. The only ship close enough to have a chance of disabling the giant was HMS Ark Royal, which had a few Stringbags equipped with torpedoes aboard. The Stringbags took off an hour before sunset on May 26, 1941 to take on the German behemoth.

 H.M.S. Hood

As the Stringbags, each carrying a single torpedo, approached the Bismarck they dived low, hoping to evade the flak that filled the air from the ship’s anti-aircraft guns. One Stringbag, piloted by Lieutenant Commander John Moffat, got the Bismarck in its sights.
Moffat and his observer, Flight Lieutenant JD Miller, had to time the release of their torpedo with extreme precision. They only had one chance to do this, and if they missed or the torpedo hit the crest of a wave in the extremely choppy sea, it was mission over. With flak flying all around them, and Miller waiting for the exact moment, Moffat’s hands were surely sweating on those controls.

A Swordfish III of RAF 119 Squadron being refueled at Maldegem, Belgium, (1944–1945). The fairing of the aircraft’s centimetric radar can be seen below the engine

Finally, the moment came, and the torpedo was dropped. Against all odds it hit home, striking the mighty battleship in a small area of vulnerability: the rudder, which the torpedo succeeded in jamming mid-turn.
With her rudder jammed to port, and thus unable to move in anything but endless circles, the Bismarck became a sitting duck. British naval ships later surrounded the Bismarck and eventually sank her after extensive bombardment.

Stringbags also played a key role in the night attack on Italy’s Taranto naval base. Two waves of Stringbags launched a surprise attack on the naval base on the night of November 11, 1940, and succeeded in destroying or disabling the bulk of Italy’s naval fleet – an attack that would be carefully studied by the Japanese, who would use similar tactics to attack Pearl Harbor.
Stringbags also saw extensive use in taking out Axis shipping lines, especially in the Mediterranean, where they sunk over a million tons throughout the war. All in all, this humble airplane proved its worth to the British Royal Navy many times over during the course of WWII.

The Myths and reality of the Montana Class Battleships..

I have been binge watching "Space Battleship Yamato 2199", it is basically an updated "Space Cruiser Yamato" of the 1970's fame, the graphics are much better and the storyline is different.  So it is interesting. 

I still think it is strange that an Army guy likes Navy ships...especially old Navy ships...

I shamelessly clipped this from the "Navy General Board"

A stretched Iowa with an extra turret. A ship designed to kill the Yamato class. Many myths surround the Montana class, the immensely powerful super battleships of the United States Navy. Designed to be larger and more powerful than any previous dreadnought, these ships would have been the most powerful dreadnoughts of their time. However, the ships were never built. This has led to many speculations about the ships. In this Navy General Board article, we breakdown some of the more common myths and set the record straight!

Myth #1: The Montana class Ignored the Panama Canal Restrictions

The Montana class was the first battleship designed to ignore the restrictions imposed by the Panama Canal locks. Prior to them, all United States battleships had to be able to fit through the 110′ locks of the Panama Canal. The immense size of the Montana class was in response to the dropped requirement to fit through the locks.

The Truth

One of the common misconceptions about the Montana class battleships is that they were to ignore the Panama canal restrictions. This is only partially true. In realty the US was planning on expanding the Panama Canal locks to 140ft. Construction was meant to be completed around the same time that the Montana ships would come into service. The ability to quickly send ships through the Panama Canal was an advantage that the US was unwilling to part with. The fact that the canal locks were going to be enlarged was likely a big reason why the US Navy finally designed the Montana class.
While the Montana might have ignored the Panama Canal restrictions, they were bound by another equally important size requirement.
A little known fact is that the US Navy placed almost as much importance on being able to travel underneath the Brooklyn bridge as they did the Panama Canal. The height of the bridge at low tide was an important design consideration for ship design. This was because the New York Naval yard was one of the largest naval bases at the time. It was also one of the largest naval repair facilities available. The Navy needed all ships to be able to travel to that yard and the Brooklyn bridge was the largest obstacle blocking the way to the yard.

The Battleship Richelieu arrives in New York for Repairs. Note that the top of the fire control tower has been removed so that it can pass under the Brooklyn bridge. All US Battleships were designed in such a way that they could easily pass under this bridge. The Montana class would not have been any different.

Myth #2: The Montana was Designed to Counter the Yamato

Another big misconception about the Montana class was they were “Yamato killers”. Yes, They were the only other battleship capable of engaging the Yamato on equal terms. Also, the Yamato was known (Somewhat) to the US Navy at the time of the Montana’s design. However, what the US Navy thought they knew about the Yamato was a far cry from what it actually was at the time.

A model of the Montana class super battleships. Though similar in appearance to the Iowa class, several important differences separated the two classes.

The Truth

It would be a long time before the US had a grasp of the Yamato’s capabilities. When design started in 1938, the Yamato was believed to be a battleship of typical size and armament. In 1936, a US received reports that Japan was building ships up to 55,000 tons.
A few years later in 1938, reports stated that Japan was building two 16″ heavy battleships with two more on the way. Over the course of the war, new evidence slowly allowed the navy to better understand what it was that it was up against. By 1944, interviews with captured Japanese personnel revealed that the Yamato class carried 18″ guns. Finally, It wasn’t until late 1944/1945 that the US navy finally had a grasp of the accurate specifications of the Yamato class.
Since the design of the Montana class began in 1939, this proves without a doubt that the Montana class wasn’t designed to counter the Yamato.
So if the Montana wasn’t designed to counter the Yamato, why was it so large? It is largely because the ship was designed to withstand the firepower of its own guns. The 16″/50 cannon when coupled with the “super heavy” 2700lb shell could have been the finest battleship gun ever to see service. At long ranges, its penetration power was almost that of the larger Japanese18.1″ shell. Due to this similarity, the fact that the Montana was so well protected against the Yamato’s mighty 18.1″ guns was really a happy/lucky accident.
The other contributing factor was that the US wanted a battleship more powerful than anything its adversaries was likely to use. A ship more powerful than the vessels preceding it, the Bismarck class of Germany, the Nagato class of Japan, and so on. An almost impractically large ship to dominate all others. In some ways the US didn’t believe anyone else would construct such a large ship. Unknown to the US, Japan had the exact same thoughts when designing the Yamato. The Montana class and the Yamato class were the premier super battleships of their respective navies.

Myth #3: The Montana was basically a larger Iowa Class Battleship

Probably one of the most common myths found across various forms of media today. Perhaps its because of the visual similarity of the two classes. Perhaps it is due to the similar choice in armament at first glance. Many claim that the Montana class was simply a larger Iowa class battleship with an extra turret added.

The Truth

The belief in the connection between the Iowa and Montana classes likely stems from their similar appearance and use of the same main armament. However, examination of their design features shows two very different ships for two different roles.

Firepower

It is true that the Iowa and Montana class battleships shared the same 16″/50 main armament. A remarkably powerful weapon for its size, the United States Navy did not need to introduce a heavier weapon. While the United States had already developed naval gun of 18″, the lower weight of the 16″/50 allowed more of them to be carried. The twelve guns of the Montana class would have given them the heaviest broadside of any battleship then in service.
Outside of the main guns, the Montana class also differed from the Iowa class in the choice of secondary armament. While still utilizing twenty 5″ guns in ten twin mounts, the Montana class would have carried a more powerful 5″/54 model rather than the older 5″/38. Firing a heavier shell at a higher velocity, the Montana class would have enjoyed much greater anti-surface firepower than the Iowa class.

Armor

Armoring is the largest difference between the two classes. The Iowa class ships used an internal armored belt inherited from the proceeding South Dakota class. This brought the armored belt inside the hull and was done as a weight saving measure, helping the ships achieve their famous speed. However, shells striking this belt first penetrated the outer hull. This had the unwelcome effect of potentially flooding the void space between hull and belt for shots that hit at or below the waterline. The Montana design didn’t have to follow weight restrictions and so reverted back to a traditional external belt where the armor was on the outside of the hull. This ensured that potential damage was outside of the hull and that watertight integrity would remain intact. Perhaps the most important difference is, unlike the Iowa class, the Montana was protected from its own guns. This armoring style reflects the design philosophies behind the two ships. The Iowa was meant to be a fast interceptor to guard against cruisers and fast battleships. The Montana class was designed to participate with the main battle line and engage in furious gunnery duels with multiple battleships.

Speed

After armor, speed shows another sizable difference between the classes. The Iowas were designed to be high speed 32 knot battleships to act as protection to the carrier fleet. While designers considered making the Montana class faster, they decided that firepower and armor were more important for the design. Thus, the Montana was limited to a speed of 28 knots like the 27 knot North Carolina and South Dakota classes. The Montana class were not fast enough to keep pace with carriers at their highest speeds, but more than fast enough to operate with other battleships making up the United States battle line.
Overall, the Montana was a vastly different warship compared to the Iowa class. The design reflects the role that they were intended for, a heavily armed and armored warship capable of taking on anything else that it might encounter.

Final Thoughts

The Montana class battleships would have been one of the most powerful dreadnaughts ever to be launched, rivaled only by the Yamato class battleships. However, like the Yamato, the tiger tank, or many other of the “wonder weapons” created during the Second World War, a certain aura of myth has been built around them. They weren’t ultimate weapons conjured up to single handedly win the war, just simple units designed to fill a role particular role in warfare. Unfortunately for the Montana class, the role of the battleship in warfare was in its twilight phase. They were to be built right when the battleship was no longer the glorious warship it once was. The result was that the greatest battleship ever was never laid down.