Was unable to upload this with my "Pale Moon Browser", am using my backup Chrome browser.
I snagged this from "Aviation World", I get emails from them at my job and if I see something I think my readers might like, I "Nick" it to use a British phrase..
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It is still challenging to make a global assessment of what happened in the air over Ukraine, mainly because there is no openly accessible comprehensive data. Initial observations of the war, admittedly restricted, are based on what is publicly available from social media and official messages regarding Russian combat helicopters, their weapons, and self-defense measures.
From helicopter registrations (though they are often obscured), testimonies of captured Russian pilots and obituaries in the local Russian press, it is evident that helicopters from all army aviation units stationed in southern and western military districts bordering Ukraine participated in the invasion (AW&ST Feb. 21-March 6, p. 42). Helicopter squadrons also entered Ukraine from central and eastern Russia.
Mil Mi-8 transport helicopters carried out one large operation, the capture of Hostomel Airport in the first days of the war. After that, Mi-8s were used less frequently, mostly to evacuate shot-down pilots. The Kamov Ka-52 Hokum—used most frequently—Mi-24P/Mi-35M Hind and Mi-28N/UB Havoc—used the least—combat helicopters have all been continually active.
Russian helicopters operating in Ukraine are armed with 80-mm S-8 unguided rockets carried in 20-round B-8V20A launchers. Their Mi-8s usually carry two of the launchers and sometimes two more 23-mm UPK-23-250 gun pods. Mi-24/Mi-35 and Mi-28 helicopters carry two B-8V20A rocket launchers as standard, and sometimes also four 9M113 Shturm or 9M120 Ataka anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM).
(When I tried to save the picture, it had extra information attached with the picture and even saving the picture as a separate link didn't save the extra information that was attached to the pic)
Ka-52s operating from Belarusian territory carried two additional fuel tanks suspended under the wing. In this case, the weapons were limited to one rocket launcher and a block of 9M127-1 Vikhr-1 or 9M120-1 Ataka-1 ATGMs. In eastern and southern Ukraine, the rotorcraft are stationed closer to the border, so the Ka-52s usually do not require additional fuel. Instead, they have taken on more weapons, such as two B-8V20A rocket launchers and four ATGMs. Illustrations show Ka-52 helicopters additionally armed with two or four 9M342 Igla-S anti-aircraft missiles, most likely to work against UAVs.
Russian helicopters have suffered heavy losses in Ukraine. By early April, Russia had lost more than 20 helicopters in the air; about 10 helicopters were destroyed on the ground by artillery or UAV fire. These figures only include visually confirmed cases—actual losses are likely higher. The Ukrainian side reports that by April 10, it had destroyed 137 Russian helicopters, likely an overstated figure; Russia does not provide any data.
About two-thirds of the destroyed helicopters are Ka-52s (estimated at 11), Mi-24s/Mi-35s (seven) and Mi-28 (two) combat helicopters; the others are Mi-8 transport helicopters of different versions. All were destroyed by man-portable air defense systems and/or possibly small arms. A video shows a hovering Ka-52 shot down by a Ukrainian Stugna-P ATGM. The Russian defense ministry released a video of a Ka-52 returning to its base after being shot by small arms. There is no information about helicopters shot down by Ukrainian fighter planes.
A video dated March 17 shows Russian Ka-52s and Mi-28Ns shelling the town of Popasna near Luhansk in eastern Ukraine with unguided rockets. The helicopters approach at a very low altitude, then fire a rocket salvo in a short-climb flight before quickly turning back at low altitude. As the rockets are launched, the helicopters deploy flares for self-protection. The accuracy of such fire is low, but Russian helicopters are afraid to get close to the target, as Ukrainian anti-aircraft weapons threaten them.
The most active Russian combat helicopter in the war with Ukraine is the Kamov Ka-52, including the most extensive self-defense suite in Russia, the L370 Vitebsk.
Its development began in the Soviet era, in Vitebsk in what was then the Soviet Republic of Byelorussia, now Belarus. The program encountered a problem common to all such systems—curbing a high number of false alarms. Work stopped on the program, but production of small batches began in 2011, with the output intended for special helicopters, such as the Mi-8AMTSh-1, a VIP variant for the Russian defense ministry.
Large-scale production of the Vitebsk began in June 2015, after which it was widely deployed in all Russian combat and transport helicopters in various configurations. The most extensive of these is the L370P2 on Ka-52. KRET, a Rostec subsidiary, now makes the system, and the export name of the series is President-S.
The L370P2 Vitebsk consists of two sections—the information section with warning sensors and the executive section with countermeasure devices. The information portion consists of four L370-2 ultraviolet missile approach warning sensors (MAWS) positioned on the sides of the Ka-52’s front fuselage and tail boom, covering the full 360 deg. around the helicopter and spotting launched missiles from up to 15 km (9 mi.).
An additional warning device, cooperating with the Vitebsk but not integrated into the system, is the L140 Otklik laser warning receiver. Four Otklik sensors are installed around the fuselage: two on the fuselage sides near the main landing gear, one in the front of the right wingtip fairing, and one at the rear, under the rudder. The Otklik sensor works in the 0.4-1.1-micrometer-wave range and determines the position of the threat with an accuracy of 10 deg.
Another information system that works with the L370 Vitebsk is the L-band N035 warning radar, capable of detecting and tracking small air targets, including anti-aircraft missiles. On the Ka-52, the N035 radar has four antennas: two placed on the tailplane endplates and looking to the sides, one located in the fairing at the left wingtip, looking forward, as well as one located under the tail boom, looking backward. The manufacturer states that the N035 radar can detect a Stinger-class missile from a distance of 3 km and a fighter aircraft from 10 km.
The executive part of the Vitebsk suite consists of two L370-5 directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) installed on the sides of the lower part of the fuselage, just ahead of the main landing gear. The L370-5 module is a rotating ball containing the SP2-1500 lamp that generates modulated infrared and ultraviolet radiation within a 7-deg. angle, jamming the infrared seekers of air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles. Together, both modules cover a sector of 360 X 90 deg.
The Vitebsk system also controls launch of the 26-mm PPI-26 flares or PPR-26 radar decoys from the UV-26M chaff-and-flare dispenser system, with two 32-round dispensers in each wingtip fairing.
Other Russian helicopters use simpler variants. The Mi-35M helicopter includes the L370E8-35 suite, with four L370-2 MAWS housed in four sizable superstructures on the sides of the fuselage and tail boom, and three L370-5 DIRCM turrets. Additionally, the rotorcraft uses the L150-28 Pastel radar warning receiver; however, there is no L140 Otklik laser warning device. It also typically has six UV-26M chaff/flare dispensers on the sides of the fuselage.
Mi-8 transport helicopters are fitted with an L370E8 suite that comprises four L370-2 warning sensors fitted at the tips of the weapons’ outriggers, three L-370-5 IR jammers (two at the outriggers’ tips and one beneath the tail beam) and standard UV-26M flare launchers on the fuselage sides.
Mi-28N combat helicopters have only a limited set of devices, including the L140 Otklik laser warning receiver, L150-28 Pastel radar-warning receiver and UV-26 flare dispensers in the wingtip fairings. Some of the helicopters used in Ukraine, such as the Mi-24P and the older Mi-35M and Mi-8, have even weaker self-defense features.
In March 2017, Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov told the Russian press that after the experience of fighting in Syria “the Vitebsk suite will be modernized to work in a broader band of frequencies and at long ranges, and to provide the best protection of aircraft against attacks of modern air-to-air and portable surface-to-air missiles.” Even in August 2013, the Russian defense ministry had commissioned research and development work for a new-generation L417 electro-optical jammer. Its results are so far unknown.
Russia’s experience in Ukraine will likely provide a strong incentive for modernizing the Vitebsk and developing the new airborne self-defense system.
Helos ARE MANPAD magnets...
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