I have been working a lot and a lot of end of school activities going on at Casa De Garabaldi, I have some pithy musings I figured I would comment on.
First on, there was a special election in Montana and a liberal reporter from a rag called the "guardian" apparently ambushed the GOP candidate right before he was supposed to speak to a news team about the Election and apparently he did what we wanted to do to the smarmy media, he "body slammed" the reporter. I guess the candidate got grumpy when the reporter kept asking him loaded questions hoping to provoke a response and put him in a bad light and sticking a recorder in his face and not letting him get a word in edgewise.
I also am saddened about the backpack bomb at a concert in Manchester England where 22 people died, mostly kids going to a concert with a singer named Ariana, the same ditzy celebritwit that bashed the United States and praised open borders and diversity. Well England has a muslim problem and they in the name of political correctness refuse to deal with it.
And we are having problems here in my area, apparently a county commissioner had a problem with a confederate flag being flown from a battlefield in the county. Sent a representative to the area owned by the county and told them to remove the flag. Well that was not good enough and the commissioner showed up and demanded that all confederate flags be removed because they are"offensive". Well the museum that is run by volunteers decided that this was enough and shut down the museum. Apparently the commissioner wanted to pander to her base pushed the issue, There are many worse problems in my county to worry about like a bunch of failing schools, crime and other issues and she picks the confederate flag. I can't make this crap up.
I know that this installment of Monday Music went out on Tuesday....Well
And scouts cut short my sleep and my Monday Music. I also went to my sons graduation ceremony at his middle school. He got student of the month and A&B honor roll. 5 A and 1 B, pretty good.
I heard this song for the first time on that cassette tape that I bought full of 60's hit. It was a real good song especially for a road trip. Apparently the album "Pet Sounds" is one of the iconic albums of the 60's and I didn't know that until I saw a reference of it in "Bloom County". I learned more about the album and it is very good.
"Sloop John B" is a traditional folk song from the Bahamas, also known as "The John B. Sails", which was included in Carl Sandburg's 1927 collection of folk songs The American Songbag. It is best known for its folk rock adaptation by the Beach Boys, which was produced and arranged by bandleader Brian Wilson. Released two months before their 11th studio album Pet Sounds (1966), it served as the lead single
for the album, peaking at number 3 in the US and number 2 in the UK. In
several other countries, the single was a number one hit.
Wilson based his version on the 1958 recording by the Kingston Trio, but took some liberties with the song's arrangement, changing a few lyrics, and at the suggestion of bandmate Al Jardine, modified one part of the song's chord progression to include a supertonic chord (ii). The Beach Boys' Brian Wilson, his brother Carl Wilson, their cousin Mike Love, and their friend Al Jardine all share lead vocal duties. The instrumentation was provided mostly by the session musician conglomerate nicknamed "the Wrecking Crew".
The song remains one of the group's best-remembered recordings of their mid 1960s period, containing an unusual and elaborate a cappella vocal section that was unlike anything in the pop music of its era. In 2011, the group's version of "Sloop John B" was ranked #276 on Rolling Stone's list of "The 500 Greatest Songs of All Time".
The Kingston Trio's 1958 recording of "The John B. Sails" was recorded under the title "The Wreck of the John B." It was the direct influence on the Beach Boys' version. The Beach Boys' Al Jardine was a keen folk music fan, and he suggested to Brian Wilson that the Beach Boys should do a cover version of the song. As Jardine explains:
"Brian was at the piano. I asked him if I could sit down and show him
something. I laid out the chord pattern for 'Sloop John B.' I said,
'Remember this song?' I played it. He said, 'I'm not a big fan of the
Kingston Trio.' He wasn't into folk music. But I didn't give up on the
idea. So what I did was to sit down and play it for him in the Beach
Boys idiom. I figured if I gave it to him in the right light, he might
end up believing in it. So I modified the chord changes so it would be a
little more interesting. The original song is basically a three-chord
song, and I knew that wouldn't fly. So I put some minor changes in
there, and it stretched out the possibilities from a vocal point of
view. Anyway, I played it, walked away from the piano and we went back
to work. The very next day, I got a phone call to come down to the
studio. Brian played the song for me, and I was blown away. The idea
stage to the completed track took less than 24 hours."
Working in the key of A-flat major, Jardine updated the chord progression by having the IV (D♭ major) move to its relative minor (B♭ minor) before returning to the tonic
(A♭ major), altering a portion of the song's progression from IV — I to
IV — ii — I. This device is heard immediately after the lyric "into a fight" and "leave me alone". Wilson elected to change some lyrics: "this is the worst trip since I've been born" to "this is the worst trip I've ever been on", "I feel so break up" to "I feel so broke up", and "broke into the people's trunk" to "broke in the captain's trunk". The first lyric change has been suggested by some to be a subtle nod to the 1960s psychedelia subculture
The instrumental section of the song was recorded on July 22, 1965 at United Western Recorders, Hollywood, California, the session being engineered by Chuck Britz and produced by Brian Wilson. The master take of the instrumental backing took fourteen takes to achieve.
The vocal tracks were recorded over two sessions. The first was
recorded on December 22, 1965, at Western Recorders, produced by Wilson.
The second, on December 29, added a new lead vocal and Billy Strange's
12-string electric guitar part. Jardine explained that Wilson "lined us
up one at a time to try out for the lead vocal. I had naturally assumed I
would sing the lead, since I had brought in the arrangement. It was
like interviewing for a job. Pretty funny. He didn't like any of us. My
vocal had a much more mellow approach because I was bringing it from the
folk idiom. For the radio, we needed a more rock approach. Wilson and
Mike ended up singing it." On the final recording, Brian Wilson sang the first and third verses and Mike Love sang the second.
I cribbed this off the internet, to me it plays with the theme I am running with the "Red Storm Rising". In the Book the "Bears" look for the American Naval Aviation ships so the Backfires and Blinders can go after them. The Bears are considered the premier assignments for Soviet Naval Aviation.
A Flight by the Crews of the 392nd ODRAP in search for the Aircraft Carrier “USS Saratoga”
In
the late seventies, regular flights by the long-range reconnaissance
aircraft Tu-95RTs (NATO: “Bear D”) of the 392 ODRAP to Cuba had already
become quite routinary. But since the task had always been fairly
complex and important, and its fulfillment in isolation from the
regiment, far from the Russian shores, the selection of crews received
special attention. The aircraft commanders and navigators were selected
from a level of training usually not lower than 1st Class.
The qualifications and skills of all the other members of the aircrews
were taken into account, as well as their psychological readiness to fly
in long flights. The team spirit of the crews was also checked in the
air.
The
total length of the flight route from the airfield at Olen’ya, Kola
Peninsula, USSR, to the airfield at San Antonio de los Baños, 20 kms.
SW of Havana, Cuba, was 10,150 km, and the flight time, taking into
account the prevailing winds, was usually 15:40 to 16:00 hours. They
always flew at night, so as to land in Cuba in the morning hours,
before strong cumulus and thunderstorm clouds developed. The flights
were over the Barents and Norwegian Seas, and over the Eastern, Central,
and Western Atlantic Ocean. Major disruptions to the flights were
mostly winds and jet air currents. During the flights, the Soviet pilots
had to cross frontal clouds. When entering the jet stream they faced
the strong turbulence of air masses, and buffeting for a long time while
flying in the clouds over the ocean, without any landmarks. At the same
time, they tried to save fuel by flying across the ceiling “at a
distance”, that is, constantly selecting the flight mode at which they
got the minimum fuel consumption per kilometer. The art of such flights
was thus learned and utilized by almost all the crews of the regiment,
and this saved them not just once, giving them the necessary additional
kilos of fuel at the right time. In addition, the Cold War over the
ocean was in full swing, and they often had to meet with U.S. and NATO
fighters, which not always behaved amicably and peacefully.
Sometimes
the crews had to perform tasks, from the outcome of which could depend
the future of their flying careers. About one such case tells us Col.
(ret.) Pavel Pavlovich Burmistrov, who flew in the 1970s as navigator in
the crew of Squadron Commander Major Nikolai Gordeyevich Fedotov.
Intercept Saratoga! – A Photo for Fidel Castro
December, 1977.
After completing a long non-stop night flight, and meeting the sunrise
over the ocean while approaching the island of Cuba, the crews of Majors
Nikolai Gordeyevich Fedotov and Ghennady Nikolayevich Simachov landed
safely at the airport of San Antonio, 40 kilometers from Havana. At that
time I was flying as navigator in Major Fedotov’s crew. Flying with him
was easy and interesting. After completing all the necessary
formalities to carry out on arrival and a short hop in a bus, our crews
were accommodated in a comfortable villa in Casablanca, one of the
oldest and most beautiful areas in Havana, drowning in greenery. To
their credit, the Cubans were able to provide for the flight crews’
R&R. Any problems about this were immediately solved.
On the second day, came to us in the villa Colonel V. I. Dubinsky, a former commander of the 392nd
ODRAP, and our flight director in Cuba. We were always glad to
communicate with him. He informed the crew about the state visit to the
island of Cuba taking place at that time, by the Commander in Chief of
the Soviet Navy, Admiral Serghey G. Gorshkov. Along with him, was the
Commander of the Naval Aviation, Colonel-General Mironenko. They decided
matters of naval cooperation between the two friendly nations. Among
those considered were the issue of basing some units of the Soviet Naval
Aviation at the Cuban airfields.
From the beginning of the visit
to Cuba, Tu-95RTs landed in the island, so the Commander of the Navy
ordered the Commander of the Naval Aviation to show Cuban leader Fidel
Castro, how effective was the work of Soviet aircrews when carrying out
sorties in their search for warships of the U.S. and NATO naval forces
along the U.S. east coast, in the Bermuda Triangle, and in the Central
and Western Atlantic Ocean.
At
that time, a major US capital ship, the multitasking aircraft carrier
“USS Saratoga” was returning from a tour in the Mediterranean Sea
together with its carrier group, composed of six surface warships. Our
crew was ordered to prepare for a flight to search and discover the
group in order to take aerial photographs of the aircraft carrier. The
task was familiar to us, but the level of interest in its implementation
in this occasion left a definite impression in us.
TU-95RTs
(NATO: Bear D) similar in type to the “Bear D” Col. Burmistrov flew
from Cuba as navigator in 1977. The navigator sat in the nose, under the
refueling “cannon”.The crews immediately began
preparations for the flight. According to the fleet intelligence
reports, the alleged objective area had been identified. The navigators
planned the flight route, taking into account the estimated position of
the aircraft carrier at the time of its discovery. The weather at the
time of departure and throughout the flight route was favorable, the
weather conditions would allow us to perform the task. The
pre-calculated flight duration, taking into account the wind, was about
14 hours, each aircraft taking 82 tons of fuel. The flight was scheduled
to start at night, at 3:00 hours local time, so as to arrive at the
area of detection in the morning, and confidently produce photographs of
the aircraft carrier at a low altitude. Cumulus and strong cumulus
clouds at that time of the day were still underdeveloped, and could not
prevent the taking of photographs. Typically, high-quality images were
always obtained when taking pictures of ships from a height of not less
than 300 meters. If we went below 300 m, the flight itself produced an
effect, besides giving the body extra adrenaline, but more often than
not led to photographs of the vessel that did not show the deck, which
spoiled the result of the photographic reconnaissance.
On the eve
of departure, during preparations, we worked out in detail all the
possible variations of the flight and the interaction between both
experts in the crew and the crews themselves, and thoroughly tested and
prepared the photographic equipment. As standard equipment the TU-95RTs
had a perspective camera AFA-42/100 and two hand-held cameras AFA-39,
one on the nose and another in the tail cabin.
To ensure secrecy,
the decision was made of taking off at a 2-minute interval from the
airfield at San Antonio, and proceed to the flight route in radio
silence mode. After the first aircraft climbed, the leading aircraft
would shoot a signal rocket from onboard, and the use of radio equipment
was to be reduced to a minimum. This would enable the approach in
secret to the search area, and prevent the withdrawal of the carrier
from the group. The American naval commanders had in the past taken this
course of action many times before, when they wanted to avoid
identification and photographing of the carrier. In case of threat
detection, sometimes the aircraft carrier sailed away from the main
group, sometimes hiding under storm clouds. The last calculated position
of the aircraft carrier at the time of departure turned out to be some
700 km to the east of Bermuda Islands. The flight time before the
expected moment of detection was estimated to be about 5 hours.
The preparations for the take-off complete, now only remained some time for pre-flight rest.
The
trip by bus through Havana at night was short. An hour later, we were
at the airport and started the preflight preparations. Taking off at the
exact preset time, and flying through all of Cuba from west to east,
the tactical group took a course towards the area of the proposed
encounter with the A/C “Saratoga.” The night sky in these latitudes is
very starry, ideal for the study of Astronomy. To control our location I
used a sextant and a pair of stars, thus defining it. Below, the
Atlantic Ocean, its western part. Behind – the Bahamas, the islands in
front of the Bermudas, which would take an additional three and a half
hours to reach.
Radio communication between the two crews was not
engaged, and the use of ELINT equipment was kept to a minimum. At the
estimated distance, in the left sector, the onboard airborne radars were
turned on to illuminate, thereby correcting the airplane’s flight path
to the Bermudas Islands, clarifying its position on the map. Then we got
to the target search area. All the restrictions on the onboard radio
equipment were released, the onboard radar was switched on to its
maximum range, 400 km. The real work began for all the specialists of
the intelligence gathering complex.
Photo:
Two Tu-95RTs flying in pair. In the1970s. Photo taken by Flight
Engineer M.V. Matveyev from his position in the lead aircraft.I
reported to the captain that to the detection perimeter of the USS
Saratoga we still had some 600 km to fly. The commander gave the order
to the SIGINT operator to start listening for radio broadcasts in the
flight and guidance networks of the American naval aviation. There were
no radio exchanges, reported the operator.
The ELINT operator was
tasked with monitoring the work of the ship’s equipment which provided
the American task group’s electronic jamming defense. According to his
report, this type of defense was also not observed. The crew of the led
aircraft confirmed this information.
Major N.G. Fedotov, the
leader of the tactical group, decided to follow the same course, to be
sure to reach the center of the assumed target area. When we were at a
distance of 400 kms. from the target zone, the navigator-operator
reported that there was a large mark on the position indicator radar. It
was almost in the flight path of the aircraft.
Usually, many
ships may be found in this area. Their evaluation may go from a giant
tanker with oil coming to America, to a large container ship. These
vessels have a fairly large displacement and can provide the same
indications on the radar screen as an aircraft carrier. There’s only one
solution: Fly an additional 200 km., then it will be clearly visible
on the radar – it’s either one target, or many. And on the horizon the
sun was coming out, shining directly in our eyes, as we flew towards
dawn, on the east. Altitude: 7800-8100 m; beneath us, still dark;
overcast at 3-4; the ocean calm. It was getting light right before your
eyes.
Having reached 250 kilometers from the target, the SIGINT
operator reported to the commander that naval aircraft were being sent
from the aircraft carrier. Simultaneously, the ELINT operator confirmed
the operation of the carrier’s anti-aircraft defenses. The call sign of
the “USS Saratoga” left no doubt that the information from fleet
headquarters was correct, and that we were in the right course. I
quickly prepared an urgent radio transmission: “Arrived at the search
area, according to ELINT equipment found the aircraft carrier
“Saratoga,” place, altitude, remaining fuel, time.”
15 minutes
later came up to us a pair of F-4 “Phantom” jet fighters. By their ID
numbers and inscriptions it was evident that they were precisely from
the A/C “Saratoga.” At an order from the commander, the radio operator
transmitted a report of the interception by fighters to the CP in Cuba,
to the CP of the Northern Fleet’s Naval Aviation, and to the Navy
General Staff in Moscow.
The pair of Phantoms split, one went to
the led aircraft, the other stayed with us. This one got closer, up to
15-20 meters, by the rear. The American pilots, using their portable
cameras, took photographs of our aircraft. The SIGINT operator in the
tail position took photos of the fighter jets with his AFA-39 camera, as
a confirmation of the interception.
An F-4 Phantom II. Interception over the Atlantic. Photo taken by the crew of a TU-142 of the 76th OPLAP.Then
the SIGINT operator on the intercom informed the commander that the
Americans had come quite close, about 10 meters, and that the second
pilot (the RIO – tr.) got closer to the canopy and was showing a big
photo of a naked woman. After that, he removed his oxygen mask and
smiled broadly, pointing to the photograph, then to the West.
We
knew that the American pilots in the air usually did not behave towards
us too friendly, and now such extravagance… I told the SIGINT operator
that that could not possible be. “It does,” -he replied- “Right now the
Phantom is going forward, to your position.”
After undoing my
safety belts and parachute straps, I leaned against the front windshield
of the cockpit, and immediately saw very close to us the cockpit of a
fighter, the broad smile of its pilot, and photos of women. The American
pilot, after six months of combat patrol in the Mediterranean Sea, and
just a day away from home, was just bursting with excessive emotion.
Realizing his desire to communicate, I still showed him with a gesture
that he should not approach any closer, and that he was better off going
further away to the side. He was surprisingly understanding, removed
the photo, and the fighter immediately went to the left at a safe
distance from our plane.
At some 200 kms. from the target, from
the radar screen it was obvious that there were no errors – that was a
task force of a few ships. The only thing to do then was to perform the
main task – to descend to low altitude and take a good shot of the A/C
“Saratoga.”
At 180 kms from the target we began to descend, behind
us, following us, after being ordered, the led aircraft also began to
descend. The escorting Phantoms were nearby. Below it was already clear
enough, the weather was excellent, and the onboard fuel was quite enough
for a flight at low altitude.
We had already worked out the
descent in pairs. The leader would descend to the desired low altitude,
the led or wingman’s aircraft would take a safe altitude, higher than
the leader, at no more than 300 meters, depending on cloud cover. I
checked the onboard AFA-42/100 camera, the angle of inclination of the
viewfinder already set at the desired inclination, so that the contrails
from the running engines do not affect the quality of the photograph.
Near
the target. The radar was already at a scale of 60, the target was
clearly illuminated. We turned towards it. The lower edge of the cloud
cover was at 1500 meters. From an altitude of 1200 meters and at a
distance of 40 kms, the entire group could be examined visually.
An
F-4 Phantom II from Squadron VF-31 (in 1977 it was based aboard the
aircraft carrier “Saratoga”) intercepts a Tu-95RTs. Photos taken by a
crew from the 392nd ODRAP. From Major I.F. Gladkov’s family archives.We
descended and remained at an altitude of 300 meters. The led crew, at
600 meters. The entire carrier group, consisting of the aircraft carrier
and six escort ships, was following a western heading. Clearly visible
from afar was the massive hull of the “Saratoga.” We began to maneuver
so as to pass along its side no closer than 1.5 kilometers. At the same
time, the accompanying Phantom started to maneuver near an open camera
port on the left side of our aircraft, so that its fuselage covered the
aircraft carrier, thus preventing any photograph. 15 minutes before he
had been smiling at us widely, shortly after, maneuvering dangerously,
trying to disrupt the completion of our task. We had our own task, he
had his own…
We got closer to the aircraft carrier. On the deck
superstructure the number 60 was clearly visible, but on the flight deck
there were several aircraft, no more than 15 units, the rest seemed to
be hidden beneath the deck. It was also clearly seen a helicopter flying
close to the aircraft carrier, at an altitude of about 100 meters,
following the same heading.
I pointed the camera’s viewfinder to
the middle of the hull, and as soon as the nose of the aircraft carrier
appeared, I pushed the shutter button. I heard the characteristic sound
of the device’s functioning and saw the green light of the film advancer
flash briefly. The photo shooting completed, I reported to the captain.
But there was no certainty that the Phantom accompanying us did not
ruin it. To get a duplicate image, we tried another run, but from the
other side of the aircraft carrier.
We prepared and sent a radio
transmission to the CP in Cuba: “Visually detected the A/C “Saratoga” №
60, heading 280 degrees, speed 15 knots, latitude, longitude, weather
in the area, sea state, visibility, balance of fuel, time of detection. ”
After
the duplicate run we turned to shoot the escort ships, but we
approached them at a distance no closer than 1 km. From the tail
position the SIGINT operator duplicated the whole shooting with the
AFA-39 camera. At an order of the group leader, Major N.G. Fedotov, we
exchanged flight altitude with the wingman. They started to overfly and
photograph the ships, and we repeated the maneuver 300 meters above
them.
While we were flying at low altitude, the accompanying
Phantoms, having used up all their fuel, managed to refuel directly in
the air from a tanker that rose from the deck of the aircraft carrier,
and again came back to us.
In the photo: F-4 Phantom II from Squadron VF-31 lands on the aircraft carrier Saratoga. 1977.After
working in the area with the remaining available fuel, our crews went
into a climb to flight level 9000-9300 meters, reported on the
completion of work to the CP, then took a withdrawing heading from the
area. The fighters escort accompanied us to about 200 kilometers from
the aircraft carrier, and together went back and headed to their
floating airfield.
Flying on a fixed route west of the island of
Bermuda, we successfully completed this flight, landing at the San
Antonio airfield. After landing, we reported to Colonel V.I. Dubinsky on
the completion of this crucial task. He shook everyone’s hand and
announced his gratitude, while adding that next day he’d call on us,
while the navigator’s group would continue its work.
After
landing, the Commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, gave
orders to take the results of the aerial reconnaissance of the A/C
“Saratoga,” and make a commemorative album for Fidel Castro.
Early
in the morning we, together with V.V. Alexeyev, the navigator of
Simachov’s crew, were taken to the CP of the anti aircraft defense of
Cuba in Havana. Our films had already been processed and a large number
of photos had been printed. Together with the specialists in
photographic equipment from the technical support team of our flights,
we decoded all the images, selected those of the highest quality, and
started to design the commemorative album. We printed it in Russian and
Spanish.
By evening it all was ready, it came out perfectly.
The
next morning arrived at the villa the Commander of the Naval Aviation
himself, Colonel-General Mironenko, looked at the album, and took it to a
meeting between Admiral S.G. Gorshkov and Fidel Castro. After the
meeting, he met once again with us, and said that while looking at the
album very carefully, Fidel Castro said: “I know that in Cuba land
Soviet planes and that they perform some of these tasks. But now, I
personally see how like no one else they have direct contact with our
potential enemy. These pilots should be proud of themselves.”
Mironenko
also said that after the meeting with Fidel Castro, the Commander of
the Navy, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, gave him the command to present the
crew commanders and the aircraft navigators with awards.
Exactly
one year later, Major N.G. Fedotov was awarded the Order of the Red
Banner, Major Simachov and I were awarded the Medal “For Military
Service”, Capt. Alekseyev received a commendation from the Commander of
the Soviet Navy. The other crew members received thanks from the
Commander of the Naval Aviation.
A TU-95RTs of the 392nd ODRAP, escorted by an F-4 Phantom from VF-31, overflies the “USS Saratoga” (CV-60)USN aircraft carrier “USS Saratoga”. North Atlantic, 1971. From the personal files of Ivan Tretyakov.Col. Pavel Pavlovich BurmistrovThe commanders of the two TU-95RTs, Majors Nikolai Gordeyevich Fedotov and Ghennady Nikolayevich SimachovVilla in Casablanca, in the Nuevo Vedado sector of Havana, where the crews were accommodated by the Cuban Government.
Recollections of a Bear Intercept on December 19th, 1977
by CDR Dean Steele USN (ret.) – December 8th, 2010
I
just read the report from Pavel Burmistrov (“A Photo for Fidel
Castro”). I’ll give you some of my impressions about the report from our
standpoint, together with more info on our launch and intercept. It is
very interesting how perceptions can be radically different from the two
sides
In December 1977 I was a lieutenant assigned to Fighter
Squadron VF-31 flying the F-4 Phantom from the USS Saratoga (CV-60). We
were just completing a six month Mediterranean deployment and were
excited to be returning home before Christmas. As I recall, this
deployment was being completed right on schedule without the undesired
extension that occasionally happened.
The two F-4 squadrons
onboard, VF-31 and VF-103, were primarily tasked with air to air
missions including air defense of the task force. We were provided
initial guidance information from ship radar controllers as well as the
E-2C Hawkeye airborne platforms of Airborne Early Warning Squadron
VAW-123. The Radar Intercept Officers (RIOs) in the back seat then
acquired the incoming aircraft on radar and directed us to intercept, or
in a hostile environment, gave us the missile firing parameters.
When
there was a possibility that a Soviet aircraft would pay us a visit, we
would be upgraded to a 5 minute alert status, which required us to be
in the aircraft, on the catapult, and ready to go. When the launch
command came we could then start the engines, complete final checks, and
be ready to launch as soon as the ship had turned into the wind.
Standing alert was boring (and sometimes cold and uncomfortable), but
the possibility to launch and intercept an “enemy” aircraft that in
wartime was capable of sinking our ship was exciting. We also enjoyed
chatting with the squadron personnel and catapult crew who were also
standing by for launch.
It was always expected that any potential
Soviet attacker would be escorted when it reached possible ordnance
release distance from the ship. This meant we needed to turn
immediately and race out to intercept. After intercept we would escort
the Soviet aircraft, take pictures for the intelligence folks and often
attempt to get in any photo they took of the ship to show they had not
arrived without being intercepted.
In this case as I recall, we
intercepted at good range, flew formation on the tail (as usual), and
waved to the Bear crew looking out of the observation windows, so we
could communicate with them. We also compared the relative sizes of our
government issued cameras with the friendly Soviet Bear crew in the
tail. All in fun. The chance to see and, at least with hand signals,
communicate with the Soviet crew was fun. No pilots I knew on our side
had any real animosity toward the Bear crews. Yes, they were the
potential enemy and all, but we realized we were just the “soldiers” on
each side. Of course, in an actual combat situation we would have done
anything possible to down the plane prior to missile launch.
As
the Bear descended to fly past the ship it flew through a rather thick
overcast. I flew as close to the tail as possible to preclude loosing
visual contact, and was about to drop back to a safer radar trail when
we broke out underneath the overcast.
Going past the ship I’m sure
we did try to get between the Soviet airplane and the USS Saratoga, and
might have flown a bit too close in order to “look good” while going by
the ship, as well as an attempt to insert my plane into the
photography, if possible. That would prove to Soviet Intel folks that we
had escorted their planes. As for myself, my “maneuvering dangerously”
at the time struck me that the Bear pilot was being extremely smooth,
thus allowing me to more safely tuck in closer. The reason for getting
close was to better see the crew. Due to the size of the Bear we could
not get too close to the cockpit (I tried once but it was a bit scary). I
didn’t consider it dangerous but maybe I was a bit cocky. We fighter
drivers often prided ourselves in the ability to fly close, and in so
doing I might have exceeded the parameters the Bear crew was used to
seeing.
I do remember my back seater, Lt. jg. E. Holland, carrying
a Playboy centerfold and pointing toward Cuba when showing it. It was
also interesting to see the faces of the crew and have some interaction.
That was the reason for the Playboy centerfold. I never considered the
Playboy centerfold “extravagant”, but maybe his feelings could have
better been translated as “in poor taste”, which I guess was true. Ha!
I
can’t remember the details of the refueling but we often did that, and
the speeds the Bear flew made it pretty simple to refuel while flying a
loose formation. The refueling aircraft simply took over the escort
while we “plugged”. After refueling was complete we would monitor the
refueling drogue retraction and give the pilot a thumbs up, indicating
that his plane looked good and the drogue had stowed correctly. We then
signaled that we would resume flying lead and the tanker would depart.
After
the Bears departed we were told to divert to NAS Bermuda since the ship
was busy off loading ammunition. This process required the carrier to
steer alongside the ammo ship while ordnance was passed via helicopter
and cable. This allowed the carrier to get rid of its ammunition before
entering port and for it to then be readily available to pass to
another ship or be taken back to a port where it could be appropriately
stored. I distinctly remember us (naively) hoping we would receive
orders to fly directly home to NAS Oceana, VA, where our wives awaited,
but sadly that did not happen. A few hours later we flew back and
landed on the big gray boat instead.
Pavel Burmistrov in his
report indicated a belief that carriers would often sail away from the
task force to avoid being detected by incoming Soviet aircraft. I was
not privy to those decisions about the larger tactical picture but
seriously doubt that. I never heard of a carrier departing the rest of
the battle group to hide. I strongly suspect we maintained a defensive
posture a lot like we would during an actual Soviet attack in a combat
situation. If weather presented itself, a carrier might have
occasionally ducked into a rain shower to avoid visual detection, but I
believe the major effort was to exercise all defensive measures of the
task force as an exercise. Remember, a carrier skipper also had to
think about landing airborne planes before their fuel ran out. For this
reason, and the safety of the deck crew, I doubt they would drive the
ship into any serious weather.
McDonnell-Douglas F-4J Phantom II of VF-31 aboard “USS Saratoga”, December 1977Author: Miguel Vargas – Caba FromMiguel Vargas – Caba for War History Online All Photos Provided by the Author A Short Glossary of Soviet Military Organization and Terminology AFA – Aviatsionnyy Fotograficheskiy Apparat – Aviation Photographic Apparatus/Air photocamera. CP
– Command Post – The reconnaissance airplanes of the SNA usually
reported their findings to their home base, in this case the airbase at
San Antonio, near Havana, Cuba, to the SNA’s Headquarters in Leningrad,
USSR, and to the Soviet Navy’s Headquarters in Moscow. Lead/Led aircraft
– A system in use by the Soviet Naval Aviation whereby a Bear rarely
flew alone, especially when flying outside the USSR. Two airplanes were
the norm with the “Lead” or “Leader” navigating the flight routes, while
the “Led” or “Wingman”, followed the “Lead” close behind. ODRAP – Otdyel’nyy Dal’nyy Razvedyvatel’nyy Aviatsionny Polk
[lndependent Long-Range Reconnaissance Air Regiment] – A division of
the Soviet Naval Aviation. The Tupolev TU·95RTs Bear D aircraft usually
belonged to these regiments, in all the fleets of the SNA. OPLAP – Otdyel’nyy Protivo-Lodochnyy Aviatsionny Polk
[Independent Antisubmarine Air Regiment] – A division of the SNA. The
Tupolev Tu·142 (Bear F) was usually assigned to these regiments.
Olen’ya – (also known as Olenyegorsk) – Primary airfield of the Soviet
Naval Aviation in the Kola Peninsula, 92 km south of Murmansk, and from
where TU·95RTs took off after refueling on their long flights to the
Central Atlantic Ocean, Cuba, Guinea, and Angola. Pilot 1st Class
– Soviet pilots, both in the Air Force and in the Naval Aviation, were
ranked according to a particular system – different from that used in
the West – whereby the pilots started as Pilot 4th Class and progressed towards the 1st Class level, regardless of their rank. This system was based on experience and length of service rather than rank. RTs – Razvedyvatel’nyy Tselekazannyy
[Reconnaissance Target Indicator] – The type of mission function this
particular version of the Bear was tasked with while on operational
flights. SNA – Soviet Naval Aviation – Sometimes, even in Western writings, it is known by its Russian acronym AV-MF, which stands for Aviatsiya Voyenno-Morskogo Flota, or literally: “Aviation of the Military Seagoing Fleet.”
This is a continuation of my "Red Storm Rising" post that I was doing. In the book, the SAMS were a major target for the Tanks and TOW systems that were used to protect the NATO forces. In the book, the A10 was a major nemesis of Soviet Armor and the mobile SAM system were used to try to protect the advance of the Armored formations. I actually do have experience with the "Roland" system. During Frankonian Shield and more information was here.
This was my first field problem and it was a big exercise, we had Americans, Germans, French, that I knew of. We were running around the countryside doing our thing and we were in one of these...
We were on a hilltop and we were DFing equipment and the Germans put some tanks and infantry on the hill we were at along with a couple of Roland Missile systems to protect the tanks. I had a few minutes so I walked over to say "hi" and practice my real bad German, I was already trying to learn the language. I was speaking to the "Herr Feldwebel" or the NCO in charge and he was showing how it worked. He had me climb in and set in the seat and turn the system on and it used a joystick on the side to turn and a turnwheel at the tip of the joystick and that is used to fine tune the radar on the target. Well I was moving it around there was a blip and the NCO hit a button and I guess it interrogated the IFF system and it came back "French",
well the French was aggressors and they had launched a push for the hill and the one next to us. Well I got a lock on the helicopter and he hit a button and it was registered a "kill". Man that was some real neat stuff, let me tell you.
Well the French got upset I suppose and sent in more Helicopters to take out the tanks and Rolands on the hill we were on. Well the Germans called in the Phantoms,
Well Helicopters cannot operate when Jets are around and they left. so the French assault on our hill failed. We were cut off for 3 days surrounded by the French and it was great being away from our first sergeant trying to sneak up on us. Needless to say, this really set the bar high for subsequent field problems. This one was still one of my favorite exercises. The Soviets used an integrated SAM system to protect their Armored Formations with overlapping systems going from low to the Ground up to the high altitudes that bombers like to fly.
The Roland is a Franco-German mobile short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. The Roland was also purchased by the U.S. Army as one of very few foreign SAM systems.
Roland was designed to a joint French and German requirement for a
low-level mobile missile system to protect mobile field formations and
fixed, high-value targets
such as airfields. Development began in 1963 as a study by Nord
Aviation of France and Bölkow of Germany with the system then called
SABA in France and P-250 in Germany.
The two companies formed a joint development project in 1964 and later
(as Aérospatiale of France and MBB of Germany) founded the Euromissile
company for this and other missile programs. Aerospatiale took primary
responsibility for the Roland 1 day/clear-weather system while MBB took
primary responsibility for the Roland 2 all-weather system. Aerospatiale
was also responsible for the rear and propulsion system of the missile
while MBB developed the front end of the missile with warhead and
guidance systems. The first guided launch of a Roland prototype took
place in June 1968, destroying a CT-20 target drone
and fielding of production systems was expected from January 1970. The
test and evaluation phase took much longer than originally anticipated
with the clear-weather Roland I finally entering operational service
with the French Army in April 1977, while the all-weather Roland II was
first fielded by the German Army in 1978 followed by the French Army in
1981.
The long delays and ever-increasing costs combined with inflation meant
Roland was never procured in the numbers originally anticipated.
The Roland SAM system was designed to engage enemy air targets flying
at speeds of up to Mach 1.3 at altitudes between 20 meters and 5,500
meters with a minimum effective range of 500 meters and a maximum of
6,300 meters. The system can operate in optical or radar mode and can
switch between these modes during an engagement. A pulse-doppler search
radar with a range of 15–18 km detects the target which can then be
tracked either by the tracking radar or an optical tracker. The optical
channel would normally be employed only in daylight against very
low-level targets or in a heavy jamming environment.
The Roland missile is a two-stage solid propellant unit 2.4 meters
long with a weight of 66.5 kg including the 6.5 kg multiple
hollow-charge fragmentation warhead which contains 3.5 kg of explosive
detonated by impact or proximity fuses. The 65 projectile charges have a
lethal radius of 6 meters. Cruising speed is Mach 1.6. The missile is
delivered in a sealed container which is also the launch tube. Each
launcher carries two launch tubes with 8 more inside the vehicle or
shelter with automatic reloading in 10 seconds.
For defense of fixed sites such as airfields the shelter Roland can
be integrated in the CORAD (Co-ordinated Roland Air Defense) system
which can include a surveillance radar, a Roland Co-ordination Center, 8
Roland fire units and up to 8 guns.
Roland 1 – This is the fair-weather daylight-only, version used by the French and Spanish armies on the AMX-30R chassis.
Roland 2 – This is the all-weather version employed on the AMX-30R
and Marder chassis and also as a shelter mount in either a static
location or mounted on a 6×6 or 8×8 all-terrain truck. Euromissile, MaK,
IBH and Blohm and Voss of Germany in 1983 proposed the Leopard 1 tank
chassis as a carrier for the Roland system to appeal to those countries
who already used the Leopard I tank.
MARDER(IFV)
Germany was to buy 12,200 missiles 340 Roland 2 fire units installed on the Marder (IFV) chassis to fully replace the towed Bofors 40 mm
guns systems and Contraves Super Fledermaus fire control systems in
service with the Bundeswehr Corps-level air defense regiments. Each
regiment would have 36 fire units in 3 batteries of 12. Eventually 140
fire units were procured and equipped 3 regiments with one assigned to
each army corps. The Luftwaffe had a requirement for 200 Roland 2
shelter systems mounted on MAN 8×8 trucks for the close-in defense of
airfields and as mobile gap-fillers for the MIM-23 HAWK
SAM systems. 95 systems were eventually procured from the mid-1980s
with 27 of those used to defend American air bases in Germany. In
1998–99 10 Roland LVB systems were installed on MAN 6×6 trucks to be
air-transportable in the Transall C-160
for the German rapid reaction forces. The German Navy also procured 20
truck-mounted shelter systems for defense of naval bases. In February
2003 the Bundeswehr cancelled a planned upgrade of Roland and announced
it would phase-out all of its Roland systems. This was completed by the
end of 2005. The Luftwaffe and Navy have also withdrawn Roland and it is
no longer employed by Germany. The German Army will replace Roland with the new and much more capable development: LFK NG). A battery of German systems have been passed on to Slovenia.
he 9K33 Osa (English: wasp) is a highly mobile, low-altitude, short-range tactical surface-to-air missile system. "9K33" is its GRAU designation. Its NATO reporting name is SA-8 Gecko. Its export version name is Romb.
The SA-8 was the first mobile air defense missile system incorporating its own engagement radars on a single vehicle.
All versions of the 9K33 feature all-in-one 9A33transporter erector launcher
and radar (TELAR) vehicles which can detect, track and engage aircraft
independently or with the aid of regimental surveillance radars. The six-wheeled transport vehicles BAZ-5937 are fully amphibious and air transportable. The road range is about 500 km.
The 1S51M3-2 radar system on the SA-8 TELAR received the NATO codename Land Roll.
It was derived from the naval `Pop Group' radar system but is smaller
since it does not require the elaborate stabilisation system. An
improved system designated the SA-8B `Gecko' Mod 1, was first seen in
Germany in 1980. It had improvements added to the launcher
configuration, carrying six missiles in ribbed containers. The system is
reported to be of the frequency-agile monopulse type. It consists of an
elliptical rotating surveillance antenna mounted on top of the array,
operates in H band (6 to 8 GHz) and has a 30 km acquisition range
against most targets. The large pulsed J band (14.5 GHz) engagement
antenna is mounted below it in the centre of the array and has a maximum
tracking range of about 20 km.
Mounted on either side of the tracking radar antenna is a small J
band parabolic dish antenna to track the missile. Below that is a small
circular antenna which emits an I band uplink capture beam to gather the
missile shortly after launch. The final antennas in the array are two
small white rectangular ones, one on either side of the array mounted
alongside the I band. These are used for command uplink to the missile.
This twin antenna system permits the 'Land Roll' radar to control up to
two missiles simultaneously against a single target. Furthermore, the
two missiles can be guided on different frequencies to further
complicate ECM. There is also a tubular device fitted to and above the
tracking radar; this is a 9Sh33 electro-optical tracker. It can be used
to track the target when the main tracking radar is jammed by ECM.
A 9K33 battery comprises four 9A33B TELAR vehicles and two 9T217
transloader vehicles on BAZ-5939 chassis with reload missiles and a
crane. A reload time of five minutes has been reported per TELAR.
In addition to the TELARs, each regiment is also assigned a single radar collimation vehicle 9V914
(initially on the BAZ-5938 chassis but more often found on the ZiL-131
truck). This vehicle assists in the alignment of the TELAR's radar
systems, ensuring accurate target tracking and engagement.
Engagement range for the early versions is approximately 2–9 km
(1.3-5.6 miles) and engagement altitudes of between 50–5000 m
(164-16,400 ft). The 9M33M2 "Osa-A" missile extends the ranges out to 1500-10000m (1-6.2 miles) and engagement altitudes to 25–5000 m (82-16,400 ft). The 9M33M3
missile greatly enhances the altitude engagement envelope to 10–12000 m
(33-42,500 ft), and as such are also able to fly further (about 15 km/9
miles) but the system is not able to engage targets at longer ranges,
due to other factors such as the radar tracking of the missiles. The
system is designed for use primarily against jet aircraft and
helicopters in any kind of weather.
The 9M33 missiles are 3.158 m (10.3 ft) long, weigh 126 kg (278 lb) and use command guidance. There is also a backup low-light optical tracking system for heavy ECM
environments. The latest 9M33M3 missiles have an increased total weight
of 170 kg (375 lb) in order to provide the extended range coverage and
larger warhead. Propulsion is provided by a dual-thrustsolid fuelrocket motor. Both versions feature a missile speed of around Mach
2.4 (peaking at around Mach 3) for a maximum target engagement speed of
around Mach 1.4 for the original missile and Mach 1.6 for the M2\M3
missiles. The warhead
for the initial and M2 versions weighs 19 kg (42 pounds), increased to
40 kg (88 lb) in the M3 version to improve performance against
helicopters. All versions have impact and proximity fuzes.
There have been unconfirmed reports of other possible versions of the
missile with both infra-red and semi-active radar terminal homing
seekers.
Each TELAR is able to launch and guide two missiles against one target simultaneously. Kill probability
is quoted as being 0.35-0.85 for the Osa and 0.55-0.85 for the Osa-AK
and Osa-AKM (presumably depending upon target aspect, speed,
maneuverability and radar cross section). Reaction time (from target
detection to launch) is around 26 seconds. Time to prepare for
engagements from being in transit is around 4 minutes and missile
reloading takes around 5 minutes. Each battery of four TELARs is usually
accompanied by two reload vehicles carrying 18 missiles in sets of
three, with a crane mounted on the reload vehicles to assist in moving
the missiles.
When launched the booster motor burns for two seconds, this permits
the radar to gather and control it at very short ranges (about 1.6 km).
The sustainer motor has a 15-second burn, bringing the missile to a top
speed of about Mach 2. Once launched the missile is command-guided for
the whole flight, and the warhead is detonated by its proximity fuze or
possible command. The warhead is said to have a lethal radius of 5 m at
low altitude against a F-4 Phantom size target.
1S51M3 ("Land Roll") - C band target acquisition radar, H
band conical scan target tracking radar and two J band pulse mode fire
control radars (range 35 km/22 miles for acquisition, 30 km/19 miles for
tracking and 25 km/16 miles for guidance). Mounted on the TELAR.
P-40 ("Long Track") - E band early warning radar (also used by the SA-4 and SA-6, range 175 km/108 miles), mounted on a tracked vehicle (a modified AT-T).
P-15 ("Flat Face A") or P-19 ("Flat Face B") or P-15M(2) ("Squat Eye") - 380 kW C band target acquisition radar (also used by the SA-3 and SA-6, range 250 km/155 miles), mounted on a ZiL-131 truck.
PRV-9 or PRV-16 ("Thin Skin") - E band height finding radar (also used by the SA-4 and SA-6, range 240 km/148 miles), mounted on a KrAZ-255B truck.
I had posted several months ago about the Falkland war and the sinking of the HMS Sheffield after she was hit by an exocet missile from the Argentinian Air force. The post is Here. I saw this post and it was talking about the Argentinian point of view of the conflict and I learned a few things I didn't know about before.
The Falklands War is often perceived, from the British perspective,
as a victory that confirmed the British imperial status in the post-WWII
world. Even though the war was criticized by the British public as
unnecessary, it won the Conservative Party government a second term in
Government for it was indeed a clear and decisive British victory.
On
the other side, the Argentinian public deemed the war unnecessary as
well; it was forced upon them by the ruling military junta. The conflict
which started on 2nd of April 1982, lasted for 74 days and claimed the
lives of 649 Argentinians military personnel, 255 British military
personnel, and 3 Falklands civilians. It proved to be a stand-off
between the British recapturing lost territory and a dictatorship with
expansionist tendencies.
Argentina had for long wanted to claim
the Falklands (or the Las Malvinas, as the Argentinians called it),
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which had all been under
British rule since 1833 and populated by British settlers who were loyal
to the crown.
The HMS Invincible, pictured here in 1990, which took part in the conflict.In
Argentina, a military junta under the name National Reorganization
Process was the government in the period of 1976-1983 and ruled with an
iron hand, dealing with political with imprisonment and execution. The
man behind the junta, who was the main advocate of the attack, was
Admiral Jorge Anaya. He estimated that the British would not pursue a
military conflict, but would rather choose a diplomatic solution, in
which the Argentinians could further promote the idea of sovereignty
over the archipelago.
The campaign was designed and executed in
the midst of devastating economic stagnation in Argentina, which
provoked civil unrest. To divert the civilian attention from the fall of
living standard and the inflation climb of 600%, a military government
did what it does best – mobilize the population towards a general
nationalistic sentiment for the islands, several hundred kilometres from
the Argentinian coast, that were under British colonial rule.
They called it the illegal usurpation of Las Malvinas.
The preparations for war included a power shift in the military junta,
from its initial leader, General Roberto Viola, to General Leopoldo
Galtieri, on whose behalf Admiral Anaya organised the Argentinian Navy
to participate in the attack.
The Argentinian Submarine ARA Santa Fe, which was crippled during the conflict and scuttled by the British.Before
the invasion took place, the Argentinan junta helped CIA suppress the
communist elements in Nicaragua by funding the Nicaraguan counter
rebels, or the Contras. This is why the Argentinians had reasons to
believe that the US would keep a neutral stance if an invasion were to
take place.
Also, Admiral Anaya relied on the fact that the US
objected the use of force by the British during the Suez crisis in 1956.
On top of that, in 1981, Britain accepted the independence of it former
colony, Rhodesia, which was an example of how Britain was slowly
renouncing its colonial past.
Argentinians
were mainly influenced by the events of Indian annexation of the island
of Goa, in 1961. The annexation was condemned by the international
community but was later accepted as an irreversible act.
Argentine POWs at Port StanleyOn
March 19th, 1982, the Argentinians launched an invasion of the South
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, 165 kilometres from the coast of
Patagonia. Following the initial invasion, they started to disembark on
the shores of the Falklands Islands on April 2nd.
Concerning the
occupation of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, the British
deployed two submarines, but it wasn’t until the invasion of the
Falklands that they had taken the matter seriously.
The war was
never officially declared although both sides did declare the Islands
areas a war zone and officially recognized that a state of war existed
between them. Hostilities were limited almost exclusively to the
territories under dispute and the area in the South Atlantic where they
lay.
Argentina’s original intention was to mount a quick,
symbolic occupation, followed rapidly by withdrawal, leaving only a
small garrison to support the new military governor. This strategy was
based on the Argentinean assumption that the British would not respond
militarily.
Royal Navy Sea Harrier.Argentinian
assault units were indeed withdrawn to the mainland in the days
following the invasion, but strong popular support and the rapid British
reaction forced the Junta to change their plans and reinforce the
islands since they could not afford to lose the islands once the British
came out to fight.
When the conflict broke out, the UN called for
peace talks, the immediate end to the hostilities and urged both
parties to resolve the conflict diplomatically. The US feared that
Argentina would ask the Soviet Union for help, and so they stood firmly
on the side of the British.
On the South American mainland, Chile
actively helped Great Britain with intelligence support. The support was
evident, and Argentina was forced to keep some of its best trained and
best-equipped mountain troops on the Chilean border to counter the
possible military intervention by the neighboring British ally. The
intervention never took place, but the Argentinians were on high alert
throughout the war.
British forces landed on the islands, after
which a war for aerial domination commenced. Several intense dogfights
occurred during the war. The British were using Harriers as their main
combat airplane while Argentina used Mirage III fighter jets, which were
purchased from France several years before the war.
The Mirage
was not good enough for the Argentinian air force to successfully engage
the far more nimble RAF fighters. Other than the Mirage, Argentine Air
Force used American A-4 Skyhawks, Israeli Daggers, the Israeli version
of the Mirage fighter, and English Electric Canberras.
The most significant naval incident of the war was the sinking of the ARA Belgrano,
an Argentinean WWII-era light cruiser, by the nuclear-powered submarine
HMS Conqueror on May 2nd, 1982. 323 men aboard the ARA Belgrano lost their lives.
The retaliation for this loss occurred two days after, when a British Type 42 Destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was bombed by a naval air strike. The British lost 20 men with another 24 others severely injured.
ARA Belgrano sinking on May 2nd, 1982. After
the British victory on land, their terms for the Argentinian surrender
proved to be much harsher than originally expected by the Junta, but
Argentina accepted them on 14th of June 1982. Argentinean troops
withdrew from the islands, leaving them in British hands.
The
relations between the two countries were strained for a while, until
their official normalization in 1989. Argentina continues to debate the
sovereignty of the Falklands to this day. In 2013, a referendum was held
on the Falkland Islands, after which the majority stated that they wish
to stay under the British crown.
The Falklands conflict remains
the largest air-naval combat operation between modern forces since the
end of the Second World War.
I am in a big city at the behest of my employer, I am participating in a "Safety Conference", my employer runs a very safe and ontime operation and we feel good about that until we compare ourselves to the oil and gas industry and we realize that we still have a way to go.
I am still there and a Mechanic from Beijing gave all us participants a souvenir from his homeland. It is a small thing but I though it was very neat and very nice thing that he did.
It is a bookmark of a leaf and it has artwork drawn into it. I though it is very neat and I really appreciate the gift.
On another hand, I saw where Hillary released a message from her twitter account...
I know it is humor but the number of dead people surrounding the Clinton's seem to increase...
I am working on my next "Red Storm Rising "Post, I am using SAM(Surface to Air Missile) system in the next comparison. Hopefully I will have it up tomorrow. Meantime I ran across this article and
I shamelessly cribbed this from "Angry Staff Officer". I am a fan of history and always believed that the lessons from WWI helped the Army in WWII. I also believe that the lessons from Vietnam were used by my generation of leaders in the Army that was used to great effect in Desert Storm. The officers swore that they will not have "Another Vietnam". Same principles applied here from WWI to WWII.
We’re in the early months of the
centennial of U.S. participation in World War I, the so-called, “War to
end all wars.” With the vantage of 20/20 hindsight, we now know that
rather than “making the world safe for democracy,” as Woodrow Wilson
hoped, World War I instead set the stage for the next round of global conflict.
The United States entered the war in 1917 as a relatively unknown
quantity. The U.S. Army was tiny in 1917, and many wondered whether it
would be able to mobilize enough men to really make a difference. In the
end, the U.S. was able to put over a million military personnel in
Europe – enough to sway the balance of power in Europe against the
Central Powers. November of 1918 saw the Armistice signed and a tenuous
peace return to the world. And suddenly, America felt and saw the power
of her military might. This came at the cost of hundreds of thousands of
killed, wounded, and missing servicemen.
Great Depression Unemployment Line
After the initial euphoria of victory
wore off, Americans began to ask what had been gained from the war. As
the Great Depression swept the world and Germany slid towards
totalitarianism, this question became all the more pertinent. When war
flared again in 1939, one can hardly blame those who advocated for U.S.
isolationism given that U.S. participation in the Great War seemingly
did little to prevent another conflagration. But what these people
didn’t realize was that America would win World War II because of their
experience in World War I.
When the U.S. entered World War I in
1917, the Army more closely resembled that of the Civil War than that of
World War II. The horse was still the prime mover for the majority of
the Army. The National Guard was still organized in state entities with
no division alignments, ill-suited for modern warfare. The Army had few
effective machine guns and virtually no modern artillery. There were no
tanks or aircraft. Thus it was that machine guns, automatic rifles, gas
masks, grenades, artillery, tanks, and aircraft all had to be supplied by the French and British in the first year of U.S. participation in the war.
While the equipment and organization
of the Army lagged behind the rest of the world in 1917, there were
greater and more serious gaps at the strategic level. Very few leaders
had commanded or maneuvered anything larger than a brigade. Now the Army
was designing divisions of 28,000 men – a massive and unwieldy
organization. The Army would struggle to keep command and control across
these huge units throughout the entirety of the war. There was very
little concept of command and staff operations in the U.S. Army at the
strategic level at the outset of the war. And the man chosen to lead the
new American Expeditionary Force had some strong ideas about warfare
that did not mesh with the realities on the battlefields of Europe.
General John J. Pershing stated that, “the ultimate success of the army
depends upon their proper use in open warfare…Aggressive offensive based
on self-reliant infantry.” In other words, Pershing said that movement
and maneuver in the open would be the foundation of U.S. tactics rather
than the trench warfare of literally everyone else.
There was a problem with this, of
course. The French and British had been trying this for years – with
calamitous results. In fact, just as the U.S. was entering the war, the
French were annihilating a large part of their army in the Nivelle Offensive.
The enormous losses they incurred from this operation caused whole
divisions to mutiny. This led to massive reforms within the French Army.
The Germans were already moving toward infiltration tactics. All sides
were experimenting with combined arms with tanks, airplanes, artillery,
and infantry working together. And here came the Americans, scoffing at
the battle-hardened British and French, saying that trench warfare had
made them immobile and scared to attack. As one American brigade
commander told his men in 1917, “The war will be won in the open; the
Boche is in the trenches now and has been for four years. We have got to
be able to drive him out and that is why this French instruction is
valuable; but remember we are going to get him out into the open and
then all the old and fixed principles of our school of warfare will come
into play.” In the first American offensives of 1918 at Cantigny and
Chateau-Thierry, thousands of Americans died in droves in front of
German machine guns and under bursting artillery shells. Divisions were
cleaned out in weeks and had to be revitalized with barely-trained
replacements. It was an unsustainable form of warfare.
Throughout 1918, the Americans
struggled to adapt their tactics to their adversaries. They fielded
tanks at St. Mihiel, built up a formidable Air Service, and slowly
learned how to fight war in the 20th century. Pershing and his staff
began to learn that prosecuting war on the battlefield was not the only
fight; as important was negotiating with allies. Unfortunately, Pershing
was not a man cut out for diplomacy. While he certainly looked the
part, he lacked the temperament for dealing with his British and French
counterparts – with whom he clashed constantly. To his credit, he had
been placed in an incredibly difficult situation: raise, arm, train, and
field the largest American army ever created while staving off British
and French attempts to take all his troops for their own offensives. But
he didn’t make it easier on himself by blowing up at his allied
counterparts and creating what could have been international incidents,
had the Allies not needed American assistance so badly. Fortunately, he
had some good subordinates, such as George C. Marshall. It was Marshall
who not only organized and planned the Meuse-Argonne Offensive – the
war-ending battle – but who smoothed over Pershing’s relations with
everyone from foreign generals to Pershing’s own irate division
commanders who objected to his micromanagement. It was junior officers – men like
Marshall, George Patton, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight Eisenhower (although
he was never afforded the opportunity to fight in Europe), Mark Clarke,
Lesley McNair, and Walter Kruger, amongst so many – who looked at the
lessons from World War I and realized that the U.S. Army needed to
change if it wanted to be competitive on the battlefield in another war.
They knew that the Army could not sustain the disastrous casualty rates
that “open warfare” had caused. So they began to change the Army after
the World War. Change was slow because they were still fighting the
general officers who had grown up in the pre-World War I Army. Patton
and Eisenhower were threatened with court martial if they didn’t stop
publishing articles about such heretical things as the tank being the
basis for offensives rather than dismounted infantry. Efforts of the
World War I generation were not helped by popular distrust in the
military as the Army battled small budgets, low manpower authorizations,
and increasing responsibilities around the world. Marshall moved his
way through the Army staff system, overseeing sweeping changes to
doctrine and staff procedures. By 1939, he was the Army Chief of Staff;
the WWI officer corps was finally in a position to effect the changes
that they had envisioned and written about for twenty years. It wasn’t a
moment too soon: the same day Marshall was sworn in, Germany invaded
Poland.
George Patton with a Tank
In 1940, Marshall – remembering the poor performance of commanders in World War I – began the GHQ Maneuvers
in the southern U.S. He called up National Guard divisions and paired
them with Regular Army divisions to create full-scale army maneuvers:
hundreds of thousands of men moving around Texas, Louisiana, and the
Carolinas. Here he and other military leaders were able to evaluate new
technologies, test new doctrine, and get a feel for whether commanders
were effective or not. Many were not, and were relieved of command,
probably saving many lives in the coming conflict. The entire maneuvers
provided Marshall and other key leaders the informational snapshot that
they needed in order to start building the Army to war footing. Just as
the maneuvers were winding down in the winter of 1941, the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor and the U.S. was at war again.
One of the first things that the War
Department did in 1942 was to operationalize the National Guard. One of
the key lessons from World War I was that the Guard was needed on the
front lines, but that they needed a time to train up. The other move was
to get rid of the 28,000-man monstrosity of a division. The Army’s
divisions were cut down in size, made more agile and adaptive, and given
greater lethality through the addition of more enablers. The Army got
rid of the brigade and replaced it with the regimental combat team,
composed of an infantry regiment, a field artillery battalion, and an
engineer company. Infantry regiments gained antitank capabilities as
well as their own organic artillery companies. These smaller and faster
forces proved far more effective than their lumbering predecessors of
World War I. The Army adopted a tank corps as well and began training
for combined arms warfare. Although the Army was still behind the 8-ball
when it entered combat in 1942, the results would have been far more
disastrous had it not been for the efforts of the generation of officers
who had lived through the Great War.
Generals Eisenhower and Marshall
Another key take-away from World War I
was building relationships with Allies. Marshall and Eisenhower were
far more patient men than Pershing had been, and were able to navigate
the diplomatic pitfalls of being an allied commander far better than
someone like Patton or MacArthur would have. But Marshall did have his
breaking points. For example, during a 1944 planning conference with the
British, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was demanding an Allied
invasion of the island of Rhodes, at which Marshall finally exploded,
allegedly stating, “No American is going to land on that goddam island!”
These outbursts were minimal, however, and the American and British
coalition managed to stay together to defeat the Nazis and the Japanese.
Bonus Army in Washington
There was one more way that World War I
taught the U.S. people a lesson, and that was in the realm of veterans’
affairs. Between 1919-1920, the U.S. military sent millions of
servicemembers back into civilian life. Many were wounded – both
physically and mentally – and there was no real plan to take care of
these “ex servicemen” as they were called at the time. Congress had
passed a bill in 1924 granting a bonus to those who had honorably served
during the war, but during the Great Depression the payouts had been
Police clash with Bonus Marchers (Wikimedia Commons)
cut back. In 1932, thousands of
veterans descended on Washington D.C. in the infamous Bonus March. They
were eventually evicted at gunpoint and with tear gas by Army units in
one of the most shameful treatment of veterans in our nation’s history.
MacArthur, Patton, and Eisenhower all took part in this execrable
affair. With that living in recent memory, veterans services
organizations and WWI veterans in Congress resolved that nothing like it
should ever happen again. The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944
provided a whole range of benefits to veterans returning to society, the
chief of which was access to a college education. This act is commonly
known as the GI Bill. From the battlefield to the staff room
to the college campus, World War I veterans made their presence felt.
While World War I would lead to World War II, it was American experience
in the first that brought victory to the second.
French
counterparts – with whom he clashed constantly. To his credit, he had
been placed in an incredibly difficult situation: raise, arm, train, and
field the largest American army ever created while staving off British
and French attempts to take all his troops for their own offensives. But
he didn’t make it easier on himself by blowing up at his allied
counterparts and creating what could have been international incidents,
had the Allies not needed American assistance so badly. Fortunately, he
had some good subordinates, such as George C. Marshall. It was Marshall
who not only organized and planned the Meuse-Argonne Offensive – the
war-ending battle – but who smoothed over Pershing’s relations with
everyone from foreign generals to Pershing’s own irate division
commanders who objected to his micromanagement. 
