I live in this area graduated from a high school next town away from Jonesboro and never really thought about the battle while I was in high school, then went to college for a year, then joined the Army, The war against northern aggression, er I mean "The war between the States" ah the Civil War was an abstract to me. I didn't think much about the area that I live in until after i had gotten out of the Army and I was living in Griffin and saw all the old stately buildings in that city that were older than 1861. Griffin wasn't put to the torch like other cities in Georgia because General Sherman "March to the Sea" General Sherman turned his armies away from Griffin after the battle of Jonesboro and headed to Savannah.
I drove past this monument in the early 90's while I ran that pizza place everyday and I guess it registered. This monument was where the bodies of both the confederate and union soldiers died from the battle of Jonesboro,
In a lot of places history is a relative term or an abstract, but when you actually are there it kinda seeps into your consciousness. I pay a lot of attention to history now that I wish I had paid attention sooner. I had made the same comment when we were stationed in Germany when we went by Remagan and I didn't pay attention to the bridge area when I was a kid. Ad I was stationed there for 5 years and didn't drive up there. It is on my bucket list to go back to Germany and see the stuff that I missed. I had fun working this article about the Battle at Jonesboro.
I drove past this monument in the early 90's while I ran that pizza place everyday and I guess it registered. This monument was where the bodies of both the confederate and union soldiers died from the battle of Jonesboro,
In a lot of places history is a relative term or an abstract, but when you actually are there it kinda seeps into your consciousness. I pay a lot of attention to history now that I wish I had paid attention sooner. I had made the same comment when we were stationed in Germany when we went by Remagan and I didn't pay attention to the bridge area when I was a kid. Ad I was stationed there for 5 years and didn't drive up there. It is on my bucket list to go back to Germany and see the stuff that I missed. I had fun working this article about the Battle at Jonesboro.
At the Battle of Jonsboro Union General William T. Sherman hoped to destroy the Army of Tennessee and seize Atlanta, Georgia. By
late August 1864,the situation of the Confederate Army of Tennessee in
Atlanta had become extremely grim. Its new commander, General John Bell
Hood, had counterattacked the superior forces of red-bearded Maj. Gen.
William T. “Cump” Sherman’s forces in their positions north, east, and
west of Atlanta with no success. Each loss added to the list of
Confederate casualties that numbered in the thousands. Sherman had
devised an effective plan of cutting the railroads into Atlanta, and the
last order of business was to sever the Macon & Western Railroad.
While Hood pondered his remaining options, “Cump”
ordered the vanguard of his army to pack 15 days of rations and begin
marching south around the western rim of Atlanta to Jonesboro
Georgia, which was situated on the railroad that entered the city from
the south. Sherman entrusted one-armed Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard with
overseeing the movement. By the evening of August 27, all of Sherman’s
army, except the XX Corps, was between Sandtown and Atlanta. Hood
learned about the Union movements from his cavalry; however, he was in
the dark as to exactly where Sherman planned to strike.
For four long months Union and Confederate forces in
northern Georgia had ground away at each other, leaving the landscape on
the Chattanooga-Atlanta corridor dotted with the graves of fallen
Johnny Rebs and Billy Yanks. Sherman, who had replaced General Ulysses
S. Grant on March 18, 1864, as the commander of the Military Division of
the Mississippi, had departed Chattanooga and crossed into Georgia in
May 1864 with his three Union armies. He fought his way steadily south
over the roughly 100 miles to the Athens of the South by repeatedly
outflanking Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s smaller Army of Tennessee. Facing the superior Union numbers, Johnston took up one strong
position after another only to see it turned by the resourceful
Sherman. By early July, Johnston’s back was against the Chattahoochee
River just north of Atlanta.
Sherman was acutely aware that U.S. President Abraham
Lincoln needed a decisive Union victory to increase his chances for
reelection in November. As commander of the Military Division of the
Mississippi, Sherman had 100,000 men under his command. Although Sherman
had substantially more men than Johnston had in the Confederate Army of
Tennessee, the Confederates had strong fortifications surrounding
Atlanta. A headlong attack against those fortifications was sure to be
bloody, and it was by no means certain of victory.
The Confederates had their own problems. Confederate
President Jefferson Davis wanted an aggressive commander who would put
up a more effective defense against the Union Army at the gates of
Atlanta. Dissatisfied with Johnston’s tactics, Davis sacked him on July
17. Davis replaced Johnston with Hood, who was promoted to full general.
Hood counterattacked on July 20 at Peachtree Creek
north of the city but suffered a bloody repulse. Unfazed, Hood attacked
again on July 22 in what became known as the Battle of Atlanta. This
time the Confederate commander sent Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee’s corps
on a 12-mile forced march to get around the Union left flank east of the
city. But Hood miscalculated the time it would take for Hardee’s corps
to get into position. Union Maj. Gen. James McPherson committed reserve
forces to hold his position. Although the Confederates broke through his
line briefly, they were driven back by heavy artillery fire. Hood lost
7,000 men he could ill afford to lose, while the Union Army lost
McPherson, who was killed in the confused fighting when he inadvertently
rode into a group of Rebels from Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne’s
hard-hitting division. Sherman gave command of McPherson’s troops to
Howard, who had been transferred to the western theater from the Army of
the Potomac.
Sherman’s plan was not to attack Atlanta headlong but
to send Union forces to slip around the Confederate flanks and sever the
rail lines that were the city’s lifelines to the rest of the South.
Sherman eventually found that he could not effectively cut off Atlanta
from the east without getting too far away from the railroad that
supplied his army. For that reason, he ordered Howard to pull back and
swing to the right in order to threaten the city from the west. The
Macon & Western Railroad was the only open railroad supplying the
beleaguered Confederate army in Atlanta.
Hood once again saw a chance to catch the Federals off
balance. On July 28, he sent Lt. Gen. Alexander Stewart and Lt. Gen.
Stephen D. Lee to launch a coordinated attack against Howard. Hood
expected to catch Howard on the move, but Howard had already entrenched
by the time the Rebels attacked. The battle unfolded in the woods
surrounding a rural chapel called Ezra Church. The botched attack cost
Hood another 5,000 men. The Confederate Army was hemorrhaging badly.
Hood had fought three large battles in nine days and come up short each
time. The initiative reverted back to Sherman.
While Howard had shifted west of the city, Maj. Gen.
George Thomas, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, and Maj. Gen.
John Schofield, commander of the Army of the Ohio, had maintained a
steady bombardment of Hood’s forces opposite them. On August 26 all of
the Union forces except for Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XX Corps of the
Army of the Cumberland had vanished from the trenches opposite Atlanta.
Sherman had put in motion the Union operation to cut the Macon &
Western Railroad.
The Atlantic & Western Railroad joined the Macon
& Western Railroad at East point a few miles south of Atlanta. As the
Yankees marched around Atlanta, some of the units halted midway through
their march to tear up sections of the Atlantic & Western Railroad
before proceeding to the Macon & Western Railroad.
“In one and one-quarter hours we utterly destroyed
rails and ties for twice the length of our regiment,” wrote Sergeant
Charles Wills of the 8th Illinois Infantry, XX Corps, Army of the
Cumberland. “We, by main strength with our hands, turned the track
upside down, pried the ties off, stacked them, piled the rails across
and fired the piles. Used no tools whatever.”
Howard’s troops in the vanguard arrived August 30 west
of Jonesboro. Instead of occupying Jonesboro, which was lightly
defended, they began entrenching on the east bank of the Flint River. On
the east side of the river were bluffs that ranged from 100 to 200 feet
in height. It was a strong defensive situation; to make it even
stronger, Howard rested both flanks on the river. His battle line was
more than a mile long. The Flint River paralleled the Macon &
Western Railroad and in some places was only one mile from the railroad.
Part of the XV Corps, under Maj. Gen. John A. “Black
Jack” Logan, arrived later than the others and needed to entrench
hastily. The 55th Illinois, a regiment in the XV Corps, had to drive
away some enemy sharpshooters and skirmishers before it could reach a
prominent hill that provided a good position. “While half the brigade
pushed back the enemy and held them in check, the rest piled rails and
logs … into a rude low breastwork,” wrote Logan. “Lying behind this,
with bayonets and tin plates—anything that could serve as a tool—the men
dug into the hard gravel to increase their protection.” The Yankees
built a second line of entrenchments behind the river, backed with
artillery.
The Federal cavalry, under Brig. Gen. Judson
Kilpatrick, picketed the Union right flank. The rest of the Army of the
Tennessee was positioned, right to left: Brig. Gen. Thomas E.G. Ransom’s
XVI Corps, Logan’s XV Corps, and Maj. Gen. Francis P. Blair, Jr.’s XVII
Corps.
Hood knew that a large Federal force was threatening
to cut his supply line with Macon, Georgia. He believed it was only two
corps, though. He did not know that the force consisted of most of
Sherman’s troops. On the evening of August 30, Hood ordered Hardee to
take his own corps, which was commanded by Cleburne, and Lt. Gen.
Stephen Dill Lee’s corps to Jonesboro. The Confederates expected to
arrive before sunrise, but Cleburne’s corps, which was in the lead,
encountered Yankees holding a bridge that they had to cross. Once a ford
was found, Cleburne sent a communication for the rest of Hardee’s
command to follow him.
“The darkness of the night, the dense woods through
which we frequently marched, without roads, the want of shoes by many,
and the lack of recent exercise by all [due to being in the trenches for
so long,] contributed to induce a degree of straggling which I do not
remember to have seen exceeded in any former march of the kind,” wrote
Confederate Maj. Gen. Patton Anderson.
The head of the column did not reach Jonesboro
until mid-morning on August 31. The lead brigade of Lee’s column did not
get there until 11 am, and it was not until 1:30 pm that the entire
command was in place. As the Confederates arrived, they immediately
began fortifying their line.
Hardee’s corps deployed facing northwest. Cleburne’s
own division, under Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey, moved into position on
the left. Brig. Gen. Hiram B. Granbury’s Texas Brigade of Cleburne’s
division took up a position on the extreme Confederate left flank. The
rest of Cleburne’s division consisted of Lowrey’s Alabama/Mississippi
Brigade behind Granbury. To the right of Granbury were Brig. Gen. Hugh
Mercer’s Georgia Brigade and Brig. Gen. Daniel C. Govan’s Arkansas
Brigade. The other divisions of Hardee’s corps were Maj. Gen. W.B.
Bate’s division, on the right of Cleburne, and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F.
Cheatham’s division, in reserve behind Bate.
Lee’s corps deployed facing west to the right of
Cleburne’s troops. Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson’s division held the
left, while Anderson’s division held the right. Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Clayton’s division backed Anderson. The rest of Stevenson’s division was
held in reserve behind the main line.
Hood told Hardee that the fate of Atlanta rested on
his ability to push the Federals back across the Flint River at
Jonesboro. He instructed Hardee that the Confederates should attack
with fixed bayonets. Hardee planned to attack in echelon, from left to
right, led off by Granbury’s brigade. An echelon attack was intended to
compel the enemy to commit his forces against each separate advance,
thus leaving an easier path for the next advance in line.
Granbury began the attack as ordered. Granbury’s men
were met by Kilpatrick’s dismounted troopers, with four cannons, behind
rail breastworks. After a brief fight, Kilpatrick retreated across the
Flint River.
Kilpatrick’s cavalry “just fairly made it rain bullets
as long as they had any in their guns, but as soon as they gave out,
and we were getting closer to them every moment, they couldn’t stand it
but broke and ran like good fellows,” recalled Captain Samuel T. Foster
of Granbury’s brigade. Contrary to specific orders, Granbury chased
after them, beyond the river. The cavalrymen “outran us by odds,” Foster
said.
Lowrey’s and Mercer’s brigades followed Granbury’s
example, and all three brigades crossed the river. Lowrey commanded the
three brigades to retire back across the river and to change the
direction of their advance to the north, hoping to hit the Federal
infantry in the right flank. Instead of finding the Yankees with their
flank in the air, they discovered that their right was anchored on the
river.
The three right brigades of Cleburne’s division,
followed by Bate’s and Cheatham’s divisions, respectively, went up
against the main Federal line. “Our men were true in emergencies…. On
the command, ‘forward,’ they moved as one man with steady steps,”
recalled Sergeant Sumner A. Cunningham of the 41st Tennessee. “Very soon
we were in one of the fiercest battles of the war.” Before reaching the
Yankee line, they were ordered to retreat. The men reformed and were
ordered to charge again, but this met the same fate as the first charge.
“Soon our men begin to fall, rapidly and steadily we
advance,” wrote Sgt. Maj. Johnny Green of the 9th Kentucky. “Just as we
have fired the volley at them and begin to rush on them we come to a
deep gully ten feet wide and fully as deep. No one can jump this gully
and at this close range it will be impossible to clamber up the other
side of the gully and reform to rush on them with fixed bayonets. The
shot and shell and MiniĆ© ball [were] decimating our ranks.”
Lee, on the right of Cleburne, heard skirmish fire
coming from the main line. He thought the chief attack had begun and
hurled his men forward too soon. In addition to attacking ahead of
schedule, their assault was confused. They attacked in two lines and Lee
instructed the second line not to allow an interval of more than 100
yards between them and the line in front. Some of the lead brigades were
slow in starting, which made it hard for the support brigades to keep
the proper intervals and to keep an even alignment with each other.
“In front of the breastworks, a dense growth of timber
and brushwood had been felled,” wrote Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Manigault.
“This obstruction proved a serious inconvenience to our men, creating
much irregularity in the line.”
Anderson led the right three brigades of Lee’s advance
line. “They advanced up the ascent to within a pistol shot of the
enemy’s works,” wrote Anderson. “At this point, under a deadly fire, a
few wavered [and] the rest laid down. The line was unbroken, and,
although the position was a trying one, every inch of ground gained was
resolutely maintained…. Both men and officers in the front line were
suffering severely. Each moment brought death and wounds into their
ranks.”
The line officers shouted encouragement to the men
under their command, urging them to stand firm. “Slowly but resolutely
they advanced up the ascent to within pistol-shot of the enemy’s works,”
wrote Anderson. “Every effort was made to hold the ground already
gained. Stragglers were pushed up to the front and the slightly wounded
were encouraged to remain there.”
The men of Colonel Theodore Jones’s brigade of Brig.
Gen. William B. Hazen’s division of the Union XV Corps manned the left
of their line opposite Anderson’s Rebels. “The first rebel line rushed
into sight out of the skirts of the brush that fringed the slope, and
when within a hundred paces our first volley met them full in the face,”
wrote a soldier of the 55th Illinois. “A few of the more desperate
reached the rifle-pits, but the main body was swept back to the shelter
of the copse, leaving the hill crest covered with a bloody burden.”
The Federals of Logan’s corps encountered Lee’s men.
“They came with a yell, attacking our whole line,” wrote Private John K.
Duke of the 53rd Ohio. “We reserved our fire until they were quite
close, when we opened up a continuous fire, some of our officers
standing back of the firing line biting off the ends of cartridges and
urging coolness and rapid fire…. The space between our works was strewn
with their dead and wounded.”
Lee was repulsed all along the line. He informed
Hardee that he did not think he could capture the Union position in a
second assault. Hardee had received information, which later proved to
be false, that the Federals were going to assault Lee. Therefore, he
ordered Cleburne’s division to the right to reinforce Lee and went on
the defensive. Night ended the fighting, and the Confederates withdrew
behind the protection of the Jonesboro defensive works.
Although the Confederate attacks were fierce, the
Federals repulsed them with relative ease. The casualties reflect the
inequality of the contest. Confederates suffered 1,700 casualties, while
the Union suffered only 200.
“The enemy attacked us in three distinct points, and
were each time handsomely repulsed,” Howard informed Sherman. “Besides
losing a host of men in this campaign, the Rebel Army has lost a large
measure of vim, which counts a good deal in soldiering,” wrote Wills.
“The agonies of the wounded and dying, as they lay
between the lines that night, was peculiarly horrible,” recalled
Sergeant Cunningham of the 41st Tennessee.
The Confederate losses were not large enough to
satisfy Hood. The attack “must have been rather feeble, as the loss
incurred was … a small number in comparison to the forces engaged,”
wrote Hood. Hardee’s failure to drive the Federals into the Flint River
“necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta,” he wrote.
On the night of August 31, Hood ordered Hardee to
return S.D. Lee’s corps to Atlanta. Hardee directed them to vacate their
positions at 2 am. Cleburne’s division then spread out to occupy Lee’s
position. Cleburne’s men were so few they had to fill the trenches in a
single line. There was some delay, and Lee’s men did not get on the
route back to Atlanta until daybreak.
The next morning the troops of Stanley’s IV Corps
moved south along the Macon & Western Railroad. “Marching early, our
brigade soon struck the railroad, and turning south, began the work of
demolition,” recalled Sergeant Lewis W. Day of the 101st Ohio Infantry.
“Everything that could be burned was committed to the flames; cedar ties
proved to be excellent material for heating the rails, and adjacent
trees offered solid supports for bending them; a roaring fire of cedar
rails soon destroyed the wooden culverts, and a few pounds of powder
blew up the stone ones. The railroad was utterly wrecked—nothing was
left, except the roadbed, and even that looked exceedingly
disconsolate.”
When they reached the existing Federal entrenchments,
they formed on the left of Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’s XIV Corps,
facing south against the right flank of Cleburne’s Confederate division.
The rest of the XIV Corps faced southeast opposite the rest of
Cleburne’s division. Logan’s XV Corps held the right of the Union line,
facing east and confronting Bate’s and Cheatham’s divisions.
The Confederate entrenchments formed a fish hook, with
the barbed end on the north, bending back to the right. The right flank
faced north, and the center and left flanks faced west. Cleburne’s
troops were in a single rank spaced a yard apart in order to fill their
entrenchments. They were on the right, facing north, with Govan’s
Arkansans holding the angle where the fishhook was curved.
To the left of Cleburne’s division were the men of
Bate’s division and to the left of Bate’s division was Cheatham’s
division. All of Bate’s and Cheatham’s troops faced west.
Because he believed Govan’s line was in a bad
position, Hardee ordered its commander to move his line back and prepare
new works. As his men carried out these instructions, they were also
able to destroy the entrenchments they abandoned to deny their use to
the enemy. But owing to the heavy fire from Union guns, Govan’ men were
unable to destroy their old fortifications.
Hardee shifted Brig. Gen. “States Rights” Gist’s
brigade at 1 pm from the extreme left of the line to the extreme right.
They were formed with their left resting on the Macon & Western
Railroad cut. The men received orders to strengthen their position as
much as possible since they were responsible for holding the right
flank.
“The men climbed up the small trees, bent them over,
and, using pocket-knives to cut across the trunks, succeeded in a half
hour in making a first-rate abatis of little trees, interlaced thickly,
and held by half their thickness to the stumps,” wrote Colonel Ellison
Capers of the 24th South Carolina. For breastworks, the men used rails
and logs.
In the Union Army, Brig. Gen. James D. Morgan’s Second
Division of the Union XIV Corps acted as a pivot for the right of the
corps. They swung around until they were facing east and aligned, in a
north-south direction, opposite the Confederate entrenchments. Left of
them, the Federal line faced south to the Confederate right flank.
Confederate guns opened on them as they crossed the Flint River.
The Third Brigade of the Second Division held the
right of the line, the Second Brigade held the left, and the First
Brigade was in reserve as they approached the Rebel entrenchments. On
the left, they could see Brig. Gen. William P. Carlin’s First Division
of the XIV Corps and Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley’s IV Corps.
“As far as we could see brigades were massed for a
charge, with batteries thundering from the intervals between them, flags
waving and flashing in the sunlight, staff officers dashing here and
there, all made a martial scene grand and inspiring in the highest
degree,” wrote First Sergeant Henry J. Aten of the 85th Illinois. “At
the command the men moved forward with bayonets fixed and their empty
guns at the right shoulder-shift.” The 17th New York Zouaves suffered
heavily; their red turbans made them an inviting target.
The Federal columns began pushing their way through
thick, swampy woods toward the enemy works at 4 pm. They were on a
collision course with the Confederate field works that ran along a
wooded ridge in the distance. Despite their fortitude, the Yankees had
difficulty keeping their direction and alignment as they moved through
swamps, ditches, and tangles of thickets. After an hour of slow but
steady progress, the Federal units halted at 5 pm to dress ranks. They
then surged forward along their entire front. Behind the main body,
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood’s Division of the Army of the Cumberland’s IV
Corps, which constituted the Union reserve, moved south along the Macon
& Western Railroad in columns to the left of the railroad.
Men on both sides watched tensely as the skirmishers
became engaged and the roar of artillery grew in intensity. “Dirt, rock,
slivers of rail and bushes, together with the grape and canister, as
well as the MiniĆ© balls, filled the air with the most deafening noise,”
wrote alf Hunter, adjutant of the 82nd Indiana.
Federal artillery fire pummeled Govan’s brigade. The
Rebels endured frontal fire, crossfire, and enfilading fire. The
brigade’s eight cannons were disabled, having had their wheels shot
away. When the Union guns ceased fire, the men of Brig. Gen. Passmore
Carlin’s First Division of the XIV Corps swept forward against Govan’s
entrenched men.
“The entire brigade had to pass a morass, densely
covered with brambles and undergrowth, so that it was impossible to
preserve an exact alignment. The officers and men, however, pressed
through the swamp, and rushed gallantly up the hill in the face of a
galling fire from the enemy,” wrote Major John R. Edie of the 15th
Infantry of the U.S. Regular Brigade.
Advancing on the left of the U.S. Regulars was Colonel
Marshall F. Moore’s Third Brigade. “[We] threw out skirmishers, and
moved forward through a dense thicket,” wrote Captain Lewis E. Hicks of
the 69th Ohio. “We advanced to charge the rebel works. We reached a
point within 50 yards of the works, and held it for 15 minutes, under a
murderous fire, which speedily decimated our ranks.” The regiment’s
colors were left in the no-man’s land between opposing lines when the
color bearer was killed; however, the Yankees recovered them in their
second charge.
“We assaulted the enemy’s intrenched position in the
edge of woods, moving in line of battle through an open, difficult
swamp, across an open field, under the severest artillery and musketry
fire, flank and front,” added Captain Lyman M. Kellogg of the 18th U.S.
Infantry of the U.S. Regular Brigade.
When his men stalled under the enemy’s galling fire,
Kellogg sought to lead them through the hailstorm of lead by example. “I
rode in front of my colors, and caused them to be successfully planted
on the enemy’s works, jumping my horse over them at the time they were
filled with the enemy, being the first man of our army over the enemy’s
works.” The irate Rebels knocked Kellogg off his horse. While inside the
enemy’s lines, he suffered severe wounds from shot and shell.
Govan’s Arkansas Rebels repulsed the first assault,
but the enemy came again, in three columns, all converging on the
Arkansans. They broke through the center of their line, capturing Govan,
his adjutant general, 600 men, and the immobilized cannons.
“Although the odds were very great, the men gallantly
contested their advance, fighting the enemy with clubbed guns and at the
point of the bayonet, and thus a great many lost the opportunity for
escaping,” recalled Colonel Peter V. Green of the 5th-13th Arkansas
Consolidated Regiment. “The advance of the enemy was so rapid, and the
woods on the right being so dense as to screen their movements, it was
impossible to form any combinations to resist it.”
Granbury’s Texans were on the left of Govan. When the
Arkansans’ line was broken the Kentucky Orphan Brigade’s right flank
became exposed. “Our brigade [was] taken out of the works at a double
quick and formed a line in rear of our works perpendicular to them
facing the Yanks,” wrote Green. “Our battery [was] taken out of its
position and wheeled around so as to face the new direction.” The Rebels
waited patiently while the Yankees escorted their prisoners to the rear
before resuming fire.
Vaughan’s Tennessee Brigade, in Cheatham’s division,
arrived at this opportune moment, from the left of Hardee’s line, and
was ordered to retake Govan’s old position. “Major-General Cleburne
threw Vaughan’s brigade into the lurch, which, with the assistance of
the remaining portions of Govan’s and Lewis’ brigades, completely
checked the advance of the enemy,” wrote Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey.
Three of the regiments advanced too far to the left, coming up behind
Granbury’s Texans, but the remaining regiment forced the Yankees in
Govan’s entrenchments to assume the defensive.
“It was about five o’clock when the first [Union] line
made its appearance, then another and another, until five double lines
were in full view, coming in double-quick,” wrote George D. Van Horn of
Swett’s battery of the Mississippi Artillery. “Our guns opened on them
at a distance of three-quarters of a mile, and kept it up, the Yankees
halting only at times to reline, then on again. Shortly our infantry
commenced on them, and we began to use double charges of canister, but
they kept coming.”
The Yankees surged over the Confederate breastworks in
a desperate effort to silence the menacing guns. “Our infantry and
artillery were still firing as rapidly as possible, but hundreds of them
were climbing over the works,” continued Van Horn. “The first ones that
came in found the gun already loaded and ready to fire. The embrasure
was filled with howling Yanks.”
The Yankees swore and yelled at the Rebels in an
effort get them to surrender or abandon their guns, but the resolute
cannoneers stood fast. “One of them called to the man who was firing the
gun that if he fired again he would run his bayonet through him, but
the gunner paid no attention and fired, clearing out the porthole,”
recalled Van Horn. “The Yank pulled down his gun and drove his bayonet
through the gunner’s breast, pinning him to the ground, and, putting his
foot on the man’s breast, jerked the bayonet out, leaving his man on
the ground, as he thought, dead.”
One of the Yankee regiments that attacked Govan’s
position was the 14th Ohio of Colonel George P. Este’s brigade. “After
one of the most desperate hand-to-hand contests ever witnessed between
two contending foes, the works were finally carried,” wrote Union Lt.
Col. John A. Chase of the 182nd Ohio.
The 105th Ohio of Colonel Newell Gleason’s brigade
supported Este’s men as they advanced against Govan’s brigade and
Lewis’s Orphan Brigade of Kentuckians. “Este’s men dashed off with a
wild cheer, carrying everything before them,” wrote Lieutenant Albion
Tourgee of the 105th Ohio. The troops had fixed bayonets “along the
whole front of the brigade,” Tourgee said.
The soldiers fired at each other at point-blank range.
“I rose from a stooping posture in the trenches to shoot but just as I
looked over our trenches a Yankee with the muzzle of his gun not six
inches from my face shot me in the face and neck but fortunately it was
only a flesh wound,” recalled Green of the 9th Kentucky. “It stung my
face about as a bee sting feels but in my knees I felt it so that it
knocked me to a sitting posture. But my gun was loaded and the other
fellow had had his shot. I rose and put my gun against his side and shot
a hole through him big enough to have run my fist through.”
At one point, a Union soldier poked his rifle through a
small crack in the Rebel fortification and fired, killing two soldiers
with one shot. Two of the Kentuckians grabbed the muzzle of his gun and
bent it so that it could not be extracted.
The Union troops who overran Govan’s Arkansans swung
around behind the Kentuckians. Many of the Confederates were captured,
but the rest of the brigade fell back and then reformed.
Sherman had arrived at Jonesboro just before the
Union attack began and was with Logan’s XV Corps. He was deeply pleased
with the progress of the battle. “They’re rolling them up like a sheet
of paper,” he said with evident delight.
Brigadier General William Grose’s Third Brigade of the
IV Corps attacked the right flank of the Confederate line. “[They]
pressed forward under a heavy canister fire from the enemy’s guns to
within 300 yards of the enemy’s barricaded lines,” wrote Grose.
Brigadier General John Newton’s division of the IV
Corps pushed forward around the enemy’s right flank, confronting only
the Rebel skirmishers. They did not have much to do, but did capture a
Confederate hospital, with the sick and wounded, about a dozen nurses,
and a doctor. As the doctor was being led back through the lines, he
said, “Billy Fed, we are sold; we did not expect such an army here.”
Both sides, blue and gray, were fought out. The
majority of the Confederates had been pushed out of their original
entrenchments but still held on. Hardee issued orders at 11 pm for his
troops to withdraw from their positions. Despite the determined attacks
of the Yankees, Hardee had held his position long enough to give Hood
the amount of time he needed to evacuate Atlanta.
The Battle of Jonesboro “decided the fate of
Atlanta,” wrote Aten. “The troops slept on their arms, and were startled
during the night by what appeared to be terrific artillery firing in
the direction of Atlanta…. We learned next day that the noise proceeded
from the explosion of ammunition, the rear guard of the enemy having
destroyed his abandoned ordnance stores as his army retreated from the
city."
On the morning of September 2, the Union Army looked out on the “wreck of a defeated enemy,” Aten wrote, “who had retreated during the night, leaving his dead unburied and his wounded uncared for.” Union and Confederate soldiers alike heard deafening explosions inside Confederate lines.
On the morning of September 2, the Union Army looked out on the “wreck of a defeated enemy,” Aten wrote, “who had retreated during the night, leaving his dead unburied and his wounded uncared for.” Union and Confederate soldiers alike heard deafening explosions inside Confederate lines.
“About this time I heard a terrible roar,” recalled
Private Robert Patrick, a Confederate soldier stationed in Atlanta. “At
first I could not imagine what it was but after a time I ascertained
that it was shells exploding.” What Patrick heard was the explosion of
rail cars loaded with ammunition being destroyed to prevent their
contents from falling into enemy hands.
“I could see how to walk for a long distance by the
light of the shells and the burning cars,” wrote Patrick. “My road lay
parallel with the track and as I approached nearer and nearer the
burning train, the sound became deafening, and the fragments of shells
hurtled through the midnight darkness over my head with an ominous
rushing sound.”
What Patrick heard was the death knell of the western
Confederacy. Mary Boykin Chestnut in Richmond, Virginia, echoed the
feelings of the entire South when she noted in her diary, “Since Atlanta
fell I felt as if all were dead within me forever.”
Hood would not give up but, from this time forward,
nothing he could do would compensate for the loss of Atlanta. To force
Sherman to abandon Atlanta, Hood would attack the Federal communications
and supply lines north of the city. When that did not force Sherman to
quit Atlanta, Hood moved into Tennessee, hoping Sherman would follow
him. Sherman sent Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland and Schofield’s corps
from the Army of the Ohio in a race to beat Hood to Nashville.
With no need to hold Atlanta, Sherman destroyed the
city. On November 15 Sherman led his 62,000 men on devastating march of
destruction to Savannah, arriving on December 10. Meanwhile, Thomas and
Schofield successfully defended middle Tennessee against Hood. Schofield
defeated Hood at Franklin on November 30, and Thomas won a decisive
victory over Hood at Nashville in mid-December. At that point, the once
great Confederate Army of Tennessee ceased to exist as an effective
field army.
The war ground on for another seven months but, after
the Battle of Jonesboro and the fall of Atlanta, there was no
question that the North would prevail, and little doubt that Lincoln
would win the 1864 presidential election.
Great post! Excellent research and well presented!
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