I saw this Article pop up on one of my feeds and it talked about the 1972 Easter Offensive and the failure of the Intelligence community and the commanders to pay attention to the reports and the misconceptions of the commanders. The Allies figured that the North Vietnamese were planning something along the lines like Tet Offensive, instead they got a huge conventional offensive with a lot of Chinese support. It is a long article and there is a lot of information of a historical nature.
W.
R. Baker wrote this extraordinary article about his "Human
Intelligence" Group in I-Corps during the later part of the Vietnam
War. After the failure of Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos, the South
Vietnamese Army was licking their wounds and reorganizing units. During
that time, intel reports cited enemy buildups and routes of travel
through I-Corps with warnings to the brass of a potential large enemy
offensive in the works. Easter was just around the corner and only a few
commanders of the Allied forces had read the Intel Reports. The Easter
Offensive begins and the Allied forces are ill-equipped or prepared for
the invasion...if only the brass had heeded the warnings in the intel
reports. Here's the author's take on it:
Before
Vietnam completely fades from memory and its lessons learned gather
even more dust, it might be worth exploring a few issues that will
likely resurface again.
During
the latter months of the Vietnam War (1971-72), the United States was
actively sending units home, turning facilities and functions over to
the South Vietnamese and to U.S. forces located elsewhere before the 29
March 1973 deadline for all U.S. forces to be out of the country. In
January 72, President Nixon announced that 70,000 troops would be
withdrawn by 1 May 72, reducing the troop level in Vietnam to 69,000.
Beginnings
I
was assigned in 1971 to the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment in
Da Nang, the unit primarily ran Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations
throughout I Corps in northern South Vietnam. I was quickly exposed to
Viet Cong (VC), North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and friendly forces’
activity in our area of interest. As such it was evident that South
Vietnamese forces that had taken part in Lam Son 719 in Laos were
licking their wounds - even the much touted 1st Army of the Republic of
Vietnam (ARVN) Division, garrisoned in Hue had been severely crippled in
this failed campaign in 1971.
We
also dealt with other foreign country units, i.e., South Korean, who
left I Corps a few months after I arrived, in addition to ARVN
commanders and secret police officials.
As
we ran Unilateral and Bilateral agent networks, remaining U.S. units in
I Corps and MACV, USARV, USPACFLT, 7th AF, 7th PSYOPS, and our
headquarters (the 525 Military Intelligence Group in Saigon) all
received copies of our Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), as they
applied to their Areas of Operations and Interest. Unit 101 was an ARVN
intelligence unit that also received selected reports. Being responsible
for the distribution of all these IIRs allowed me to know the status of
the remaining units, which would aid me later during the Easter
Offensive of 1972.
Shortly
after arriving at my unit, it became clear that it had been content to
operate without understanding the tactical and strategic situation in I
Corps (the identifier that most soldiers continued to use after it
switched into the newer term, which I will continue to use in this
article), relying on XXIV Corps, which soon became the First Regional
Assistance Command (FRAC), for area knowledge when it became necessary.
“The advisory command, recalled Major General Kroesen (the FRAC
commander), was ‘heavily weighted to provide administrative assistance
and logistical advice’ with only a token intelligence and operations
section. It was neither manned nor equipped to monitor the combat
actively or to provide tactical guidance.”[1] The general and his staff
failed to mention these “little” points to our intelligence
organization. The rub, though, is that we were the only functioning
intelligence unit in all of I Corps/FRAC during the Easter Offensive of
1972 and we didn’t know it!
I
was very fortunate to work for an organization that didn’t inhibit new
ideas – actually, this was not uncommon for intelligence units then and
for the next few years after Vietnam ended. Trained as an
Intelligence/Order of Battle Analyst, I began creating topical files on
enemy units and equipment (the “old” Composition, Disposition, Strength,
etc, of FM 30-5 that was drilled into us in intelligence school), while
obtaining 1:50,000 scale UTM maps, which took up considerable wall
space. Our unit was lucky to also have helicopter support from the 358th
Aviation Detachment for 2-3 weeks every month for “ass and trash”
missions. I would occasionally fill in for sick door gunners and visit
our teams in Quang Tri, Hue, Chu Lai, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai, making
notes on the physical features I saw to make changes to our maps,
highlighting such things as avenues of approach, military crests, new
physical features, friendly military positions, etc. This type of
reconnaissance was supplemented by occasional trips by jeep, as well.
The
maps were an immediate “hit” with our unit, as we and any visitors
would be able to view and comment on where enemy units were positioned
and other loci made while using the maps. The maps were obviously a
tremendous asset during the Easter Offensive, especially since they were
manually and accurately updated. Unexpectedly, an event occurred that
made use of them beforehand.
As
U.S. units left, so our presence would eventually follow and so would
the amount of money that could be expended on our agents. So it fell to
me to go through each agent’s reports and each net that we ran. I
protested at first, but I was told simply that there was no one else
qualified to do it because I knew the military situation in I Corps and
had created topical files for each area and unit.
Well
aware that this “paring down” of agents was a huge responsibility and
what the consequences meant, I took 3-4 months’ worth of IIRs for each
agent, my topical files and the appropriate maps and carefully waded
through them all. What I found was eye-opening. Some of the agents had
been reporting virtually the same events over and over, making little
changes. Some agents rarely reported anything, while others sometimes
described units located well outside their operational area. Some agents
were mediocre and a few were exceptionally good – these reports were
always valuable.
The
next step was to rate all the agents, each net, and to justify the
reasons for each rating. Having my recommendations affirmed by the area
specialists and our leadership was gratifying. Little did we know that
this was to become more of a plus in our accuracy and information
reliability during the Easter Offensive.
The
NVA/VC were “expected” to make trouble during TET (mid-February) 1972.
Because nothing happened, the press took the intelligence and various
other command organizations to task for not having any idea of what was
going on and of being mere sycophants of the upper echelons. Events were to prove that the press weren’t too far off…
Because
we were such a small unit that was HUMINT-oriented, we were never asked
for our opinion or intelligence. We had received virtually nothing
about TET from anyone, but early the next month (March), we started
getting various indicators from our own agents. It is important to
understand that we never received intel from 7th Air Force, MACV, DIA or
CIA: our information always went up but NOTHING came down – we were
disregarded, just as HUMINT was and generally is today.
Hostilities Begin
Soldiers manning a perimeter on a hilltop looking into the A Shau Valley
The 324B NVA Division moved into the A Shau Valley in early-March, heading for its usual
AO to the west of Hue to keep the 1st ARVN Division occupied. The 324B
was a Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH) unit. As it moved through
the A Shau, it linked up with the 5th and 6th Independent Infantry
Regiments, also of the MRTTH. As time progressed, it was obvious that at
least two regiments were moving northeasterly and could act as a
blocking force along QL-1 (the main north-south highway in country),
while the other two regiments confined 1st ARVN to Firebases Bastogne
and Birmingham. There wasn’t as much as a single ARVN battalion able to
defend Hue as the 324B engaged ARVN.
We
started to receive information from across I Corps on targets and unit
activity. Though we were generally a strategic unit and our IIRs were
often not timely enough to act on, it was necessary to make or
strengthen contacts to respond to the targets that were rapidly
presenting themselves, which could just as rapidly move away. There had
been no usual way for us to provide targets to air or ground forces
before. We had gone out with 23rd (Americal) Infantry Division units to
confirm some of our IIRs, but time was always critical as units and
weapon caches moved, etc.
We
had been coordinating with the local Special Forces unit when we
received information on the “Salt and Pepper” VC propaganda team
operating to the west of Chu Lai. I knew they had an on-call capability,
so I would feed them information on newly developed targets, as well. I
also had a friend that worked ARCLIGHT (i.e., B-52) targets in Saigon
and would make sure the 196th Light Infantry Brigade would get
infiltration and unit reports for their AO.
In
early March, we had information concerning the forthcoming Offensive of
major importance. “Moreover, among the reduced number of enemy
documents that were exploited were detailed orders of battle and COSVN plans for the spring offensive”[2]
contained in our IIRs. Even this information wasn’t enough to convince
other intelligence agencies, nor command elements, that a major event
was going to take place.
Throughout
March 1972, the pace of incoming information quickened to the point
that it was obvious that a major offensive was going to take place, but
this time (and unlike TET 1968) it would involve main-force units, to
include tanks – something the NVA had never done before! “One example of
the close-mindedness of some senior military commanders was the total
disregard (MG) Kroesen and (Gen) Westmoreland among others showed toward
intelligence predictions of an enemy frontal assault along the
Demilitarized Zone.”[3]
“John
M. Oseth, who was then serving as the G-2 adviser to the 3rd ARVN
Division, acknowledged that although there might have been isolated
agent reports of an impending invasion, the general consensus, at least
at the division level, was that the threat of enemy attack though
present, was not great.”[4]
“The
most prevalent problem in this regard was an unwillingness on the part
of commanders to heed warnings of massed armor and heavy artillery.”[5]
“…and in spite of at least four separate human resources
who claimed that there would be a ‘great offensive’ in the near future,
American military personnel for the most part were dubious about any
impending large-scale attack. Information from theses human sources
proved to be both detailed and factually accurate as the Offensive took
its course."[6] Undoubtedly, this was our northernmost network of
agents.
As
the IIRs arrived, it was obvious that we needed to report our compiled
information in an expeditious manner. Again, I was asked how best to do
this and we went with an Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) format, which
allowed us to report virtually everything with a minimum of format.
There had never been an INTSUM used by the 525 MI Group before,
undoubtedly because there had never been a tactical situation arise
before like the Easter Offensive of 1972. An INTSUM was later imposed by
the Group on all its detachments, twice a day.
Just
prior to the Offensive, many of the major NVA units crossing the DMZ,
their commanders and their probable avenues of approach and initial
objectives were developed and reported in our INTSUM.
Though
not specifically cited, South Vietnam’s Joint General Staff was said to
have issued an alert for the end of March based on intelligence
reporting. This implies that our INTSUMs were used by at least one
organization, though it was not an American one!
In
fact, even the ARVN had little idea of the I Corps situation for days
afterwards and the U.S. FRAC commander was caught dumfounded. LTG Ngo
Quang Truong, ARVN I Corps Commander (beginning 3 May 1972) wrote,
“Although there was general agreement in the intelligence community –
Vietnamese as well as American – that an offensive in early 1972 was
highly probable, some observers of the Vietnam scene, perhaps those not as well informed as those of us privy
(my emphasis) to the most reliable estimates, were influenced more by
what seemed to them to be the illogic of a major North Vietnamese attack
at this time.”[7]
Our
reporting was ignored until after the offensive began on the morning of
30 March 1972. The exact time the Easter Offensive started depended on
where you were located. One thing is certain, the NVA had acquired the
M46 130mm Field Gun from the Soviets and they used it throughout the
morning and very accurately.
In
the first few hours of the Offensive, the first two Americans died.
Both were US Army Security Agency soldiers assigned to the 407th Radio
Research Detachment/8th RR Field Station. Bruce A. Crosby, Jr., and Gary
P. Westcott were both working atop FSB Sarge when a rocket apparently
blew up their bunker, killing them both.
As
it was, the MACV commander, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, the
MACV J-2 and others were visiting their wives out of country. The
Secretary of Defense was headed for Puerto Rico to play golf and the
Senior Advisor of Team 155 to 3rd ARVN was also headed out the same
morning that the Offensive began. The South Vietnamese warning was
obviously not believed or didn’t make it into the U.S. command elements
anywhere in the country.
Just
below the DMZ, the newly organized 3rd ARVN Division occupied the
northern and western firebases. The 2nd ARVN Regiment was taken whole
from the 1st ARVN Division, while the 56th and 57th ARVN Regiments were
entirely new 3rd ARVN Division units, composed of deserters and
malcontents from within South Vietnam.
In an odd twist of fate (or design), 3rd ARVN’s 56th and 2nd Regiments were coincidently
turning off their comms and swapping firebases when the NVA began their
extensive artillery preparation of the battlefield, which began the
invasion. The problem-plagued 56th Regiment was to occupy the western
and northwesterly facing firebases to lessen the effects of something
called “firebase syndrome,” after having only spent a few months in one
of the northern firebases! Both regiments were on the road when the
shelling began – well exposed in the open to NVA artillery.
Eventually,
elements of the 56th ARVN reached Camp Carroll, the lynchpin of the
western firebases and the major artillery support location in northern
South Vietnam.
We
were the only unit providing current intelligence for the first few
weeks of the Offensive – primarily due to the bad weather across
northern I Corps keeping winged-aircraft away and because FRAC was no
longer in the intel business. Knowing that the USN destroyers were
providing gunfire support in the waters off the DMZ (e.g., the USS
Buchanan, DDG 14, in its resolute support of Captain Ripley and the Dong
Ha Bridge), we tried to provide them with our INTSUMs (via the FRAC and
NILO, who also supported the local SEALs). We also knew the destroyers
would be in contact with PACFLT, who would also converse with MACV about
the current situation.
The first day of the Offensive quickly became a Friday and a Saturday heralding the beginning of April and there was proverbially no rest for the weary. By Saturday, every ARVN firebase north of the Cam Lo River had fallen, from where the 57th ARVN had already been routed. But the first Sunday of the month (2 April 1972) was to be the most memorable.
Three key events were to occur within 1 ½ hours of each other on this Easter Sunday afternoon of 1972.
The
first major incident occurred at 1520 when the LTC Phan Van Dinh
surrendered all of his 56th ARVN Regiment at Camp Carroll to the 24th
NVA Infantry Regiment/304th NVA Infantry Division and a tank company.
The exploits of LTC Camper and MAJ Brown, who tried to convince LTC Dinh
not to surrender are well-known. Dinh’s cowardice didn’t end with his
surrender of Camp Carroll, as the next day he broadcast on Radio Hanoi
to the military in South Vietnam to lay down their arms because the NVA
was sure to win. The fall of Camp Carroll compelled the firebase at Mai
Loc to be evacuated minutes later as the 66th NVA Infantry Regiment
pressed their attack. The whole western defense line crumbled.
On the U.S. Army side, MG Kroesen wrote several statements in Quang Tri: The Lost Province that
directly bear on this particular event. “The surrender (of Camp
Carroll) has never been explained” and “…unidentified personnel of the
regiment made radio contact with the enemy to arrange surrender terms.”
LTC Dinh was the traitor who made the call and the arrangements. Another
Kroesen error also mentions that the 56th lost two of its battalions
and three artillery batteries, while “a third battalion refused to
surrender and fought its way to Dong Ha.”[8] This statement directly
contradicts Camper and Brown’s MFR, as well as any other known documents
and makes one wonder where this information originated. Not one
battalion even attempted to fight its way out and there was a report
that most of the 56th had been executed in the vicinity of the Rockpile,
northwest of Camp Carroll.
The Rockpile near Camp Carroll
Ironically,
sometimes the press knew more than the generals. For instance, the
Stars and Stripes had this to say about the fall of Camp Carroll. “The
most crushing blow to the South Vietnamese Sunday
was the fall of Camp Carroll, which had been pounded with hundreds of
artillery, rocket and mortar shells since last Thursday. ‘Field reports
said some government troops may have escaped and those left ran up a
white flag of surrender. ‘All American advisors had been evacuated from
Carroll by helicopter just before it fell, sources said. ‘It was not
immediately known whether the four long-range 175mm artillery guns at
Carroll were destroyed or fell into Communist hands.”[9] A battery of
four 175mm guns, a 155mm Howitzer battery, two 105mm batteries and
numerous quad-50s and twin-40s were lost to the enemy. In their haste to
surrender, none of these weapons were rendered useless.
One
of the 175mm guns remains on display in Hanoi. The forfeiture of all
the artillery in Camp Carroll without a fight represented the almost
complete loss of all indirect fire assets in northern South Vietnam,
with the exception of U.S. naval gunfire off the coast.
Even
more outrageously, Kroesen wrote that the surrender of Camp Carroll
“had not shaken the morale or confidence of the other defending forces
to any noticeable degree.” The reverberations of a surrender of a whole
regiment were quickly and keenly felt across the country. American
advisors assigned to II and III Corps have written of the instances of
cowardice and of turncoats after the Camp Carroll surrender occurred in
their areas.
The bridge at Dong-Ha
The
second major incident was the Bridge at Dong Ha, which was blown at
1630, after various contradictory orders. The ARVN leadership didn’t
want the bridge blown in order to use it for a counterattack, but the
3rd ARVN was not up to the task with NVA tanks attempting to cross the
bridge.
Painting depicting Marine Capt. Ripley blowing up the Dong-Ha bridge during the 1972 Easter offensive.
Marine
Captain Ripley and Army Major Smock ended up blowing the bridge after
great difficulty, with the assistance of the USS Buchanan which was
laying close in-shore supporting them. The Buchanan is credited with
destroying at least four PT-76 tanks. Though Team 155 Senior Advisor and
a South Vietnamese I Corps commander (who was not assigned to I Corps
at the time) all credit ARVN for blowing up the bridge, it is obvious
that Ripley and Smock brought the span down under the eyes of the
Buchanan.
Iceal (Gene) Hambleton - Bat-21. His escape was portrayed in a film by the same name with Gene Hackman and Danny Glover
The final major event of that Easter occurred some 20 minutes later, at 1650, when an EB-66, call sign Bat-21, was shot down south of the DMZ by SA-2/Guidelines located SOUTH of the DMZ in South Vietnam.
Only one of the crew made it out of the aircraft, parachuting right
into the attacking 308th NVA Division’s area. An immediate 27km no-fire
zone was automatically imposed around the crewman (an Air Force
lieutenant colonel). As Dong Ha Bridge was just blown, the invading NVA
were forced to move west to the Cam Lo Bridge to cross or ford the Mieu
Giang River, adding to the number of enemy troops in the area.
Though
the no-fire zone was reduced, many enemy troops, trucks and tanks were
able to cross the bridge at Cam Lo because it was not blown for 12 more
days. The no-fly zone was a great matter of concern to ARVN and their
advisors (et al), who chafed at the protection one man was receiving as
the NVA moved without molestation in the area.
These
three major events also show some of the major problems that occurred
in Vietnam. The creation, training, and deployment of the 3rd ARVN
Division was an open invitation to the NVA to strike at the key to the
western firebases. The changing dynamics of the battlefield which
caused Ripley and Smock to act, undoubtedly saved lives by forcing the
NVA to find a crossing to the west. The knowledge that SAMs and AAA had
set-up shop in South Vietnam were known to USAF. The NVA had also
created and improved the road network through the DMZ into South Vietnam
allowing the NVA an easier entry into the South, which was observed and
reported by 1st MIBARS during the year before.
As
can be imagined, contact with our agents became increasingly more
difficult as the Offensive continued, especially the northern most
network in South Vietnam. The NVA divisions roared through the DMZ and
Laos, primarily fighting in a regimental organizational structure.
Dropping the Ball
There
were many senior officers who quite literally dropped the ball in not
embracing the intelligence given them and acting upon it.
We
will begin with COL Donald J. Metcalf, Senior Advisor of Team 155,
advising 3rd ARVN Division. His U.S. War College Paper is an interesting
bit of equivocation. The first few pages have to do with why he
didn't know the Offensive was coming and the role of intelligence. For
instance, “I contend that among all the items of intelligence produced
prior to the attack, a small fraction indicated that such an offensive
might occur, but other equally sizable and equally believable fractions
indicated that something less might occur. ‘The sources available to me
were the G2’s of the 1st and 3rd ARVN Divisions, and the American
estimates produced by XXIV Corps, and they were in general agreement
that the enemy would repeat the dry season activities of previous
years....” Past activity patterns, he wrote “can cloud the observer’s
vision…” and “may have led informed persons in the intelligence
community to give less credence than was warranted to (other)
indications….”[10] A not so nice way of blaming intelligence for the
mistakes of a professional combat commander, it seems.
NVA soldiers taking over one of the northern firebases vacated by ARVN troops during the Easter Offensive
What
COL Metcalf forgot to mention is that one the 571st’s Teams was
co-located on Quang Tri and they were also recipients of our INTSUM, as
well.
Kroesen
states that, “Only a superficial study of the map, the foot mobility of
the enemy, and the history of prior years was needed to conclude that
these preparations would require two to three months.”[11] Yes, general,
but there were many reports of vehicular Ho Chi Minh Trail activity and
of NVA activity above the DMZ and let’s not forget the 1st MIBARS
reports that stated the NVA were expanding and improving roads below
the DMZ, too. As for the history of previous years, one wonders why,
“It’s always been this way” is an excuse? General Kroesen’s FRAC also
received our INTSUMs, though he admits his intelligence capabilities
were limited, one would have thought he would have prized any
information (especially in light of some of his statements).
MACV,
PACFLT, 7th AF, CIA, DIA, JCS, the South Vietnamese JGS and even the
Secretary of Defense had no expectations of a North Vietnamese
offensive. All had preconceptions, helped along by the NVA who showed
the U.S. and South Vietnamese what they expected to see. Americans still
became KIAs and WIAs (as did the ARVN and South Vietnamese Marine
Corps-SVMC), though only a couple of U.S. units remained in-country
after all the U.S. divisions left. The indiscriminate artillery shelling
of thousands of civilians caused thousands of deaths, as well.
One
of the reasons given by some high-ranking individuals was that they
never thought the North Vietnamese would break their agreement of not
striking from the DMZ. This, despite the years of the North Vietnamese
and VC lying only adds to the incredulity that the Easter Offensive of
1972 was allowed to happen.
“(John
Paul) Vann (who commanded II Corps/SRAC), ever the doubting Thomas,
stated on 7 February 1972 that ‘Intelligence gathering is the chief
problem’ and that ‘Nearly all reliable intelligence is limited to US
S.I. (Special Intelligence) Channels.”[12] Don’t listen to all of your intelligence personnel at your peril.
Aftermath
Having
had this HUMINT experience, as I continued my MI career for a few more
years in an all-source, multi-service environment, I found that HUMINT
was often derided by commanders and analysts alike. Just as in Vietnam
(and WWII before it), SIGINT was all knowing and all-important, with
HUMINT relegated to a last-place position. I was to find years later
that the remaining SIGINT units in Vietnam did have indications of some
kind of NVA activity, but none of it was disseminated to other intel
units. The question becomes why weren’t U.S. and ARVN/SVMC units warned?
LTG Michael Flynn, in his The Field of Fight,
wrote about human intelligence and interrogation being “essentially
nonexistent” at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk. He goes
on to mention the “politicization of intelligence” and “don’t deliver
bad news to your leaders” and how this “appears to be going in our
intelligence system today regarding our fight against Radical
Islamists….”[13]
Perhaps we need to relearn our lessons learned, again?
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